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I I
The Supreme Court in a New Role: From Negative
Naysayer to Affirmative Commander*
Arthur S. Miller**
Four major milestones mark the almost two centuries of Supreme
Court activity. The first three are the 1803 power-grab in Marbury,l
the invention of "substantive" due process after the Civil War,2 and the
abdication of the Justices as ultimate economic policymakers in the
1930s and '40s.3 The fourth, and possibly the most significant, is now
clearly evident. Since 1958" the Court at times has been an affirmative
commander as well as a negative naysayer. On occasion, the Justices
tell other government officers what they must do to have their actions
jibe with the fundamental law, rather than what they cannot do. The
Court has become a commander. This article outlines that portentous
development.
At the outset, I recognize the semantic problem: a naysaying deci-
sion can be considered to mean that the Justices chose affirmatively to
pursue certain values. For example, by striking down a statute-say,
one providing for minimum wages and maximum hours in employ-
* Copyright 1981 by Arthur S. Miller. This article is an adaptation of a chapter
to appear in the author's forthcoming book, ORACLE IN THE MARBLE PALACE:
POLITICS AND THE SUPREME COURT, to be published in 1982 by Greenwood Press.
** Professor Emeritus of Law, George Washington University.
1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
2. Recounted in A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN CAPITALISM
50-62 (1968). See also J. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM (1924);
McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and
Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 34.
3. The turning point came in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937), and in National Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S.
1 (1937).
4. The new posture of the Court first became explicit in Cooper v. Aaron, 358
U.S. 1 (1958).
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ment-the Court in the 1890-1937 period could be said to have made a
"must do" pronouncement on corporate rights and to have furthered
business expansion even at the expense of the working class. The se-
mantic problem exists, but my point is different. The Justices in recent
years have begun openly and expressly to command, by issuing opinions
couched in language of affirmative duty laid upon political officers. In
these instances, there is no need to infer a command (as in the employ-
ment decisions); it is flatly stated in plain language.
This is a constitutional revolution of the first water. Although it
was not announced as such, the Court moved in an entirely new direc-
tion without fanfare. It tried to make the new posture appear a mere
variation on what had gone before; the Court was doing only what
judges had long done. That is far from true; nothing quite like it
has been seen in American history (nor in the history of any other na-
tion). The Justices became a defacto council of elders. By asserting the
right and the power to say what the law is (as in Marbury) they have,
through time and because of widespread acceptance, become able to
say what the law should be. Rather than being "mere umpires," they
now are able to be, in Justice William Brennan's words, "law-
makers-a coordinate branch of government."" The implications of this
development have not yet been seen; there is little reason to think that
the Court will not attempt to carve out an even larger role for itself in
the future.
There is another way of looking at this development. During the
heyday of what I have called the Constitution of Rights or of Quasi-
Limitations,' the Court chose to emphasize certain rights of personhood
which it attached to economic collectivities. It did so by denying the
government the power to intervene into economic matters. The Justices
spoke in terms of individualism and of laissez-faire. Today there is at
least tacit recognition that the basic unit of society is the group. Conse-
5. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 595 (1980) (concur-
ring opinion).
6. In my book, supra note *, I posit that the United States has had four constitu-
tions: the Articles of Confederation, the Document of 1787, as amended (herein called
the Constitution of Rights or of Quasi-Limitations), the Constitution of Powers, and
the Constitution of Control. See A. MILLER, DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP: THE EMER-
GENT CONSTITUTION OF CONTROL (1981) for further discussion.
Nova Law Journal 6: 1981 1
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quently, a concept of status is emerging in constitutional law.' The task
of the Court is to effect the nexus, within the scope of constitutional
values which they identify and articulate for and by themselves, be-
tween the individual and the groups (including the nation-state itself)
of a bureaucraticized society. This means that the Court has collectiv-
ized constitutional law. One aspect of such collectivism is the propen-
sity, by no means always employed, to issue decrees couched in lan-
guage of affirmative command. The Justices are attempting to preserve
the values of individualism in a group-dominated nation. In order to do
that, they have had to invent new ways of looking at old problems.
They know that in some manner the stability of "the system" depends
on siphoning off social discontent. Since those in positions of authority,
both public and private, are not likely to police themselves, and are
unlikely to alter the system even minimally, the Court steps in and does
so. In doing that, the Justices act as surrogates for those who benefit
most from the system.
One example will suffice to illustrate the point. In Green v. School
Board," a 1968 decision involving school desegregation, the unanimous
Court used language of duty: "Brown II [the second, implementing de-
cision of Brown v. Board of Education] was a call for dismantling of
well-entrenched dual systems tempered by an awareness that complex
and multifaceted problems would arise which would require time and
flexibility for a successful resolution. School boards such as respondent
[in Green] then operating state-compelled dual systems were neverthe-
less clearly charged with an affirmative duty. . . to convert to a uni-
tary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root
and branch."
No prior court opinion contained language charging administrative
officers with "an affirmative duty" to do something. Thus Green went
far beyond the traditional decisions of the Supreme Court. An express
command aimed at school officials, Green meant that the Justices had
openly entered the political arena, overtly taking part in the travail of
society. The movement was from adjudication (settling only the dis-
7. See Phillips, Status and Freedom in American Constitutional Law, 29 EMORY
L.J. 3 (1980).
8. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
9. Id. at 437-38 (emphasis added).
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putes of the parties at bar) to legislation (stating rules for the public at
large or at least for those similarly situated to the parties in court). It
was a constitutional revolution of the first magnitude. There were fore-
runners to Green, to be sure, but none used the express words "affirma-
tive duty."10
The Court makes no pretense in such decisions. In philosophic
terms, the Justices have become telocratic; they openly admit as much.
The rules of law they promulgate are instrumental, i.e., goal-seeking,
while most Americans have long believed that the United States is
nomocratic, i.e., rule-governed. That belief, that basic myth, has now
become more than threadbare; it simply is not true. In constitutional
matters the emperor has no clothes."i A government of laws, not of
men, has never characterized the United States. (To the extent it does
so today, it hampers rather than helps the resolution of public-policy
problems.) 2 Telocracy, furthermore, has always been apparent in the
Court's work; the real question is which purposes it was pursuing.
There are, however, two major differences between yesteryear and to-
day. First, the Court is now openly and outwardly purposive; and sec-
ond, it has broadened the reach of its decisions to cover many more
people.
The Justices choose constitutional questions to decide, not to fur-
ther the interests of the litigants, but to develop the general law. Chief
Justice Fred Vinson reminded lawyers in 1949 that "you are, in a
sense, prosecuting or defending class actions; . . . you represent not
only your clients, but tremendously important principles, upon which
are based the plans, hopes and aspirations of a great many people
throughout the country." 13 In a true class action, one plaintiff actually
10. For recent discussion, see J. BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES 308-09 (1981).
11. Cf. Kurland, Ruminations on the Quality of Equality, 1979 B.Y.U.L. REv.
7, 8: "[W]e are repeatedly told by the courts that the current egalitarianism which
they are helping to impose derives from the Constitution. That, I think, is arrant non-
sense. It is not being taken from the Constitution, it is being put into it." See also
Forrester, Are We Ready for Truth in Judging?, 63 A.B.A.J. 1212 (1977).
12. "[I]n 1960-80 America became a nation of laws instead of men. The country
had previously thrived by being exactly the opposite, although its lawyers wrote books
pretending it wasn't." 277 THE ECONOMIST (London), No. 7165, Dec. 27, 1980, at 22,
col. 3.
13. Quoted in H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FED-
ERAL SYSTEM 1404 (1953). See also Harlan, Manning the Dikes, 13 RECORD 541, 551
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sues in his own name and on behalf of others similarly situated. In
Brown v. Board of Education14 for example, the immediate litigant,
Miss Linda Brown of Topeka, Kansas, brought suit more for a general
principle than for specific, immediate relief. (Immediate relief, of
course, was also sought, but was not the primary motivation.) Vinson's
remark was an oblique acknowledgment of the Court as legislator, for
often "others similarly situated" do not even know of the lawsuit.
Surely that was true in the Abortion Cases15 and in the controversial
Miranda6 ruling (concerning the rights of a person caught up in ad-
ministration of the criminal law). Although the Court has recently
moved to tighten use of class actions,17 Vinson's point is that all consti-
tutional cases permit judges to rule generally while appearing to do so
only specifically. They are, thus, "backdoor" class actions, 8 and there-
fore not subject to the statutory and decisional limitations imposed on
true class actions. The Justices, not being logicians, have no difficulty
in stating a general rule from the context of one particular case. The
lesson here should be obvious: the Justices, speaking generally, set their
own rules, both in the procedure to be followed and in the substance
(the rules) to be applied. They have constitutional carte blanche and
can go as far as the political process permits them to go.
II
By fits and starts, with some Sisyphean back-pedaling, the mem-
bers of the High Bench are overtly pursuing their ideas of justice. They
(1958) (the Court chooses its cases "in the interests of the law, its appropriate exposi-
tion and enforcement, not in the mere interest of the litigants.") (quoting C.J. Hughes,
S. REP. No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 39 (1937)). I have elaborated on the point in
Miller, Constitutional Decisions as De Facto Class Actions: A Comment on the Impli-
cations of Cooper v. Aaron, 58 U. DET. J. URB. L. 573 (1982).
14. 347 U.S. 493 (1954).
15. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). For
analysis, see Miller & Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary System, and the
Flow of Information to the Justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REV. 1187
(1975), reprinted in A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT: MYTH AND REALITY ch. 8
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Miller & Barron].
16. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966).
17. E.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
18. For brief discussion, see Miller & Barron at 1193.
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do not seem to be bound by pre-existing rules.19 The consequence, as
might be expected, is obvious: ideas of justice, of good public policy,
differ among the nine Justices. I do not suggest this is a new situation,
but some Justices now openly admit that they are law-makers and must
at least try to accommodate the conflicting interests of a pluralistic so-
ciety. That they are far from successful in the latter goal is revealing
testimony of the shortcomings of pluralism itself as a form of political
order.
The differences between the outward attitude of Justices of yester-
year and those of today are suggested by the following episodes, the
first related by Judge Learned Hand about Justice Holmes and the sec-
ond personal to myself. Said Hand: "Remember what Justice Holmes
said about 'justice.' I don't know what you think about him but on the
whole he was the master craftsman of our time; and he said, 'I hate
justice,' which he didn't quite mean. What he did mean was this. I
remember once when I was with him; it was on a Saturday when the
Court was to confer. It was before he had a motorcar, and we jogged
along in an old coupe. When we got to the Capitol, I wanted to provoke
a response, so as he walked off I said to him, 'Well, sir, good-bye. Do
justice!' He turned quite sharply and he said, 'Come here, come here.' I
answered, 'Oh, I know, I know.' He replied, 'That is not my job. My
"120job is to play the game according to the rules'.
Holmes had the nineteenth-century view. (It is interesting to com-
pare that episode with his 1873 candid acknowledgment that the rules
were not neutral.)21 He simply did not care about trying to help rectify
some of the injustices of the world. "Savage, harsh, and cruel," as Pro-
fessor Grant Gilmore described him,2 he was quite willing as a Justice
on the Supreme Court to aid "the rich and powerful [to] impose their
19. See Kurland, supra note 11; Forrester, supra note 11. Cf. R. BERGER, Gov-
ERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977).
20. Quoted in M. MAYER, THE LAWYERS 490 (1967) (paperback ed. 1968).
21. See Comment, The Gas-Stokers' Strike, 7 AM. L. REv. 582 (1873), dis-
cussed in Tushnet, The Logic of Experience: Oliver Wendell Holmes on the Supreme
Judicial Court, 63 VA. L. REv. 975, 1029-31 (1977). See also Tushnet, Truth, Justice,
and the America Way; An Interpretation of Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies,
57 TEX. L. REv. 1307 (1979).
22. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 49 (1977).
Nova Law Journal 6:19811
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will on the poor and weak." 23 His was a harsh and gloomy universe;
and although he knew quite well that playing the game "according to
the rules" gave judges great leeway, he was unwilling to make the
mental leap into considerations of justice and fair play.
The modern, albeit publicly unacknowledged, conception is that of
Justice Hugo L. Black, a man whose cosmology made him an inheritor
of the ideals of the Enlightenment. He saw in the Court-not consist-
ently, to be sure, but often-a means whereby something more than the
nebulous Holmesian rules could be employed. In 1959, I had an oppor-
tunity to speak with him in his chambers in the Marble Palace. The
room was piled high with books, almost cascading off his desk, most of
which dealt with philosophy and history and economics rather than
with law as a technical doctrine. Black, a gracious man, spent an hour
discussing the work of the Court and his role. With some reluctance, I
finally got up to leave, for he obviously was a busy and hard-working
man. As we walked to the door, I turned and shook his hand, and asked
a final question: "What, sir, do you conceive your basic task to be?" I
don't know what I expected, but what came back was this: his eyes
blazed, his right hand shot into the air, and without hesitation he fer-
vently said, "To do justice!"
It would be wrong, of course, to infer too much about either epi-
sode. Black's answer to my question, nonetheless, does seem to epito-
mize the Court's new jurisprudence, the open desire, not always fol-
lowed, to do justice or achieve fairness in individual cases-and thus to
promulgate a general norm (or norms) of justice as fairness. It is not
an invariable practice. At times some members of the present Supreme
Court proceed in the opposite direction.
Justice William Rehnquist is perhaps Holmes' intellectual heir in
his attitude.24 Consider in this connection Rummel,25 decided by a bare
5-4 majority in 1980. In an opinion written by Rehnquist, a Texas law
was upheld that made a life sentence mandatory when a person was
convicted of three felonies. Texas' criminal law is notoriously harsh.
Rummel's three offenses involved a total sum of $229.11 (forgery,
23. Id.
24. For Justice Rehnquist's views, see Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Consti-
tution, 54 TEx. L. REv. 693 (1976). For early discussion of Rehnquist's ideology, see
Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REv. 293 (1976).
25. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
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wrongful use of a credit card, and not fulfilling an air-conditioning con-
tract). The life sentence, Rehnquist concluded, was not a cruel and un-
usual punishment proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. Maintaining
that he was proceeding according to the rules and that the relevant rule
was the Texas law, Rehnquist forgot (or simply ignored the fact) that
the rule-the Texas law-was the very question at issue.
Most Justices today do not pretend, as did Rehnquist, that consti-
tutional law is a game to be played-in Holmes' words--"according to
the rules." Unabashedly making law, they often seem to strain for the
"just" result. The problem is that no one, on the High Bench or else-
where, has yet produced a workable definition of justice in the context
of Supreme Court law-making. Hence sharp splits develop on the
Court, as in Rummel, and as in the well-known decision concerning
Allan Bakke's application for admission to the University of California
medical school.26 The school had a policy of preferential admissions for
blacks and other disadvantaged people. When Bakke got to the Marble
Palace, the Justices again narrowly split, and produced a Solomonic
decision: Bakke would be admitted to the school, but race could be
used as one of the criteria for future admissions. The net result was
that white Americans (represented by Bakke) as well as black Ameri-
cans (the disadvantaged generally) were each given at least a partial
victory. My point is not to argue the pros and cons of Bakke, but to
suggest that it, and others, reveal a marked propensity even in the Bur-
ger Court to follow Justice Black's cri de coeur: "Do justice!"
By no means is telocracy, avowedly pursuing a given goal and do-
ing justice, publicly admitted by the High Bench. The pretense still
exists that Holmes' prescription of nomocracy prevails. A failure to see
through the pretense, accepting at face value what the Justices say in
their opinions, impairs detection of reality and at times leads learned
scholars into serious errors of judgment. Bertrand de Jouvenel, the
well-known French political theorist, is an example:
Nomocracy is the supremacy of the law; telocracy is the supremacy
of purpose. Modern institutions [i.e., Western] were developed
around the central concept of law. Individual security is assured if
the citizens are not exposed to arbitrary acts of the government,
26. University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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but only to the application of the law, which they know. . . The
guarantees of such a regime are precious. But institutions of a judi-
cial type are not [designed] for action.2 7
He went on to say that what "distinguished contemporary government
is its vocation for rapid social and economic progress. . . .Once gov-
ernment activity has a relatively precise goal, the regime's inspiration is
telocratic and political forms necessarily reflect this.128
De Jouvenel was not speaking of the Supreme Court of the United
States, but his views are nonetheless relevant. They display a faith in
nomocracy, in "the supremacy of law." That supremacy, however, has
never existed in the United States (or elsewhere).29 He doubtless was
correct in describing contemporary government, but surely he erred in
asserting that it was a new development. Telocracy is novel only in the
express acknowledgement of it by all branches of government. Law in
America since the earliest colonial days has been instrumental, i.e.,
goal-seeking or telocratic. Professor Morton Horwitz's conclusions
about the common law are equally accurate for constitutional law:
By 1820 the legal landscape in America bore only the faintest
resemblance to what existed forty years earlier. While the words
were often the same, the structure of thought had dramatically
changed and with it the theory of law. Law was no longer con-
ceived of as an eternal set of principles expressed in custom and
derived from the natural law. Nor was it regarded primarily as a
body of rules designed to achieve justice only in the individual case.
Instead, judges came to think of the common law as equally re-
sponsible with legislation for governing society and promoting so-
cially desirable conduct. The emphasis on law as an instrument of
policy encouraged innovation and allowed judges to formulate legal
27. de Jouvenel, quoted in Kelly, Who Needs A Theory of Citizenship?, 108
DAEDALUS No. 4, at 21, 25 (Fall 1979).
28. Id.
29. In making this statement, I am referring in the main to the highest levels of
government, although it must be noted that most administrators have some discretion.
For a statement by a knowledgable Washington lawyer, see C. HORSKY, THE WASH-
INGTON LAWYER 68 (1952).
13
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doctrine with the self-conscious goal of bringing about social
change."0
That statement, particularly the last sentence, describes remarkably
well what the Supreme Court and other courts have been doing for at
least a generation.
The change, thus, is not from nomocracy to telocracy, but in the
recent open avowal of pursuit of social goals by officers in all segments
of government. Congress, for example, by enacting the Employment
Act of 1946,31 expressly called for policies that furthered the economic
well-being of the people. Other statutes have delegated authority to
agencies and bureaus to help fulfill that very purpose. The President's
annual budget and economic messages to Congress are a conscious ef-
fort to tinker with the economy for telocratic purposes. And the Su-
preme Court has had a major role in the new (open) posture-first, by
validating new powers of Congress in socio-economic affairs (the so-
called constitutional revolution of the 1930s); and second, by rendering
decisions that are themselves telocratic. "It is of the very nature of a
free society," Justice Felix Frankfurter once maintained, "to advance
in its standards of what is deemed reasonable and right."3 2 Today, it is
deemed reasonable and right, even necessary, for all branches of gov-
ernment to pursue social welfare ends. The pretenses of the past have
been cast aside. Law has become obviously instrumental. To be sure,
disagreement occurs (at this writing, for example, in the details of
President Ronald Reagan's economic programs); but it, at least out-
wardly, is about means rather than ends. Very few dispute that govern-
ment has some role to play in socio-economic affairs; even the Reagan
"supply-side" economics is being promoted as a means of helping all of
the people (not just the affluent, who would be the immediate
beneficiaries).
The legal theory for the new posture was suggested many years
ago by Leon Duguit: "Any system of public law can be vital only so far
as it is based on a given sanction to the following rules: First, the hold-
30. M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 30
(1977).
31. 60 Stat. 23 (1946). For discussion, see E. RosTow, PLANNING FOR FREE-
DOM (1958).
32. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
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ers of power cannot do certain things; second, there are certain things
they must do."' 33 Formal constitutional law from 1789 to 1937 evolved
for the most part around the "cannot do" of that formulation, making
the Constitution one of "rights" or of "limitations." Since 1937, the
"must do" aspect has been slowly emerging.
When the Court validated the New Deal in the 1930s and '40s, it
confirmed, rather than wrought, a revolution in American government.
The High Bench caught up with the political branches of government.
Each branch became an active participant in the travail of society- At
first, the Justices were not fully aware of what they were doing; but the
new form of government-the emergence of an operative Constitution
of Powers3 -- quickly made it evident that not even judges could stay
aloof from or forever block the tides of social change sweeping through
the nation. Writing in 1908, Woodrow Wilson perceived the need for a
common purpose among those who govern. Once it is conceded, as
surely it must be, that courts are an integral part of the governing pro-
cess, then his comment is particularly apt: "Government is not a body
of blind forces; it is a body of men, with highly differentiated functions,
no doubt, in our modern day of specialization, but with a common task
and purpose. Their cooperation is indispensable, their warfare fatal."3 5
Although Wilson was speaking of the President and Congress, his ob-
servation fits the Supreme Court as well. Judges are not so much inde-
pendent from other branches of government as they are cooperators
with them. Rather than being separate and apart, they stand squarely
in the mainstream of politics. And that is so whether their actions lend
legitimacy to politicians' goals, or quitely enable the political process to
continue, or even impede some actions of political officers by declaring
those invalid. Judges have an ongoing political function to perform.
An understanding of the flow of constitutional decisions, from the
Supreme Court and elsewhere, requires inquiry into trends of doctrinal
development in both the formal and the operative Constitutions. Trend
analysis involves starting in the past, discussing interim developments,
and projecting into the future. That can be done on several levels: the
33. L. DUGUIT, LAW IN THE MODERN STATE 26 (H. Laski trans. 1919).
34. So labelled by E. CORWIN, A CONSTITUTION OF POWERS IN A SECULAR
STATE (1951).
35. W. WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 56-57
(1908).
16:1981
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evolution of specific constitutional principles, the structure of govern-
ment itself, and the relationship of government vis-a-vis the citizenry.
The last is our present focus.
The fundamental trend, as has been said, is from ostensible
nomocracy to avowed telocracy. In politics, the change is from the neg-
ative, nightwatchman State to the positive State; in economics, it is
from laissez-faire to regulation "in the public interest," and in law, the
rule of law has been redefined from a seemingly static system of immu-
table principles to a dynamic, open-ended stream of decisions. Each
change merits discussion, not separately but together.
Less than a half-century ago the American people crossed over one
of the great constitutional watersheds of their history. In what was
aptly termed a constitutional revolution, judicial approval was accorded
to what most people wanted: governmental intervention in socio-eco-
nomic affairs so as to provide-at least, attempt to provide-minimum
economic security. The positive State came into existence under a third
operative fundamental law-the Constitution of Powers. Government
overtly became responsible for more than minimum internal order and
external security; it assumed obligations of a social-service or welfare
nature.
Whether the new commitments of government can long endure is
by no means certain. Its politics, seemingly settled in the post-World
War II period, are becoming unravelled. That may be attributed to the
slowing down, even cessation, of economic growth, to the depletion of
natural resources, and to the rising demands of people in the former
colonial areas of the world. It comes as no surprise that our welfare
programs precipitate tensions verging on violence. We are witnessing,
in John Kenneth Galbraith's terms, the "revolt of the rich against the
poor" 36 as a type of counter-revolution to the increasingly insistent de-
mands of the underclass (both in the United States and elsewhere).
Professor Lester Thurow has labelled the new politics "the zero-sum
society,' 37 by which he means that in a slow or no-growth economy any
important economic benefit for one segment of society requires a con-
comitant sacrifice elsewhere. Hence the zero-sum game: it is one in
which all cannot win. "In the past," Thurow says, "political and eco-
36. Galbraith, How to Get Ahead, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS 12, 14 (July 19, 1979).
37. L. THUROW, THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY (1980).
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nomic power was distributed in such a way that substantial economic
losses could be imposed on parts of the population. . . . Economic
losses were allocated to particular powerless groups rather than spread
across the population. These groups are no longer willing to accept
losses and are able to raise substantially the costs for those who wish to
impose losses upon them.""8 The groups include blacks and other ethnic
minorities, workers, women and consumers. But business interests re-
main powerful; the result is a creeping political paralysis. Whether and
how that Gordian knot of the American political economy can be-cut
may well be the central constitutional question of the day.
Galbraith and Thurow, without doubt, are correct. Their message
is well worth pondering, for what they say is that the telocracy that has
characterized government for the past several decades may no longer
be possible. The economic pie is shrinking; of that there can be no real
question. Even so, whatever the outcome of struggles already begun
and certain to continue, the commitment of government to general eco-
nomic security remains. Congress still sets the broad policy guidelines,
their administration is left to the bureaucracy, and the judiciary coop-
erates. How long that posture will continue is uncertain. One thing,
however, seems sure: there will be no reversion to the status quo ante,
to the Golden Age of the 1945-1970 period. Americans are entering the
age of limits, of frugality, of scarcity. The ecological trap is closing.
There can be little doubt that the next decade and beyond will be "a
harsher, more exacting, and more perilous age."3 9
Telocratic goals pursued by government may well have to change.
I do not propose to discuss the point further, save in the context of
Supreme Court decision-making. The social milieu is being rapidly al-
tered. Does that mean that the instrumentalism of the Justices, so evi-
dent since 1937, will be altered so that different goals are pursued?
Can human dignity, defined as the realization of basic human needs,
survive and be enhanced in a "steady-state" economy? Can, in other
words, the Court help effect the transition from the now-defunct
Golden Age to "the lean years"'40 with a minimum of stress on existing
38. Id. at 12.
39. P. DUIGNAN & A. RABUSHKA, THE UNITED STATES IN THE 1980s at xxxix
(1980).
40. See R. BARNET, THE LEAN YEARS (1980).
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institutions and expectations? These are the problems that now face all
governmental officers, including those in the Temple on the Hill,
problems with which they will continue to be concerned as the future
unfolds. No quick technological fix, nor any other similar remedy, is
available. We are in for it, deeply and irretrievably; and it behooves all
who care-and only saints and fools do not-to help in the extrication
of humankind from the crisis of crises-the climacteric-it now con-
fronts. Judges cannot be immune from that effort.
The problem emerges at the very time that the Rule of Law,
historically nomocratic, is being redefined to encompass a telocratic
dimension. Constitutional law was traditionally procedural, telling
government how it must deal with the citizenry. It has now taken on
enough of a goal- or purpose-seeking aspect to conclude that no-
mocracy is no longer an adequate conception of the role of law and
legal institutions. This is not to say that none of the traditional view
remains; of course it does. But it must operate side-by-side with the
new instrumentalism. The United States, thus, has assumed the task,
vastly more difficult than merely enforcing a law known to all (the or-
thodoxy), of deciding what the law ought to be and of making desirable
changes.4
Perhaps the clearest expression of the new Rule of Law came in
1959, in the Declaration of Delhi of the International Congress of Ju-
rists (a group of lawyers from countries outside the Soviet bloc of na-
tions): "The International Congress of Jurists . . recognizes that the
Rule of Law is a dynamic concept for the expansion and fulfillment of
which jurists are primarily responsible and which should be employed
not only to safeguard and advance the civil and political rights of the
individual in a free society, but also to establish social, economic, edu-
cational and cultural conditions under which his legitimate aspirations
and dignity may be realized.'42 To the extent that the spirit, if not the
letter, of the Declaration is accepted, (and it is by a wide range of
American governmental programs) the Rule of Law has come to mean,
41. See Knight, On the Meaning of Justice, in JUSTICE 1 (NoMos VI: YEAR-
BOOK OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR POLITICAL AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY)(C. Fried-
rich & J. Chapman eds. 1963).
42. INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF JURISTS, THE RULE OF LAW IN A FREE SOCI-
ETY 3 (N. Marsh ed. 1960) (emphasis added). See Thorson, A New Concept of the
Rule of Law, 38 CAN. B. REV. 239 (1960).
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in Aristotle's terms, distributive justice as well as corrective justice.
Government, as Duguit said, "must do" certain things of an affirmative
nature.
How, if at all, has the Supreme Court responded to that version of
the Rule of Law? The Justices, in the first place, have not announced
any spectacular shift in so many words. However, when some of their
recent decisions are viewed in terms of effects, of social consequences,
rather than as examples of doctrinal exegesis, it may be said that the
Court has indeed accepted at least some parts of the new Rule of Law.
Furthermore, it has contributed to the settlement of some immediate
aims of Americans. Yves Simon once observed that in a democratic
society, "deliberation is about means and presupposes that the problem
of ends has been settled. '43 The Justices have contributed to developing
consensuses on such troublous matters as race relations, 4 abortion,' 5
the church-state relationship, 46 the immersion of the nation in world
affairs,'7 and other critical public policy issues. 8 I do not suggest that
they have solved them. They have not. In those and other areas, the
Justices have moved to catch the conscience of the American people,
and thus to stimulate and keep alive a continuing seminar on vital con-
stitutional matters. If democracy means anything, it means a continu-
ing dialogue among the citizenry on matters of public concern. The
Justices both lead and participate in that dialogue.
The precise turning point to constitutional telocracy can be identi-
fied in Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes' 1937 opinion in a mini-
mum-wage case, West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.49 To Hughes, liberty
meant "liberty in a social organization" which used the law to ward
away the evils of industrialization. From being a limitation on govern-
mental power, the due process clauses of the formal Constitution be-
came at least an invitation, and perhaps a command, for political ac-
43. Y. SIMON, PHILOSOPHY OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 123 (1951).
44. E.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and progeny.
45. E.g., Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and progeny.
46. E.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
47. E.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, - U.S. _, 101 S. Ct. 2972 (1981).
48. Not that the Court has escaped criticism. Far from it. More than 20 bills
were introduced in Congress in 1981 aimed at cutting down Supreme Court power. See
Miller, The Supreme Court Under Fire, Miami Herald, June 28, 1981, at 4E, col. 1.
49. 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
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tion to ameliorate human distress. The command, if such, was couched
in discreet terms, and the idea lay dormant for almost twenty years.
Not until 1955, in the second, implementing decision in Brown v.
Board of Education, did the Justices screw up their courage to tell the
other government officers: "Do this." In that instance, the command
was to integrate black children into public schools "with all deliberate
speed."
Hughes' opinion in Parrish permitted government to actively fur-
ther the cause of the disadvantaged-that is, to use law purposively. It
also, as Professor Edward S. Corwin phrased it, changed the due pro-
cess clauses from limitations on legislative power to "an actual instiga-
tion to legislative action of a leveling character." 50 At what point does
an "instigation" become a command? There is no way to answer that
question. At some time, however, between 1937 and 1955, a new per-
ception of their role was accepted by the Justices.
The Parrish decision, with others, permitted the birth of what I
call the (third) Constitution of Powers, for the Court had constitution-
alized massive interventions into the political economy by Congress and
state legislatures. That third fundamental law still remains as part of
the operative Constitution; it is a layer on the palimpsest that is the
Document of 1787. It was not that the (second) Constitution of Rights
(of Quasi-limitations) was completely shunted aside and supplanted; it
now had to share top billing with the third Constitution. (A fourth fun-
damental law-the Constitution of Control is now becoming visible.)5
III
It is. "an axiom of statesmanship," Henry George once observed,
"that great changes can best be brought about under old forms. 52 So
with the formal words of the Constitution: they remain the same, but
only as a facade, beneath which lies a radically different living reality.
50. E. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 161 (1948) (emphasis omit-
ted).
51. See A. MILLER, DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP: THE EMERGENT CONSTITU-
TION OF CONTROL (1981); Miller, Reason of State and the Emergent Constitution of
Control, 64 MINN. L. REV. 585 (1980).
52. H. GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY 404-05 (1879).
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The emergence of a Constitution of Powers meant that structural
changes came without amendment of the Constitution of Rights. Two
of them are well known: the shift in the federal system toward a consol-
idation of national power, and increased flow of power within the gen-
eral government toward the presidency (and the bureaucracy). Nor was
this a sudden development. Much of American history evidences the
low beginnings of both changes. By 1950 it had become clear beyond
doubt that both were permanent alterations in the allocation of govern-
mental powers. (That is so despite some recent attempts, as in the 1976
decision in National League of Cities v. Usery,53 to resurrect historical
federalism.)
I do not propose to discuss either federalism or the rise of execu-
tive hegemony here. My interest lies in what has happened and is hap-
pening to the Supreme Court. The Justices have moved on several
fronts to meet the challenges of the modern era. They have not re-
mained quiescent, but have become active participants in the arena of
politics. Examples are easily found: racial segregation; apportionment
in state legislatures (and in the U.S. House of Representatives); the
rights of women, aliens, children and illegitimates; administration of
the criminal law. Taken together, they tend to validate, at least par-
tially, McGeorge Bundy's comment that "The fundamental function of
the law is to prevent the natural unfairness of society from becoming
intolerable.""M The core of many recent decisions of the Court is the
equality principle, writ large, and a concept of justice as fundamental
fairness.
Under its new jurisprudence, the Supreme Court acts as a com-
mander, not in the sense of having enforcement power of its own
(which it does not), but by stating norms that purportedly bind the
entire nation. By becoming a commander, and getting away with it, the
Justices have assumed an even larger role. What that might be is sug-
gested elsewhere.55 Suffice it for now to state that the Court as legisla-
tor is now well, if not fully, accepted. People throughout the United
States look to the Temple on the Hill for guidance, if not for ultimate
53. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
54. Quoted in M. MAYER, supra note 20, at 516.
55. See, e.g., Miller, In Defense of Judicial Activism, in SUPREME COURT Ac-
TIVISM AND RESTRAINT (S. Halpern & C. Lamb eds.) (to be published in 1982); A.
Miller, supra note *, ch. 11.
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resolution, in some of the more troublous problems they confront.
Anguished protests come, of course, from those whose oxen have been
gored by the very idea of the Court as commander, protests not unlike
those suffered by Chief Justice Marshall. They too will fade away. The
Justices' position as a necessary constituent of government is too solidi-
fied to be altered. The Court is needed, badly needed, by the frag-
mented and alienated populace trying to navigate the white rapids of
the climacteric of humankind lying dead ahead. I do not suggest, now
or later, that the Court can or will do this alone. That, of course, is a
manifest impossibility. But the Justices can light a candle rather than
standing aside and cursing the darkness of the coming Age of
Frugality.
IV
The new judicial posture built in the last generation or so revolves
around the concept of "positive freedom." To explain it requires refer-
ence to a long forgotten English philosopher, Thomas Hill Green, who
wrote in the latter part of the nineteenth century. To him, the notion of
positive freedom reflected the rediscovery of the community as a corpo-
rate body of which both institutions and individuals were a part, so that
the idea of collective well-being or the common good would underlie
any claim to private right. Ponder that idea for a moment. Can there
be much doubt that claims to private right do give way, under modern
law and policy, to ideas of collective well-being? The community has
indeed been rediscovered. It may be seen in the rise of the State to pre-
eminence, in the successful assertions of national security as justifica-
tions for governmental action, in invocations of the public (or national)
interest by successive Presidents, in the "entitlements" that more and
more Americans consider to be their right. In all these, and more, the
notion of individual autonomy has been supplanted by an inchoate col-
lectivism. Despite much rhetoric to the contrary, few dispute the need
for the change, and fewer would wish to revert to the storied days of
individualism, (which existed more in myth than in reality). It should
be remembered that individualism, far from being inherent in the
human experience, is a latter-day phenomenon, no older than the
French Revolution. Even as a theory or philosophy it is now either dead
or dying both in social affairs and in law. The autonomous man does
not exist as such.
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The development is reflected in American constitutionalism in the
newly-emergent concept of status rights which derive from one's mem-
bership in a group (or groups) and not from some inherent, metaphysi-
cal notion of personhood. 5 An "indivisible" nation pledges "liberty and
justice to all." That may be a mere slogan, a symbol, but we must
always remember that, as Holmes said and Frankfurter often repeated,
"we live by symbols. ' 57 The symbol today is of collective well-being, of
welfare if you will. Green gave the philosophical basis for positive gov-
ernment: social insurance programs that provide the economic means
for more people to be free (if they wish). The duty of government in
this conception is not so much to maximize individual liberty as an end
in itself, but rather "to insure the conditions for at least a minimum of
well-being-a standard of living, of education, and of security below
which good policy requires that no considerable part of the population
shall be allowed to fall." '58 Analysis of governmental programs since the
1930s shows how closely they approximate that requirement. And one
need only refer to the Declaration of Delhi59 to see how some legal
thinking coincides with Green's. It must be remembered, however, that
Green wrote at a time when the economic growth seemed to make his
proposals possible. The history of most of this century is also one of
economic growth. Modern governmental programs were created during
an age of abundance, well before the incipient age of frugality, and
thus well before Thurow's zero-sum society became apparent. That, of
course, makes the task of today's government immensely more difficult.
It is a task, furthermore, that has lately encountered serious intellec-
tual opposition from neo-conservatives generally and from such articu-
late wishful thinkers as philosopher Robert Nozick and economist
George Gilder.60 Both Nozick and Gilder want to create what they
fancy was the world of yesteryear-a free market, non-statist soci-
ety-or failing that, to move toward that end. That they cannot and
will not succeed should be obvious to all.
56. See Phillips, supra note 7.
57. For Holmes, see 0. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 270 (1920); for
Frankfurter, see H. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 148 (1981).
58. G. SABINE, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY 676 (1937).
59. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
60. See R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974); G. GILDER,
WEALTH AND POVERTY (1981).
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No one in government, certainly no Justice, has ever openly
avowed that Green was the patron saint of the Constitution of Powers.
Indeed, it would have been odd had anyone done so. Green was an
obscure academic scribbler, little known outside of England. His ideas,
however, have percolated through other, perhaps lesser minds to be
seized by men of action who never heard of him and who had no inter-
est in abstract ideas as such. But unquestionably Green's views on free-
dom as a social, not individual, right are dominant. He wished to re-
unite the individual with the social order of which he is a member, and
without which his existence has no meaning. Green saw that individual-
ism was running its course, a temporary phenomenon limited in time
and space to a few centuries and the Western world. He also knew that
organizations-the collective body, including the nation itself-were
the new order. Therefore, the individual's freedom is, paradoxically to
some, protected by legal and other institutions that can only be pro-
vided by the community. We have thus outlived the Robinson Crusoe
myth. "When we speak of freedom as something to be so highly
prized," asserted Green, "we mean a positive capacity of doing or en-
joying something worth doing and enjoying, and that, too, something
that we do or enjoy in common with others. We mean by it a power
which each man exercises through the help or security given him by his
fellow men, and which he in turn helps to secure for them."61 In a
phrase, that is a formula for benevolent collectivism-precisely where
Americans are now, at least in the ideal. The ideal, to be sure, has not
been achieved for many; with the incipient age of frugality, perhaps
even fewer will achieve it.
Has the Supreme Court lived up to Green's conception? Only indi-
rectly, as the following examples illustrate. Taken together, the Court's
decisions display a marked tendency toward overt telocracy on implicit
Green lines. Their numbers may be small, but they are of fundamental
significance, both because they reveal beyond doubt a new and signifi-
cant role of the Justices and because they are the principal targets of
the Court's modern critics. To generalize, these illustrations show that
the Court is willing for the first time in American history to give con-
61. T. GREEN, WORKS: MISCELLANIES AND MEMOIR 371-72 (1888). See Phillips,
Thomas Hill Green, Positive Freedom and The United States Supreme Court, 25
EMORY L.J. 63 (1976).
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stitutional protection to some members of certain "discrete and insu-
lar" minorities.6 2 Thus, the Constitution has been extended substan-
tially, but still not completely to "We, the people . ," the opening
words of the Preamble.
Race Relations
The Negro problem, Gunnar Myrdal maintained in his classic An
American Dilemma (1940), is really a problem in the hearts of white
Americans. Except for a brief period, from about the mid-1940s to the
late 1960s, whites have been quite willing to keep blacks in either a
formal or an informal caste system. When slavery was abolished by the
Thirteenth Amendment, the First Reconstruction began. It met an
early death, first in politics and then by judicial decrees limiting Con-
gress' power to enforce the Civil War amendments. In the infamous
Plessy v. Ferguson decision of 1896,63 the Justices legitimated a caste
system, wrapping it in the sugar-coating of "separate but equal," even
though everyone knew that blacks were in fact separate and unequal.
Under the operative Constitution, blacks were kept "in their place."
Peonage was widespread, a form of bondage scarcely distinguishable
from slavery.
That could not last, at least in formal law. No nation that trum-
pets itself as a democracy with "equal justice for all"6 4 can indefinitely
keep a large part of the populace submerged in a status providing little
hope, except for an occasional fortunate escapee, of a better future. But
last it did until the Second World War. The United States, like Great
Britain, could hardly conscript men to fight, and at times die, in the
name of freedom and democracy, only to return them to ghettoes at the
end of hostilities. Nor could blacks be further denied an opportunity for
education and thus for fuller participation in American life. Moreover,
blacks not called into service could not be denied employment in war
industries; this led to President Roosevelt's executive order barring ra-
62. The term comes from the Carolene Products case and Justice Stone's famous
footnote therein. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S.- 144, 153 n.4 (1938). For
discussion, see J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 76 (1980).
63. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
64. This is the slogan carved deeply in the facade of the Supreme Court building
in Washington, D.C.
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cial discrimination in employment. 5 FDR, a true Machiavellian, made
a virtue out of necessity.6"
The main breakthroughs for improving the status of America's
"untouchables" came in the Supreme Court-in the White Primary
Cases,67 in Shelley v. Kraemer6 8 and then in Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation.69 The facade of constitutional law has not been the same since.
Others taking their cue from black Americans made the Court an ob-
ject of pressure-group tactics. The reach of the equality principle has
been extended to other areas. The Supreme Court, supposedly dispas-
sionate, became compassionate. Men, women, and children, with little
or no political influence, found through the judiciary a way to redress
longfelt grievances. Federal appeals Judge J. Skelly Wright said it well:
After pointing out that "great social and political problems [are better]
resolved in the political arena," he went on to say "there are social and
political problems which seem at times to defy such resolution. In such
situations, under our system, the judiciary must bear a hand and accept
its responsibility to assist in the solution where constitutional rights
hang in the balance. '70 We have already mentioned that the Justices
used express language of affirmative duty in the late 1960s in an effort
to eliminate racial discrimination root and branch. What remains for
blacks is not the principle found in the formal Constitution, but one
based on cases and the operative Constitution. The Court may promul-
gate a general norm-a rule of law-but unless it is accepted and
obeyed by people generally it tends to become, if not a dead letter, less
and less significant.
Until they decided that discriminatory motive or intent was not
only important but had to be proved by those alleging discrimination,
the Justices had been remarkably consistent in furthering the cause of
human dignity for black Americans. The basic change, subtle but im-
portant, surfaced in 1976 but was underscored in 1980 in City of Mo-
65. For discussion, see Miller, Government Contracts and Social Control: A Pre-
liminary Inquiry, 41 VA. L. REV. 27 (1955).
66. N. MACHIAVELLI, THE DISCOURSES, Book I, Sec. 9: "A republic or a prince
should ostensibly do out of generosity what necessity constrains them to do."
67. E.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
68. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
69. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
70. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 517 (D.D.C. 1967).
26
Nova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol6/iss1/1
bile v. Bolden.71 In Bolden, black citizens of Mobile, comprising one-
third of the city's population, argued that their vote was unconstitution-
ally diluted because of the city's at-large system of electing the three
city commissioners who governed the city. The system, established in
1911, kept blacks from effective political participation. Six separate
opinions were filed; Justice Potter Stewart, speaking for a plurality, re-
jected the claims. Adverse action on an identifiable group was not
enough, said Stewart; there must be proof that a challenged action was
undertaken "at least in part 'because of', not merely 'in spite of', its
adverse effects upon an identifiable group. '72 Professor Aviam Soifer
ably summed up the implications:
It is as if in 1980 black citizens no longer constitute a discrete
and insular minority. A black citizen's constitutional claim will not
prevail unless he can demonstrate precise intentional discrimination
against himself as an individual or some specific and intentional
official discriminatory treatment of blacks. Otherwise, the promise
of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, and the civil rights
revolution, has either been satisfied or is properly left to the politi-
cians. As we enter the 1980s, it is presumed that we all compete
fairly. When no bad guys can be connected to evil discriminatory
deeds, the Court apparently simply assumes that we all enjoy equal
and fair opportunity.73
The Bolden decision, then, made the Court, as Justice Thurgood Mar-
shall said in dissent, an accessory to the perpetuation of racial discrimi-
nation. His point is well taken. How could Stewart and others who up-
held the Mobile system not have seen what should be obvious to all?
The meaning, for black Americans, seems clear beyond doubt: the
formal Constitution is merging with the operative fundamental law.
Under both, the blacks are slowly reverting to second-class citizenship.
Under the living law of American constitutionalism, the promise of
Brown v. Board of Education and progeny has not been realized. Ghet-
toes remain and unemployment among blacks is highest in the nation.
71. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
72. Id. at 71 n.17. See Soifer, Complacency and Constitutional Law, 42 Omio
ST. L.J. 383 (1981).
73. Soifer, supra note 72, at 389. See Miller, The Court and Racial Bias, Miami
Herald, May 24, 1981, at 1E, col. 1.
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Blacks do not receive, as in Mobile, their fair share of city services. As
for unemployment, one study concluded: "These data fail to provide
support for the popular belief that there has been a significant increase
in the proportion of middle and upper-income Black families in recent
years. If anything, these findings suggest that the proportion of such
families may in fact have declined, that the economic gains of many
blacks may have eroded under the combined effects of inflation and
recession. '"" Many whites want to believe the contrary, but the facts do
not bear them out. While a larger number of blacks have been able to
gain economic and social rewards, most do not, and they are joined by
ever-increasing numbers of Hispanics and poor whites.
The social consequences may well be considerable. Will blacks and
other disadvantaged groups long acquiesce to a condition of operative
apartheid and a growing willingness of the Supreme Court to uphold
it? Justice Marshall ended his dissent in Bolden with a warning that
may be prophetic: He said that a "superficial tranquility" created by
"impermeable" and "specious" requirements that discriminatory intent
must be proven may be short-lived. "If this Court," he concluded, "re-
fuses to honor our long-recognized principles that the Constitution 'nul-
lifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination,' it
cannot expect the victims of discrimination to respect political channels
of seeking redress. '75 Indeed, it cannot. When political avenues are
barred and the Supreme Court does not respond, is there any way vic-
tims can peacefully work within "the system"? None is apparent.
I do not wish to push the point further at this time. It is enough
now to say that the Court's new posture-issuing commands of affirma-
tive duty-poses difficult and as yet unanswered questions. But for
blacks at least, the Court's stance is by no means a one-way street. The
public at large may not disagree with the Court as commander; but
scholars, commentators, and judges themselves have not answered
many questions. Where does the Court get its constitutional right to
issue general rules? How will the rules be enforced? Is the President,
constitutionally charged with the duty of assuring that the laws are
74. Hill, The Illusion of Black Progress, 9 Soc. PoL'Y, No. 3, 14, 24 (1978).
See Miller, Brown's 25th: A Silver Lining Tarnished With Time, 3 DISTRIcT Law. No.
5, -, 22 (1979).
75. 446 U.S. at 141.
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faithfully executed, also under a duty to "execute" the decisions of the
Court? Are Supreme Court decisions of the same rank as a statute so
far as Article VI of the Constitution is concerned (making the Consti-
tution, laws and treaties the supreme law of the land, binding judges in
every state)?
As for the President, if he has a duty to execute judicial decrees, is
it merely moral or political; or does it go further, carrying the implica-
tion that someone can go into court to make him enforce a judicial
decision? Recall that in Cooper v. Aaron,7 6 the Court maintained that
its decisions are "the law of the land. 17 If that means what it says,
then a Supreme Court decision is akin to a statute under Article VI,
and the logical implication is that the President must enforce the deci-
sion. Even though the writ of the Court can now run against the Presi-
dent (as in the Nixon Tapes Case),7 8 no one has yet tried to trigger the
Court to order the President to carry out that duty. The short answer
to the question is that, at best, it is an unsettled constitutional question;
at worst, no one can get the Court to act.
Another question is this: if the Court decision is "law," can some-
one, not a litigant before the Court, be held in contempt of court for
not obeying the asserted general norm? The immediate litigants cer-
tainly can, for the Court's statement of a general norm is a specific
decree aimed at them. Legal theory, however, does not at present make
it a crime, nor does it make a person defying the Court subject to con-
tempt charges, even though he may be within the scope of the actual or
"backdoor" class-action ruling. To illustrate: if the Court holds that
prayers cannot be recited in public schools in a case coming from Ohio,
by no means would school officials be subject to contempt punishment
for not adhering to it in Montana.
Nor does legal theory yet meet the challenge of federal judges act-
ing as administrators. For example, in his sweeping mental hospital and
prison rulings in Alabama, 9 Judge Frank Johnson in effect established
76. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
77. 358 U.S. at 18. To my knowledge, this was the first time that the Court said
that in explicit terms. The decision, thus, marks the point-of departure-for the new
jurisprudence of the Court. It is unique, in that it is the only opinion in Supreme Court
history that was individually signed by all nine Justices.
78. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
79. These are the well-known decisions in Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781
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himself as de facto head of both systems, telling state officials to rectify
admitted grievances on pain of emptying the hospitals and jails. Those
decisions pose crucial questions about the power of federal judges, but
are beyond the scope of this essay. Suffice it to note that Johnson's
orders are the logical extension of the role of the Supreme Court as
commander.
As the Justices continue their open acknowledgment of their new
role, those and other questions will have to be answered. Judicial power
has been enhanced. Perhaps, however, mounting criticism of the Su-
preme Court and an increasing awareness of the intractability of many
questions may cause the Justices to pull back. They have done so, as
noted above, in some cases involving black Americans, but not in others
such as the Solomonic decision in Bakke and the decisions sustaining
"'affirmative action" in employment cases.80 The Court is developing a
new constituency-the "great unwashed" of the populace. Whether
that new base of support will allow the Court to strike out and recog-
nize claims for human dignity depends, however, upon whether those
who are the ultimate (albeit hidden) beneficiaries of judicial ac-
tion-the elites of the nation-are sufficiently acute to perceive that
human rights decisions are in their interests also. On that score one
should not be sanguine. What Gandhi called his greatest problem-the
hardness of heart of the educated-is matched, perhaps exceeded, by
the inherent inability (bordering on stupidity) of many of the moneyed
and propertied to realize where their long-range interests can best be
served.
In final analysis, what the Court can or cannot do for blacks and
others depends on the social milieu. I have written elsewhere that the
ecological trap is closing and that Americans will be fortunate if they
are able to escape realization of Arnold Toynbee's doleful forecast. "In
all developed countries," he asserted in 1975, "a new way of life-a
severely regimented way-will have to be imposed by ruthless, authori-
(M.D. Ala. 1971), and Pugh v. Locke 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976). See John-
son, In Defense of Judicial Activism, 28 EMORY L.J. 901 (1979) for a statement of
Judge Johnson's judicial philosophy. See also Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public
Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281. For discussion of the Wyatt case, see J. LIE-
BERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY 115-128 (1981).
80. E.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
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tarian government." ' We can hope Toynbee was wrong, but there can
be little question that the world is moving rapidly toward a steady-state
economy; two centuries of unprecedented technological and economic
development are drawing to a close. Those two centuries-almost ex-
actly the life span of the American republic-have left an indelible
mark on the mind of modern Americans. Many still believe in the inev-
itability of continuing progress, although few take the trouble to define
that ambiguous word. The Justices and the politicians will have to op-
erate in a social context well described by economist E. J. Misham:
Modern economic growth, and the norms and attitudes it es-
tablishes, have produced a highly complex industrial and urban or-
ganization, albeit one that is increasingly vulnerable largely be-
cause the spread of affluence, the diffusion of the products and
processes of technology, and the sheer rapidity of change, have
combined, unavoidably, to undermine the influence of the complex
of institutions and myths that invested all preindustrial civilizations
with stability and cohesion. The existing libertarian order in the
West is no longer rooted in a consensus that draws its inspiration
from a common set of unquestioned beliefs. The legitimacy of all
its institutions is perpetually under assault. Social order is visibly
disintegrating.82
In some respects, Mishan is confirming Lester Thurow's idea of the
zero-sum society. There is a factor, not mentioned by either, which
when added shows that the ecological trap is not only closing but is
producing a high potential for social tension, even violence. That factor
is simply this: when the expectations of a significant group of people,
e.g., black Americans, are raised so that many believe the rhetoric of
democracy and equality, and when those expectations are dashed as
they have been for blacks, not only is the political order in disarray (as
Thurow says) but the economic system cannot meet their demands
(Mishan and Thurow). The result is a high probability of violence,
which in turn produces harsh repressive measures.
The challenge for all American political institutions is obvious: to
81. A. MILLER, DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP: THE EMERGENT CONSTITUTION OF
CONTROL 151 (1981), quoting Toynbee.
82. E. MISHAN, THE EcONOMIc GROWTH DEBATE: AN ASSESSMENT 265 (1977).
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develop another common set of unquestioned beliefs. It is here that the
Court can be of substantial help. Of course, the Justices cannot do it
alone. But if the disintegration of the social order that Mishan per-
ceives is to be halted and turned around, the Justices cannot shirk par-
ticipating in the task. The same sort of attitude that permitted the Su-
preme Court in 1954 to grasp the nettle of racial discrimination should
prevail for other polycentric social questions. Americans should de-
mand no less from the black-robed justices who work in the Temple on
the Hill.
Legislative Reapportionment
To repeat: Brown and progeny, both judicial and legislative, suc-
cessfully altered the formal Constitution and, during America's Golden
Age, the operative Constitution, because an economy of abundance
characterized the United States. With economic growth slowing or
even ending, the consensus that held the nation together since 1945 is
falling apart. The spinoffs from Brown and the legislative reapportion-
ment cases,83 have made this disintegration both possible and inevita-
ble. The black vote, insofar as blacks vote in a bloc, becomes of great
importance in political campaigns (particularly for the presidency).
The apportionment decisions, mandating one person/one vote, came
precisely when whites began to flee to the suburbs from the large cities.
Not by mere chance did Raoul Berger, among others, single out Brown
and Baker v. Carr,8 4 the key apportionment decision, for particularly
harsh criticism.85 Baker and its aftermath, buttressed by the Voting
Rights Act of 1965,86 made bloc-voting crucial in key cities. People
long bereft of political power could now make their weight felt, particu-
larly in presidential elections where the Electoral College is still used.
(The College works only because of widespread acceptance of the no-
83. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S.
1 (1964). But see City of Mobile v. Bolden, supra note 72, and articles cited in notes
72 and 73 supra.
84. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
85. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977). See also L. CRAGLIA, Dis-
ASTER BY DECREE (1976). Berger's book is the subject of a symposium in 6 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. No. 2, at 403-662 (1979).
86. Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, (codified at 42 U.S.C. § § 1971, 1973-1973p
(1970).
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tion, not in accord with the intentions of the Framers, that electors vote
in accordance with the popular vote.)
Baker emanated from an especially pernicious situation in Tennes-
see, where the state legislature, contrary to the Tennessee Constitution,
had failed to reapportion the legislature for sixty years. That meant
that voters in rural areas had a grossly disproportionate number of rep-
resentatives. After several failed attempts to have the system declared
unconstitutional, the practice became so bad as to offend a majority of
the Justices. In 1962, they ruled that an equal protection violation had
been presented. Two years later the Court went the full distance and
decreed that voting districts had to be as nearly equal in population as
possible, both for state legislatures and the federal House of Represent-
atives.87 The principle was subsequently applied to local governments. 8
Again, a furor erupted, led by academic disciples of Justice Frank-
furter, who thought the Court had not properly reasoned its decisions
and had not exercised a proper amount of self-restraint.8 9 Oddly, how-
ever, unlike the reception of Brown, the apportionment decisions have
been placidly accepted by public and politicians alike. Frankfurter
thought the voters in Tennessee could and should ask state politicians,
in effect, to vote themselves out of office. Even a federal judge who was
once a law professor should have known better. He carried his mistaken
views about judicial self-restraint to absurd lengths. Another dissenting
Justice, John M. Harlan, waxed even more choleric in 1964: he grum-
bled that the one person/one vote decisions "give support to a current
mistaken view . . . that every major social ill in this country can find
its cure in some constitutional 'principle', and that this Court should
'take the lead' in promoting reform when other branches of government
fail to act. The Constitution is not a panacea for every blot upon the
public welfare, nor should this Court, ordained as a judicial body, be
thought of as a general haven for reform movements. . . . This Court
. ..does not serve its high purpose when it exceeds its authority even
to satisfy justified impatience with the slow workings of the political
process."90
87. See cases cited in note 83 supra.
88. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
89. E.g., A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 167
(1970).
90. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 624-25 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
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That statement, to speak gently, is simply not adequate. Not only
did Harlan seek to differentiate a "judicial body" from the "political
process," which for the Supreme Court is at best fallacious, he also
asserted that his colleagues had exceeded their authority. That simply
is not true. Nowhere is it prescribed, in the Constitution, statutes, or
rules of the Supreme Court itself, what the authority of the Court is.
Since almost the beginning of the republic, that authority has been
what the Justices say it is, and what, politically, they can get away
with. Frankfurter and Harlan, furthermore, badly misread the social
tea leaves in their impassioned dissents; people have accepted the
Court's rulings on reapportionment, whether reasoned or not. Ideally, it
doubtlessly would be better if the political process were adequate to
manifest long-denied needs. But at times it is not, as Harlan conceded.
How, possibly, could he and Frankfurter have thought that politicians
would reform themselves and voluntarily give up some of their power.
Surely, Judge Wright's statement 1 is closer to the realities of the con-
stitutional order. For present purposes, the lesson of Baker and progeny
is clear and unmistakable: they classically exemplify an affirmative
constitutional duty imposed by judges upon the political branches of
government. Since 1964 state legislatures have been restructured, at
times after a direct command from a judge. Compliance has occurred.
At this writing, another round of apportionments is taking place as a
result of the 1980 census. The rotten boroughs of the nation have been
easier to eradicate, therefore, than racial discrimination-a lesson to be
pondered when one reflects on the political power of the courts.
The suggestion here is not that the products of state legislatures
after reapportionment differ markedly from the past. It is far too sim-
plistic to believe that legislators vote on a rural-urban split. The reap-
portionment decisions did little to cure the real ills of the political pro-
cess. But the significance of Baker and subsequent decisions lies in the
creation by the Justices of an affirmative duty on the part of politicians
to do certain things, simply because the Justices so read the Constitu-
tion. That the Justices have prevailed is itself an important lesson in
politics as the art of the possible, a lesson that surely can be applied
elsewhere.
91. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
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Other Examples
No need exists to multiply the examples where the Justices have
acted as commander. Sometimes their command is couched in permis-
sive language, as in the 1980 decision allowing patents to be issued for
the creation of new forms of life.92 At other times, they are direct and
pointed. Miranda v. Arizona93 is an example of the latter. One of the
most criticized of all recent decisions, Miranda set forth a code of con-
duct for officers to follow when someone is arrested. Affirmative duties
thus were imposed on police officers throughout the nation, even though
the lawsuit nominally concerned Miranda and the state of Arizona. Mi-
randa was important to the ruling only because, as with divers others
before and after him, he was necessary to trigger the mechanism of the
Court.
Another example is the well-known and controversial rulings in the
Abortion Cases,94 where the Court decreed that a woman had a right
to an abortion limited only by the duration of her pregnancy. A trimes-
ter system was established, under which abortions could not be
prevented during the first three months, while during the second three
months a steadily increasing societal interest in the viability of fetuses
made abortions regulable by the states. During the final three months,
abortions were permissible only in extreme circumstances. Again, a set
of general rules was promulgated; and again, the litigants were
unimportant.
Judges in both federal and state courts caught the cue from the
Supreme Court; they, too, occasionally issue commands. We have al-
ready mentioned Judge Frank Johnson's mind-boggling decrees, that
since Alabama's treatment of mental patients and prisoners violated
the Constitution, the appropriate remedy was complicated administra-
tive procedures established by Johnson. In Boston, Judge Arthur Gar-
rity declared the school system to be in receivership and ordered busing
92. Diamond v. Chakraburty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
93. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
94. I happen to believe that these cases, supra note 15, were decided correctly;
and that those who criticize the Court, particularly Blackmun, J., for the reasoning in
the opinion miss the mark. Other parts of the book from which this article is derived
develop in some detail the idea of reason and its application in judicial decisionmaking.
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to achieve racial integration. 95 As for the states, an outstanding exam-
ple came in New Jersey, where its supreme court ordered the legisla-
ture to enact a financing scheme to improve schools on pain of having
them closed by court order. 6
I do not suggest that Judges Johnson and Garrity or the New
Jersey Supreme Court have been able to translate their bare-bones or-
ders into operational reality. There is a long, long road between judicial
decision and full compliance. What is important for present purposes is
to see the growing willingness of judges to actively intervene in politics
and to command obedience to judicial decrees. One can agree with Pro-
fessor Nathan Glazer that "the courts truly have changed their role in
American life" and have reached deeper into the lives of people than
"they ever have in American history. ' 97 But one need not-one should
not-agree with Glazer when he maintains that this is "against the will
of the people." '98 Some people perhaps, but certainly it is the people
themselves, many of them new types of litigants (the poor, the disad-
vantaged, women, etc.), who are energizing the judiciary. Impotent po-
litically, these people see judges as their final hope. Given this, activist
judges may be the final desperate hope of a crumbling system of Amer-
ican constitutionalism for salvation from its own inequities and incon-
sistencies. The litigants believe the incessant rhetoric about democracy
and the rule of law; they call upon an oligarchic judiciary to further
democratic ends. That may be a paradox, but it is the truth.
95. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974); arfd 509 F.2d 580
(Ist Cir. 1976); cert. denied, sub nom., White v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 935 (1976).
96. Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (Super. Ct. Law Div.
1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973), modified, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973);
119 N.J. Super. 40, 289 A.2d 569 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
976 (1973), modified, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973); 67 N.J. 35, 335 A.2d 6
(1975); 67 N.J. 333, 338 A.2d 193 (1975); 69 N.J. 133, 351 A.2d 713 (1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 913 (1975); 69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129 (1976), 70 N.J. 155, 358
A.2d 457 (1976), modified, 70 N.J. 464, 360 A.2d 400 (1976).
97. Glazer, Towards an Imperial Judiciary, 41 PuB. INTEREST 104, 106 (1975).
98. Id. For criticism, see Miller, Judicial Activism and American Constitution-
alism: Some Notes and Reflections, in CONSTITUTIONALSM 333 (Nomos XXI, J. Pen-
nock & J. Chapman eds. 1979).
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IV
The Court as commander requires affirmative cooperation from
other governmental officers. The Justices can pronounce, but they can-
not administer. Even federal judges in lower courts, such as Johnson
and Garrity, find detailed administration beyond their capacities. So
judges must trust the good will of politicians to carry out their decrees.
That means litigants, too, must trust the good will of politicians. No
doubt it would be better were that not true. Many officers who should
administer the law of the land as stated by the Court, do not; they are
reluctant and often defiant. Even with the best of intentions, which
doubtless many have, administrators also must contend with possible
public disapproval.
That has an important effect. The Supreme Court interprets the
Constitution but politicians, bureaucrats and lower-court judges inter-
pret the Court. Those entrusted with administration ofttimes apply ob-
scure commands. In so doing, they have considerable discretion. This
has long been known, but seldom analyzed in depth. Few have inquired
into the extent of compliance with the Supreme Court's rulings. Judi-
cial opinions do not enforce themselves. In a widely-quoted statement,
Bishop Hoadly said: "Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret
any written or spoken laws, it is he who is truly the lawgiver, to all
intents and purposes, and not the person who first spoke or wrote
them."99 The Justices may have "absolute authority" to interpret the
Constitution, but those interpretations must be transmuted into opera-
tional reality by literally tens of thousands of other governmental of-
ficers who were not before the bar of the Court.
Compliance, thus, often is chancy, especially so when Court opin-
ions are written in opaque language. The Justices, moreover, cannot
possibly predict all of the factual situations that might arise in which
their general norms are applied. Nor can they expect those who are
affected by administrative actions to be aware of what the Court has
said. Ambiguity in pronouncement plus uncertainty in application
makes for uneven administration. Even in the best of circumstances,
lawyers are adept at distinguishing cases, showing that factual situa-
99. Quoted in W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: CASES-COMMENTS-QuESTIONS 1 (5th ed. 1980).
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tions differ in significant ways, to evade even unambiguous judicial de-
crees. Furthermore, constitutional decisions tend to produce new claims
and thus new litigation, with the net result that constitutional law has
become a lawyer's paradise-a fertile area for more and more work for
more and more attorneys. The truly fundamental principles of Ameri-
can constitutionalism are being lost in a swamp of thousands of judicial
rulings; the Supreme Court alone has produced some 450 fat volumes
of reports, all of which are kept in law libraries and computerized files.
To summarize, freedom in the United States is as much positive as
negative in nature. For a person to have freedom to participate and to
attain goals central to the concept of human dignity he must have free-
dom both from the arbitrary exercise of governmental power and from
inadequate social conditions that make it unlikely he can achieve that
level. Courts do help, albeit imperfectly, in dispensing justice. Their
fundamental task now is to help create something wholly new: a Con-
stitution of Human Needs.100
Why judges, some may ask? The short answer is that, as political
as well as judicial officers, they cannot avoid the swirls and currents
engulfing the body politic. Why not legislators and administrators, in-
cluding the President? The short answer is that the system of govern-
ance established by the Constitution is not suited to the demands of our
era. It worked well, by hindsight at least, during the nineteenth and
first part of the twentieth centuries. Today, however, politics are in dis-
array. Serious students speak of the "ungovernability of democracy." 10 1
History since 1789 has seen a steadily expanding franchise and the rise
of decentralized groups that dominate the government, at times even
challenging the State's claim to sovereignty. The name for the political
order is pluralism. In theory, people form groups, and out of the clashes
between them something called the public or national interest is sup-
posed to evolve. That is a romantic conception of politics, far from real-
ity (although some use it to argue that the Supreme Court should have
a lesser role). Political pluralism is Adam Smith economics writ large
100. In a forthcoming book, tentatively entitled GETTING THERE FROM HERE:
TOWARD A CONSTITUTION OF HUMAN NEEDS, I am developing this idea in some
detail.
101. E.g., Professor Samuel Huntington. See Huntington, The United States, in
M. CROZIER, S. HUNTINGTON & J. WATANUKI, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY 59
(1975).
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and transferred to politics. It is no more valid there than in economics.
Why judges? Because there is no alternative, if the American system of
constitutionalism is to be saved.
I am not suggesting, of course, that the Court as commander is
always followed. Far from it. Recent decisions, such as Haig v. Agee
and Dames & Moore v. Regan °2 display a tendency on the part of the
present Justices to defer to the political branches of government. That
posture of deference, of judicial self-restraint, runs counter to the thesis
propounded in this article. Nevertheless, most members of the Court
today were on the bench when Roe v. Wade was decided; of greater
importance, there is no evidence that the Justices will not impose af-
firmative duties in appropriate situations. Certainly, it is true that they
have not repudiated the theory of Cooper v. Aaron° 3 --that their deci-
sions are "the law of the land"-nor of Reynolds v. Sims."" The Jus-
tices have more than an umpire's function, as Justice William Brennan
noted in 1980:
Under our system, judges are not mere umpires, but, in their own
sphere, lawmakers-a co-ordinate branch of government. While in-
dividual cases turn upon controversies between parties, or involve
particular prosecutions, court rulings impose official and practical
consequences upon members of society at large. Moreover, judges
bear responsibility for the vitally important task of construing and
securing constitutional rights ...
The interpretation and application of constitutional and statu-
tory law, while not legislation, is lawmaking, albeit of a kind that is
subject to special constraints and informed by unique considera-
tions. Guided and confined by the Constitution and pertinent stat-
utes, judges are obliged to do discerning, exercise judgment, and
prescribe rules. Indeed, at times judges wield considerable author-
ity to formulate legal policy in designated areas.1°0
102. Haig v. Agee, 101 S. Ct. 2766 (1981); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 101 S.
Ct. 2972 (July 2, 1981). In the same vein, see Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646
(1981).
103. 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
104. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
105. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 595 and n. 20
(1980) (concurring opinion).
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In that extraordinary statement, Brennan acknowledged what I have
argued in this article. First, general principles are inferred from one
particular situation, even though that is logically impossible; individual
cases impose official and practical consequences upon members of soci-
ety at large. Second, the Court is indeed, at times, an affirmative com-
mander; it can formulate legal policy.
While several problems of the new role of the Supreme Court have
been outlined above, the essential question, which Court critics tire-
lessly repeat, goes to the legitimacy of the Court as commander. If, as
the late Professor Alexander Bickel wrote, "Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion was the beginning,"10 6 surely it is accurate to say that we have not
yet seen the end of judicial lawmaking. The form it will take, the issues
that will be involved, may be difficult to predict; but the position of
power of the fourth major development in Supreme Court history is not
one that will soon be abdicated. 10 7
106. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 7 (1970).
107. Cf. White, J., dissenting in Miranda v. Arizona:
The Court has not discovered or found the law in making today's decision,
nor has it derived it from some irrefutable sources; what it has done is to
make new law and new public policy in much the same way that it has
...in interpreting other great clauses of the Constitution. This is what
the Court historically has done. Indeed, it is what we must do and will
continue to do until and unless there is some fundamental change in the
constitutional division of governmental powers.
384 U.S. at 531 (emphasis added).
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The Pan American World Airways-National Airlines
Merger and The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978: A
History and Analysis
Steven A. Stinson*
Introduction
Fifteen months after Texas International Airlines surprised the
commercial aviation community by announcing it had purchased 9.2
percent of the common stock of National Airlines,' the Civil Aeronau-
tics Board [C.A.B.] unanimously approved not only Texas Interna-
tional's merger application, but also the subsequently-filed Pan Ameri-
can World Airways-National Airlines merger application.2 Before the
C.A.B. decision, Texas International agreed to sell its 2.9 million
shares of National Airlines stock to Pan American for a pre-tax profit
of $45,780,000.1 On January 7, 1980, the merger became effective,4
giving Pan American the domestic route system it had sought for 34
* Attorney with the firm of Walton, Lantaff, Schroeder & Carson, West Palm
Beach, Florida. B.A. 1969 Vanderbilt University; J.D. 1972 Vanderbilt University;
M.A.L.S. 1977 University of Michigan, LL.M. Candidate, Institute of Air & Space
Law, McGill University. Member Indiana, Florida and District of Columbia Bars.
1. Wall St. J., July 11, 1978, at 2, col. 2.
2. Texas International-National Acquisition Case/Pan American Acquisition of
Control of, and Merger with National, Docket Nos. 33112, 33283, CAB Order Nos.
79-12-163, 79-12-164, 79-12-165 (October 24, 1979).
3. Palm Beach Post Times, July 29, 1979, § A, at 24, col. 1. As of October 19,
1979, Texas International had sold Pan American 38% of its holdings in National for
after-tax profits of $19.3 million. Pan Am had further paid Texas International three
million dollars for an option to purchase the remaining 1.3 million shares at $50 per
share. Texas International eventually sold Pan Am all of its National stock and real-
ized the expected profit. See A Plucky Challenge to Eastern's Shuttle, Bus. WK., Sept.
22, 1980, at 71; A New Air War, TIME, Sept. 22, 1980, at 72.
4. Application of Pan American World Airways, Inc. for Acquisition of Control
of, and Merger with, National Airlines, Inc., Docket No. 33283, CAB Order No. 80-1-
125 (Jan. 18, 1980).
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years.5 Eastern Air Lines spent $3.4 million in its unsuccessful attempt
to acquire National,6 but after unfavorable decisions from both an ad-
ministrative law judge7 and the full C.A.B.,' dropped out. Tiny Air
Florida also was unsuccessful in its limited merger application.9 Ironi-
cally, the new Pan Am has continued to have problems since the
merger, losing $126.9 million from air transport operations in its first
year of combined operations' ° and another $217.6 million during the
first six months of 1981."
This article will examine what the Miami Herald termed the "big-
gest and most complex airline merger case ever," in which National
Airlines became the "world's most wanted airline."' 2 The multi-faceted
National Airlines case is not only significant in itself; but because it
came at a time when the United States commercial aviation industry
was undergoing great change, primarily due to the drastically altered
5. For a recent history of Pan American, see R. DALEY, AN AMERICAN SAGA -
JUAN TRIPPE AND His PAN AMERICAN EMPIRE (1980).
6. Eastern to Halt Pursuit of National, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 8, 1979,
at 29.
7. Application of Eastern Air Lines, Inc. for Approval of Acquisition of Control
of National Airlines, Inc., Docket No. 34226 (June 14, 1979) (initial decision of Ad-
ministrative Law Judge Richard J. Murphy).
8. Application of Eastern Air Lines, Inc. for Approval of Acquisition of Control
of National Airlines, Inc., Docket No. 34226, CAB Order No. 79-12-74 (Dec. 17,
1979) (dismissing the application).
9. Wall St. J., Feb. 22, 1979, at 29, col. 1. Air Florida, unlike the other appli-
cants, was only seeking permission to acquire National's international routes and four
of its wide-bodied DC-10's. Id.
10. PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC. 1980 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1981).
Actually Pan Am showed a net income of $80.3 million, but this was from the gain of
some $294 million it showed from the sale of its office building in New York City. Id.
11. Merzer, Pan Am Eyes Shifting Base to S. Florida, Miami Herald, Aug. 15,
1981, § A, at 1, col. 5. Pan Am international operations were particularly hard hit by
the astronomic rise in world-wide fuel prices and competition from foreign government-
supported flag carriers as well as American carriers encouraged by the passage of the
International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-192, 94
Stat. 35 (amending 49 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq.).
12. Baron, Now Stockholders Get Their Turn in National Fight, Miami Herald,
May 13, 1979, § F, at 1, col. 5. One reason other airlines were interested in National
was that the asset value of its undervalued stock was between $60-$75 per share.
Therefore, even a purchase price of $50 a share would be a bargain, particularly in
view of National's low debt load. Id.
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regulatory climate, it illustrates the effects of that change.
The C.A.B. initially signalled the pending deregulation,13 which
was greatly expanded and codified in the Airline Deregulation Act of
197814 [A.D.A.]. The A.D.A. changed the public interest test which
the C.A.B. used to make decisions under antitrust statutes,15 delineated
the burden of proof for opponents and proponents of a merger, 6 set
time limits for C.A.B. approval17 and limited the reviewing power of
the President.' It also included labor-protective provisions for workers
adversely affected by the A.D.A.,1 9 and provided for eventual elimina-
tion of the C.A.B.20
After a brief overview of general merger and anti-trust law and
philosohphy, this article reviews pre-A.D.A. airline mergers under the
1938 and 1958 Aviation Acts.21 Next the 1978 A.D.A. is discussed.
The various proposed mergers with National are analyzed, beginning
with brief histories of each of the airlines involved and a chronology of
merger and post-merger events. Finally the various administrative law
13. C.A.B. End Set in Air Deregulation, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1978, § 1, at 79,
col. 1.
14. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705
(amending 49 U.S.C. § § 1301 et seq.). A partial legislative history of the Act may be
found in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3737. For an earlier Senate Report by
the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee chaired by Senator Edward M. Kennedy, the Air-
line Deregulation Act's chief sponsor, see SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRAC. &
PROC., SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., 1st SEss., CIVIL AERONAU-
TICS BOARD PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES (Comm. Print 1975) (hereinafter C.A.B.
PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES).
15. 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (1976 & Supp. 1979).
16. 49 U.S.C. § 1378(b)(1) (1976 & Supp. 1979). Opponents of a merger have
the burden of proof as to the anticompetitive effects and proponents have the burden of
proof that it meets significant transportation conveniences and needs, which may not be
met by less anticompetitive means.
17. 49 U.S.C. § 1490 (Supp. III 1979).
18. 49 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976 & Supp. 1111979). In international cases, the Presi-
dent must base his decision solely upon foreign relations or national defense criteria
and not upon economic or carrier selection criteria.
19. 49 U.S.C. § 1552 (Supp. III 1979). See text accompanying notes 164-76
infra.
20. 49 U.S.C. § 1551 (Supp. III 1979). See text accompanying note 70 infra.
21. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Act of June 23, 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973
and Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, Aug. 23, 1958, 72 Stat. 731.
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judges' decisions and Board orders related to the National merger at-
tempts are discussed and compared with other post-A.D.A. merger
decisions.
Background
Federal Regulation of Big Business
In response to the huge trusts and corporations established in the
last quarter of the nineteenth century by the so-called robber barons,22
the United States Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act" in
1890. In 1914 the Clayton Act24 was passed in an effort to strengthen
22. 54 Am. JUR. 2d Monopolies, Restraints of Trade and Unfair Trade Prac-
tices (hereinafter Monopolies) § 1 (1971), which principally cites Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) and United States v. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351
U.S. 377 (1956).
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (originally enacted as Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat.
209). See generally 54 Am. JUR. 2d Monopolies § § 1-108 (1971); 58 C.J.S. Monopo-
lies § § 17-25 (1948). Basically, 15 U.S.C. section 1 deals with means of monopolizing
and section 2 deals with the results to be achieved. Section 1 states in part: "Every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1. Section 2 states:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any person or persons, to monopolize any part of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be pun-
ished by fine not exceeding fifty thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not
exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the
court.
Id. § 2.
24. The Clayton Act can be found at 15 U.S.C. § § 12, 13, 14-19, 20, 21, 22-27,
and 44, and at 29 U.S.C. § § 52-53. (originally enacted as Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch.
323, 38 Stat. 730). See generally 54 AM. JUR. 2d Monopolies §§ 109-139 (1971); 58
C.J.S. Monopolies § 26 (1948). Rather than being broad and general like the Sherman
Act, the Clayton Act concentrates on certain specified practices that Congress believed
were anticompetitive and permitted economic concentration, but which the various
courts had held to be outside the coverage of the Sherman Act. 54 AM. JuR. 2d, Mo-
nopolies § 1096 (1971). Among the proscribed practices are: discrimination in price,
services or facilities (15 U.S.C. § 13) sale on agreement not to use goods of competitors
(§ 14); with various exceptions, acquisition of stock in one corporation by another cor-
poration (§ 18); interlocking directorates in certain situations (§ 19); purchases by
44
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the Sherman Act. While the Antitrust Division of the Justice Depart-
ment is responsible for federal enforcement of the various federal anti-
trust laws,25 private individuals may also bring suits and seek treble
damages.2 6 But the current political climate is once again favoring big
business; "bigness in business does not necessarily mean badness. 27
Thus, a number of extremely large corporate mergers have taken place
in the last several years. 28
Pre-Deregulation Airline Mergers
The early history of the American commercial aviation industry is
inexorably tied to that of the United States Post Office. The latter pro-
vided funds for airport and airway development and subsidized airmail
contracts. The four big airlines before the Pan Am merger, United,
American, T.W.A. and Eastern, can all trace their present prominence
to this early period. 9 Under the Black-McKellar Act,30 during an in-
common carriers in case of interlocking directorates (§ 20). Private individuals or cor-
porations who are hurt by the above activities may obtain treble damages and reasona-
ble attorney fees (§ 15) or may sue for injunctive relief (§ 26). Also a judgment ob-
tained by the Government under this Act may be used as prima facie evidence of an
antitrust violation in a private suit. (§ 16).
25. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 1978-1979, at 352-53.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 15 states in part: "Any person who shall be injured in his busi-
ness or property by reason of anything forbidden in the Antitrust Laws may sue
therefore. .. ."
27. Alexander, Beckwith & Ungeheuer, Reaching for Conoco's Riches, TIME,
July 27, 1981, at 50, quoting Attorney General William French Smith. For a sampling
of the Reagan philosophy, compare R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT
WAR WITH ITSELF (1978) with MONOPOLY POWER AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (3d
ed. E. Mansfield 1974); RALPH NADER'S STUDY GROUP REPORT ON REGULATION AND
COMPETITION: THE MONOPOLY MAKERS (M. Green ed. 1973).
28. Strout, Merger Action Boom Going Full Steam, Palm Beach Post, Aug. 2,
1981, § FF, at 2, col. 1. The author noted that first quarter 1981 merger bids were a
record $17.5 billion and that 1980 had previously set a record with mergers of $44.3
billion. The largest, Dupont-Conoco at 7.3 billion dollars, took place in 1981. Id.
29. C.A.B. PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES, supra note 14, at 29-35 and 195-215.
In 1938, when the Civil Aeronautics Act became effective, these four airlines ac-
counted for 82.5% of all revenue passenger miles flown and in 1972 they still accounted
for 60% of all revenue passenger miles flown. Id. at 6. See also A. LOWENFIELD, AvI-
ATION LAW, § 1 (1972). For a recent and comprehensive history of commercial avia-
tion in the United States, see C. SOLBERG, CONQUEST OF THE SKIES: A HISTORY OF
411
45
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1981
terim period from 1934 to 1938, the Interstate Commerce Commission
worked with the Post Office Department to regulate airmail contracts.
The Black-McKellar Act also established a five member Federal Avia-
tion Commission to study commercial aviation and make recommenda-
tions to Congress."' The eventual result of these recommendations was
the passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.32 Twenty years later
Congress passed the similar, but expanded, Federal Aviation Act of
1958.
During the forty years the C.A.B. functioned prior to deregulation,
mergers reduced the original sixteen domestic trunk lines to ten." Lo-
cal service carriers, which first came into existence after World War II,
were reduced through mergers from nineteen to nine.35 Between 1938
and 1973, eight domestic trunkline merger applications were denied or
disapproved and fifteen applications resulted in eventual mergers.
Others were withdrawn or dismissed."
Lucile Sheppard Keyes, an economist who has written much on
the subject of economic deregulation of commercial aviation, traced the
COMMERCIAL AVIATION IN AMERICA (1979).
30. Act of June 12, 1934, ch. 466, 48 Stat. 933. This Act provided competitive
bidding for airmail contracts, curtailed the Postmaster General's discretion in letting
contracts, placed a ceiling on total airmail route miles authorized, gave responsibility
for contract modifications to the I.C.C., outlawed aviation holding companies and lim-
ited the number of contracts each airline could have. C.A.B. PRACTICES AND PROCE-
DURES, supra note 14, at 206-07.
31. Act of June 12, 1934, ch. 466, 48 Stat. 933. The Commissson reported back
with 102 recommendations, including the establishment of an independent regulatory
agency. President Roosevelt, however, favored extending the authority of the I.C.C. to
cover aviation. The legislation was stalled for three years in Congress because of the
inability to decide whether to use the I.C.C. or establish an independent agency. Fi-
nally the concept of an independent agency won and the legislation quickly went for-
ward. C.A.B. PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES, supra note 14, at 208.
32. Act of June 23, 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973. See generally C. RHYNE, CIVIL
AERONAUTICS ACT ANNOTATED (1939).
33. Act of August 23, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731. The economic
regulation provisions were continued practically verbatim; among others, provisions re-
lating to the Federal Aviation Administration were added.
34. C.A.B. PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES, supra note 14, at 6.
35. Id. at 6 and 222.
36. Id. at 252.
142 Nova Law Journal
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history of U.S. airline mergers, dividing it into four periods.37 During
the first period from 1938 through the late forties, the C.A.B. main-
tained a strongly competitive attitude. This was followed by a period
running through the mid-fifties, during which the Board actively en-
couraged mergers, approving several mergers with considerable an-
ticompetitive effects. The third period, from the mid-fifties through the
late sixties, saw the approval of only one airline merger, that under the
"failing business" doctrine. This was followed by a four-year period
which saw the approval of four merger proposals, each improving .the
financial stability of at least one of the airlines.38
Oren T. Chicamoto analyzed the various factors considered by the
C.A.B. in pre-deregulation merger applications.3 9 While the Board
stated that mergers would be considered on a case by case basis with-
out reference to precedents,'40 it nevertheless considered common fac-
tors under §408 of the 1958 Act. In determining whether the proposed
merger would be in the public interest, the Board balanced benefits,
such as efficiency and economy, route integration and improved ser-
vices,41 against disadvantages, such as diversion from competing carri-
37. Keyes, Notes on the History of Federal Regulation of Airline Mergers, 37 J.
AIR L. & Com. 357 (1971).
38. Id. at 357. During the first period the C.A.B. proclaimed its pro-competive-
ness in its decisions denying merger approval: United Air Lines Transport Corp., Ac-
quisition of Western Air Express Corp., I C.A.B. 739 (1940) and American Airlines,
Inc., Acquisition of Control of Mid-Continent Airlines, Inc., 7 C.A.B. 365 (1946). A
significant change in policy was announced by the C.A.B. during the second period:
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT 2 (1950). The one merger approved
under the "failing business doctrine" during the third period was the takeover of Capi-
tal by United. United-Capital Merger Case, 33 C.A.B. 307 (1961). Only three of the
four mergers approved during the fourth period were consummated. Frontier and Cen-
tral; Pacific, West Coast and Bonanza; Allegheny and Lake Central were the three
local service mergers which were approved. The Northeast and Northwest merger was
approved but the transfer of the previously approved Miami to Los Angeles route was
not immediately approved and Northwest withdrew. Keyes, supra note 37.
39. Chicamoto, Domestic Mergers in the Airline Industry: C.A.B. Approval and
Antitrust, 11 HAWAII B.J. 3 (1974). See also Travers, An Examination of the C.A.B.'s
Merger Policy, 15 KAN. L. REV. 227 (1967); Crooker, Airline Mergers in the 1970's,
39 J. AIR L. & Com. 143 (1973); Reid & Mohrfeld, Airline Size, Profitability, Merg-
ers and Regulation, 39 J. AIR L. & COM. 167 (1973).
40. Chicamoto, supra note 39, at 7-8.
41. Id. at 8-10.
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ers, competitive balance after merger and the intent of the general an-
titrust laws. 2  Additionally, other factors were examined: the
reasonableness of the proposed purchase price, protective labor condi-
tions for employees of both carriers, the applicant's guilt of prior and
present antitrust violations, and the overall effect of the proposed
merger on local service carriers.43
The United States Supreme Court has provided analytical tools
for the Board, such as the "failing business" doctrine, to sanction a
merger that would otherwise be quite anticompetitive." The doctrine of
primary jurisdiction has often been invoked by various courts, including
the Supreme Court, to permit C.A.B. examination and judgment on
purported antitrust violations within its jurisdiction. This doctrine was
expanded considerably by the Court in Pan American World Airways
vs. United States" and in Hughes Tool Company vs. Trans World
Airlines47 where the Court held that in addition to any express exemp-
tions, there was an implied exemption from general antitrust statutes,
based on the Board's primary jurisdiction under the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958.
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
Various reasons have been espoused to explain the rapid and un-
precedented congressional movement toward deregulation of the com-
mercial aviation industry: Public and political antipathy against gov-
ernment regulation in general; discontent with burdensome regulatory
schemes and agencies such as the Occupational Safety and Health
42. Id. at 10-16.
43. Id. at 16-18.
44. United Capital Merger Case, 33 C.A.B. 307 (1961). The Board specifically
cited International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 280 U.S. 291 (1929), the ini-
tial case in which the Supreme Court adopted the failing business doctrine to uphold
such a potentially anticompetitive merger.
45. See generally Coultas, The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction. Determination
of Express and Implied Immunity from the Antitrust Laws, 39 J. AIR L. & CoM. 559
(1973); Annot., 38 L. Ed. 2d 796 (1974); 2 AM. JUR. 2d Administrative Law § § 788-
97 (1962).
46. 371 U.S. 296 (1963). See Note, Civil Aeronautics Board Held to Have Ex-
clusive Jurisdiction to Grant Injunctive Relief Against Acts Allegedly in Violation of
Antitrust Laws, 63 COLuM. L. REV. 923 (1963).
47. 409 U.S. 363 (1973).
48
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Act, 8 and the agency it spawned; economic factors affecting the indus-
try, such as wildly escalating fuel costs, excess capacity afforded by
new wide-body jets and the success of intra-state carriers; the nearly
unanimous academic and public opinion that regulation could only lead
to greater inefficiency and higher fares for the traveling public; and a
growing coalition of politicians and academic and governmental econo-
mists that started deregulation through C.A.B. regulations and intro-
duced and supported legislation until they were successful. 49
Certainly one of the most significant and pervasive sections of the
A.D.A. is that declaring Congressional policy.50 With respect to inter-
state and overseas air transportation, ten factors replaced the original
six. 5 1 These factors, considered to be in the public interest and in accor-
dance with public convenience and necessity, are:
1. maintenance of safety as the highest priority in air commerce;
2. prevention of any deterioration in presently established safety
procedures;
48. 29 U.S.C. § § 651 et seq.
49. Thornton, Deregulation: The C.A.B. and Its Critics, 43 J. AIR L. & COM.
641 (1977); Callison, Airline Deregulation-Only Partially a Hoax: The Current Status
of the Airline Deregulation Movement, 45 J. AIR L. & COM. 961 (1980); Kellener,
Deregulation and the Practicing Attorney, 44 J. AIR L. & COM. 261 (1978). During
the three year period that deregulation was being debated in the Congress, it was also
being debated in the journals; see, e.g., Brenner, Need for Continued Economic Regu-
lation of Air Transport, 41 J. AIR L. & COM. 793 (1975); Callison, Airline Deregula-
tion-A Hoax?, 41 J. AIR L. & COM. 747 (1975); Levine, Alternatives to Regulation
Competition in Air Transportation and the Aviation Act of 1975, 41 J. AIR L. & COM.
703 (1975); Thayer, And Now 'The Deregulators: When Will They Learn? 43 J. AIR
L. & COM. 661 (1977). For a legislative history, see C.A.B. PRACTICES AND PROCE-
DURES, supra note 14; Styles, Commuter Airlines and the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978, 45 J. AIR L. & COM. 685 n.1 (1980) (listing pre-A.D.A. hearings).
50. 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (1976 & Supp. 1979).
51. In summary, the six original factors were: 1) Encourage and develop the air
transportation system, 2) Regulate air transportation in such a way as to assure the
highest degree of safety and foster sound economic conditions, 3) Promote adequate,
economical and efficient service without unjust discrimination, preferences or unfair
competition, 4) Maintain necessary competition to assure the sound development of the
air transportation system, 5) Promote air safety, 6) Promote, encourage and develop
civil aeronautics. FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958, § 102. Congress readopted these
factors as the six factors to be considered in the area of foreign air transportation. 49
U.S.C. § 1302(c) (1976 & Supp. 1979).
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3. availability of a variety of adequate, efficient and low-priced
services withoug using unfair or deceptive practices, while encouraging
fair wages and equitable working conditions;
4. maximum reliance on competition in the market place;
5. development and maintenance of a sound, responsive and
prompt regulatory climate, which adapts to the country's needs;
6. development of services in major urban centers through secon-
dary and satellite airports where possible;
7. prevention of unfair, deceptive, predatory or anticompetitive
practices and avoidance of unreasonable concentration, excessive mar-
ket domination and monopoly powers;
8. maintenance of a comprehensive and convenient system of
scheduled airline service for small communities;
9. development of the air transportation system by relying on
actual and potential competition;
10. encouraging new carriers to enter the system, encouraging
established carriers to enter new markets and strengthening small
carriers.52
The subsequent International Air Transportation Competition Act
[I.A.T.C.A.] of 197911 deleted the A.D.A.'s six foreign air transporta-
tion factors, merging them with those for interstate and overseas air
transportation, and added two extra factors for all three types of air
transportation: 54
11. promote, encourage and develop civil aeronautics and a via-
ble, privately owned United States air transport industry;
12. strengthen the competitive position of U.S. commercial avia-
tion to assure at least equality with foreign carriers and to maintain
and increase profitability in foreign air transportation.
The procedures for a merger proposal are governed by 49 U.S.C.
§ 1378. Subpart A, generally unchanged, lists those consolidations,
mergers and acquisitions that are unlawful, unless approved by the
C.A.B . 5 The Board's decision process has been outlined:
52. Id. § 1302(a).
53. Pub. L. No. 96-192, 94 Stat. 35 (amending 49 U.S.C. § § 1301 et seq.). A
partial legislative history of this act may be found at 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 54.
54. 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (1976 & Supp. 1979).
55. Id. § 1378(a). The section providing presumption of control of an air carrier
50
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Unless, after a hearing, the Board finds that the transaction will
not be consistent with the public interest or that the conditions of
this section will not be fulfilled, it shall, by order, approve such
transaction, upon such terms and conditions as it shall find to be
just and reasonable and with such modifications as it may pre-
scribe, except the Board shall not approve such transaction-
(A) if it would result in a monopoly or would be in further-
ance of any combination or conspiracy to monopolize or to attempt
to monopolize the business of air transportation in any region of
the United States; or
(B) the effect of which in any region of the United States may
be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monop-
oly, or which in any other manner would be in restraint of trade,
unless the Board finds that the anticompetitive effects of the pro-
posed transaction are outweighed in the public interest by the prob-
able effect of the transaction in meeting significant transportation
conveniences and needs of the public, and unless it finds that such
significant transportation conveniences and needs may not be satis-
fied by a reasonably available alternative having materially less an-
ticompetitive effects.
The party challenging the transaction shall bear the burden of
proving the anticompetitive effects of such transaction, and the pro-
ponents of the transaction shall bear the burden of proving that it
meets the significant transportation conveniences and needs of the
public and that such convenience and needs may not be satisfied by
a less anticompetitive alternative.58
Thus, the Board must base its determinations on three distinct tests:
(1) the Sherman Act test, (2) the Clayton Act test and (3) the public
interest and convenience test.5
where 10% or more of its stock is owned by any person remains unchanged. Id. §
1378(0 (1976). If one or more of the parties to the transaction come within the pur-
view of the C.A.B., an application must be filed with the Board with copies sent to the
Attorney General and Secretary of Transportation. The Board must notify the appli-
cant(s) and others with a substantial interest in the proceedings of the manner in which
the Board will proceed. Id. § 1378(b)(1) (1976 & Supp. 1979).
56. Id.
57. The relationship or order of these three tests is a significant issue discussed in
both the TXI-Pan Am decision and the Eastern decision. See text accompanying notes
105-109 and 112-115 infra.
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Interlocking relationships of officers, directors, or stockholders
with controlling interests in air carriers, common carriers or a person
"substantially engaged in the business of aeronautics" are still unlaw-
ful, unless approved by the C.A.B. as being in the public interest.5 8
Pooling and other agreements between domestic and foreign air carri-
ers are subject not only to a public interest test, but also to an anticom-
petition test.5" Mutual aid agreements are treated separately.60 They
may only be approved if they are limited to cover sixty percent of an
air carrier's direct operating expenses, do not start for thirty days after
the beginning of the labor strike, last no longer than eight weeks and
the air carrier agrees to binding arbitration under the provisions of the
Railway Labor Act, if the union so requests.6'
The President of the United States still has final authority with
respect to foreign air transportation; his approval is necessary whenever
the merger is between carriers flying international routes. However, the
A.D.A. limits his power to national defense and foreign relations con-
58. 49 U.S.C. § 1379 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
59. Id. § 1382. Under the A.D.A. the agreements are simply referred to as "pos-
sible cooperative working arrangements," without further defining them. Id. §
1382(a)(1) (Supp. 1979). Previously such agreements were delineated:
agreement. . . for pooling or apportioning earnings, losses, traffic, service,
or equipment, or relating to the establishment of transportation rates,
fares, charges, or classifications, or for preserving and improving safety,
economy, and efficiency of operation, or for controlling, regulating,
preventing, or otherwise eliminating destructive, oppressive, or wasteful
competition, or for regulating stops, schedules, and character of service, or
for other cooperative working arrangements.
Id.; FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958, § 412. Procedures for reviewing such agree-
ments are statutorily outlined including prior notification to certain Cabinet officers
before approval, so written comments may be filed or hearings requested. 49 U.S.C. §
1382(b) (1976 & Supp. 1979). Deliniation of burdens of proof are also included. Id. §
1382(c)(2)(B) (Supp. 1979).
60. Id. § 1382(e). Mutual aid agreement is defined as
any contract or agreement between air carriers which provides that any
such air carrier will receive payments from the other air carriers which are
parties to such contract or agreement for any period during which such air
carrier is not engaging in air transportation, or is providing reduced levels
of service in air transportation, due to a labor strike.
Id. § 1382(e)(3)(A).
61. Id. § 1382(e)(2).
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siderations. He may not disapprove upon the basis of economic or car-
rier selection considerations.62
The A.D.A. also changed 49 U.S.C. § 1384, retitled Antitrust Ex-
emptions.6 3 The antitrust exemption is no longer automatic with the
C.A.B.'s approval of the transaction. Before antitrust exemption may
be given, the Board must specifically find exemption is required in the
public interest.64 A 1980 amendment to this section now provides that
the Board shall by order exempt any person "to the extent necessary to
enable such person to proceed with the transaction specifically -ap-
proved . . . and transactions necessarily contemplated by such
order." '65
To preclude deliberate stalling tactics by the Board, the A.D.A.
set specific time limits for Board decisions; for Section 1378 applica-
tions, the final order must be rendered within six months.66
62. Id. § 1461(a) (1976 & Supp. 1979). In his letter of December 22, 1979,
approving the Pan American-National merger, President Carter noted his limited re-
view power. Letter from President Carter to C.A.B. Chairman Marvin Cohen dated
Dec. 22, 1979, reprinted at Texas International-National Acquisition Case/Pan Am-
Acquisition of and Merger with National, Docket Nos. 33112 & 33283, C.A.B. Order
Nos. 79-12-163, 79-12-164, and 79-12-165 (Oct. 24, 1979).
63. 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1976 & Supp. 1979):
In any order made under section 1378, 1379 or 1382 of this title, the
Board may, as part of such order, exempt any person affected by such
order from the operations of the "antitrust laws" set forth in subsection (a)
of section 12 of Title 15 to the extent necessary to enable such person to
proceed with the transaction specifically approved by the Board in such
order and those transactions necessarily contemplated by such order, ex-
cept that the Board may not exempt such person unless it determines that
such exemption is required in the public interest.
Id. (emphasis added).
64. Id. In the Texas International/Pan American-National merger case, the
Board was asked to grant antitrust exemption to the proposed mergers, but after ana-
lyzing the A.D.A. and the arguments presented specifically declined to do so. Texas
International-National Acquisition Case/Pan American Acquisition of Control of, and
Merger with National Acquisition Case, Docket Nos. 33112 & 33283, C.A.B. Orders
79-12-163, 79-12-164 and 79-12-165 (October 24, 1979). See also Beane, The Anti-
trust Implications of Airline Deregulation, 45 J. AIR L. & COM. 1001 (1980).
65. 49 U.S.C. § 1384 as amended by section 27 International Air Transportation
Competition Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-192, 94 Stat. 35, 47-48. It would appear that
the amendment goes a long way towards an automatic exemption again.
66. 49 U.S.C. § 1490 (Supp. 1979).
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In another significant section, the A.D.A. established an employee
protection program for employees who had been employed by a certifi-
cated air carrier for four years as of the beginning of the A.D.A. and
who were deprived of either employment or compensation as a result of
bankruptcy or "major contraction"6 7 "the major cause of which is the
change in regulatory structure provided by the A.D.A."68 Monthly as-
sistance payments may be made until the protected employee finds
other employment or for 72 months maximum. Relocation assistance
may also be provided. After their own furloughed employees have been
called back, certificated carriers have a duty to hire protected employ-
ees before hiring any non-protected employee similarly qualified. 9
Most significant are the A.D.A.'s sunset provisions prescribing a
three-phase termination of C.A.B. authority, with complete phase-out
on January 1, 1985, unless Congress intervenes. Board authority to
pass on mergers ceases on January 1, 1983, and is transferred to the
Department of Justice. 0
67. Id. § 1552(h)(4) defines "major contraction" as being "a reduction of at
least 71/2 percent of the total number of full time employees of an air carrier within a
12 month period." Id. However, the C.A.B. may also determine that it is a major
contraction if less than 7 percent. Strikers are not to be included. Id.
68. 49 U.S.C. § 1552(h)(2) (Supp. 1979). However, this program is limited to
the first 10 calendar years occurring after October 28, 1979, the date that the A.D.A.
became effective. Id.
69. Id. § 1552. For an interesting history and explanation of this provision and
similar provisions for railroad employees, see Ris, Government Protection of Transpor-
tation Employees: Sound Policy or Costly Precedent?, 44 J. AIR L. & CoM. 509
(1979). The historical reasons for labor protective provisions in the railroad industry
have not necessarily been present in the commercial aviation industry. In fact until the
A.D.A., Congress did not mandate such provisions as it had in the railroad industry;
the C.A.B. nevertheless administratively applied them starting in 1950 in United-West-
ern Acquisition of Air Carrier Property, 11 C.A.B. 701 (1950).
70. 49 U.S.C. § 1551 (Supp. 1979). The Board is also required to make a com-
prehensive review of its activities and present this review to the Congress no later than
January 1, 1984. It is to recommend to Congress whether it should be continued in
existence after 1985 and what changes should be made to further the goals of the
A.D.A. The A.D.A. lists in great detail the elements and factors to be considered dur-
ing the compehensive review. Id. It was reported that the Transportation Department
would support legislation which would move the sunset date up from 1985 to 1982.
Transportation Department Backs Early C.A.B. Sunset, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH.
Apr. 7, 1980, at 32.
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Ironically the A.D.A. preempted to the federal government all au-
thority over rates, routes or services of certificated carriers.7 Liberal-
ized route application procedures and awards were provided the
A.D.A., 2 including an automatic market entry program73 and a means
to obtain unused authority. 4 Carriers obtained flexibility in rate
changes; a "standard industry fare level" 75 was established between
city-pairs and carriers could adjust their fare no more than 5% upward
or 50% downward from this level without C.A.B. authority.78 In 1980
I.A.T.C.A. established a similar "standard foreign fare level" and
71. 49 U.S.C. § 1305 (Supp. 1979). This is ironic because one of the primary
reasons advanced in support of deregulation was the economic and regulatory success
of intrastate carriers operating under California and Texas state authorities. See Note,
Is Regulation Necessary? California Air Transportation and National Regulatory
Policy, 74 YALE L.J. 1416 (1965); Means & Chasnoff, State Regulation of Air Trans-
portation: The Texas Aeronautics Commission, 53 TEXAS L. REv. 653 (1975).
72. 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (1976 & Supp. 1979). Among other provisions in this
lengthy section, the C.A.B. is authorized to establish simplified procedural rules for
route applications. See generally The Line Forms Here for Air Routes, Bus. WK.,
Nov. 6, 1978, at 66; Deregulation Spurs Airport Problems, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH.,
Nov. 3, 1980, at 55; Tinnin, Alexander & Hannifin, Fasten Your Seat Belts, TIME,
Aug. 4, 1980, at 47; Marbach, Buckley, et al. Silver Lining in the Air, NEWSWEEK,
Aug. 24, 1981, at 52.
73. 49 U.S.C. § 1371(d)(7) (Supp. 1979). Basically this section provides that
each certificated air carrier may apply for (and generally will be automatically given)
route authority for one city pair during the first thirty days of 1979, 1980 and 1981. If
the Board either determines that the air carrier is not fit, willing and able to provide
such non-stop service or that the air carrier is not the only air carrier to be given that
particular city pair under the automatic market entry program, it may reapply for
another city pair within the first one hundred and twenty days of the year. Id.
74. Id. § 1371 (d)(5)(A) (Supp. 1979). Basically an air carrier must provide a
minimum of five round trips per week between two points or city pairs for which it has
route authority for at least thirteen weeks during any twenty-six week period or any
other air carrier may apply for such unused route authority thirty days after the end of
the twenty-six week period. Id.
75. 49 U.S.C. § 1482(d)(6)(A) (1976 & Supp. 1979) which is defined as the
"fare level in effect on July 1, 1977, for each interstate or overseas pair of points, for
each class of service, existing on that date. . . ." Semiannually the Board will make
adjustments proportional to the percentage change "in the actual operating cost per
available seat mile for interstate and overseas transportation combined." Id.
§ 1482(d)(6)(B).
76. Id. § 1482(d)(4).
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range of reasonableness for foreign fare adjustments." Subsidized
"guaranteed essential air transportation" for those small communities
that have lost all air service as a result of deregulation was also pro-
vided.78 Finally, the A.D.A. amended the 1957 Guaranty of Loans for
Purchase of Aircraft and Equipment Act to encompass guaranties for
"charter air carriers," "commuter air carriers," and "intrastate air
carriers."7 9
Proposed National Mergers
Description of the Airlines
To more clearly understand this complicated merger, it is neces-
sary to briefly examine and compare each of the five airlines involved.
Prior to the merger each of the five airlines was in a different stage of
development and was practically, if not theoretically and legally, a dif-
ferent category of air carrier.80 Each of the four courtiers had a differ-
77. Id. § 1482(j)(6). See generally Is the U.S. Sabotaging Its International Air-
lines?, Bus. WK., Jan. 26, 1981, at 74.
78. 49 U.S.C. § 1389 (Supp. 1979).
79. 49 U.S.C. § 1380.
80.
ITEM (1978) NAL PAN AM EAL TXI AF
Employees 8,040 26,964 35,899 2,949 500
Equipment
Total planes 55 95 257 28 7
Wide-bodied
jets 15 43 41 ......
Passengers 6,983* 8,675 37,819 3,987 498
enplaned (11)** (10) (2) (19) (na)
Revenue 7,892,599* 21,054,983 25,183,415 1,560,554 181,000
Passenger (10)** (6) (4) (16) (na)
Miles
Passenger 587,782* 1,631,798 2,150,577 158,185 15,350
Revenue ($) (10)** (6) (3) (19) (na)
Profits ($) 18,309* 118,801 67,257 12,850 132
152
452,952* 2,048,303 1,908,556 95,200 11,474
Nova Law Journal
Assets ($)
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ent reason for wanting to merge with National.
National, the smallest of the domestic trunklines, first began flying
in 1934, carrying the mail between St. Petersburg, Florida, and Day-
tona Beach, Florida. By 1970 National's routes generally ran from
Florida to Washington and New York City, and from Florida across
the southern tier of states to California. It was awarded the Miami-
London transatlantic route in 1970, and has since steadily expanded
into Europe. Prior to the merger it flew from Florida to London, Paris,
Amsterdam and Frankfurt."1 Its stock was undervalued.82
Pan American World Airways was unique among United States
airlines because, for all practical purposes, it was strictly an interna-
tional airline. It too traced its roots to Florida. On October 28, 1927, it
first flew from Key West, Florida, to Havana, Cuba. In 1947 the com-
pany provided the first scheduled around-the-world service.83 In 1974,
it was thought Pan Am would follow Penn-Central into bankruptcy,
but this was avoided by better management procedures and elimination
of excess management personnel.84 More recently the airline faced two
problems; increasing international competition from other American
airlines and continued competition from foreign airlines, such as Air
*Add 000 **Rank among ATA carriers
AIR FLORIDA SYSTEM, INC., 1978 ANNUAL REPORT (n.d.); EASTERN AIR LINES, INC.,
1978 ANNUAL REPORT (1979); NATIONAL AIRLINES, INC., 1978 ANNUAL REPORT
(n.d.); PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC., 1978 ANNUAL REPORT 1978; AIR
TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, AIR TRANSPORT 1979 (1979); Cook, Lorenzo
the Presumptuous, FORBES, Oct. 30, 1978, at 115; Baron, New Aircraft, Increased
Traffic Push Air Florida into the Black, Miami Herald, Nov. 18, 1978, § B, at 4, col.
1; BARRON'S, Oct. 10, 1977, at 39; PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC., THE PAN
AMERICAN MERGER (n.d.).
81. NATIONAL AIRLINES, INC., NATIONAL AIRLINES HISTORY, (n.d.).
82. See note 12 supra; Russell, They're Just Wild About National, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 24, 1978, § C, at 1, col. 4.
83. For histories of Pan American World Airways, Inc., see R. DALEY, AN
AMERICAN SAGA: JUAN TRIPPE AND HIS PAN AM EMPIRE (1980); C. SOLBERG, CON-
QUEST OF THE SKIES: A HISTORY OF COMMERCIAL AVIATION IN AMERICA (1979); PAN
AMERICAN WORLD, INC., THE FIRST 50 YEARS OF PAN AM-THE STORY OF PAN AMER-
ICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC. FROM 1927 TO 1977 (n.d.); PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIR-
WAYS, INC., ANNUAL REPORT 1979 (1980).
84. See generally Pan Am In the Black-For-Now, Bus. WK., Sept. 5, 1977, at
52; Cook, Pan American: Coming Home, FORBES, Oct. 16, 1978, at 47; Griffiths, Pan
Am Cutback Geared to Profits, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Sept. 18, 1978, at 34.
57
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1981
France, Alitalia and Lufthansa, which are owned and/or heavily subsi-
dized by their respective governments.85 Increased American competi-
tion reduced Pan Am's domestic feeder traffic. Thus Pan Am was de-
sirous of obtaining its own domestic system more quickly and less
expensively than building one from scratch. Pan Am expected that
National would best connect Pan Am's transpacific, transatlantic and
Latin American operations, and enable better utilization of equipment
since Pan Am peaked during the summer tourist season and National
peaked during Florida's winter season. 6
Eastern Air Lines, as its name implies, generally concentrated its
route system in the eastern United States, with major hubs at Miami,
Atlanta, Washington and New York. It also served Eastern Canada,
Mexico and the Caribbean. Eastern was the second largest domestic
trunkline in the United States before the Pan Am-National merger.87
Eastern's present president, Colonel Frank Borman, appears to be
bringing the company out of a severe financial crisis, which saw it lose
nearly ninety million dollars in 1975.88 Two major problems appeared
to face the proposed Eastern-National merger. One was the fact that
the two airlines were major competitors on the important northeast-
Florida routes. The other was the resultant size of the combined
company. 9
Texas International (TXI), originally known as Trans-Texas Air-
85. PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC., THE PAN AM-NATIONAL MERGER
(n.d.); ANNUAL REPORT 1979 20 (1980) and Pan American World Airways, Inc.,
S.E.C. Form 10-K (1978) (S.E.C. file # 103532) (1979). For a description of state
ownership characteristics of various I.A.T.A. airlines, see generally P. HAANAPPEL,
RATEMAKING IN INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT - A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF INTER-
NATIONAL AIR FARES AND RATES 37-39 (1978).
86. ANNUAL REPORT 1979, supra note 68; Hice, Pan Am-National Merger:
Where Will All the People Fit?, FLORIDA TREND, Apr. 1980, at 150. Union seniority
and meshing problems have prevented the cross-utilization of equipment that was ex-
pected. Id. See also text accompanying notes 165-69 infra.
87. Pan Am replaced Eastern in second place, behind United, when the merger
became effective. Hobson & Golden, Merged Pan Am Slashes Fares, Miami News,
Jan. 7, 1980, § A, at 1, col. 1. See generally R. SERLING, FROM THE CAPTAIN- TO THE
COLONEL - AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF EASTERN AIRLINES (1980); E. RICKENBAKER,
RICKENBAKER - AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1967).
88. EASTERN AIRLINES, INC., GROWTH, CHALLENGE CHARACTERIZE EASTERN
AIRLINES FIRST 50 YEARS (1979).
89. See text accompanying notes 143-47 infra.
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ways, was a small local service airline. In 1967 it was rescued from a
crippling debt load of over twenty million dollars by two Harvard
M.B.A.'s, Frank Lorenzo and Robert Carney, who were able to recapi-
talize the company through innovative and aggressive management,
turning it into one of the industry's most exciting companies. Texas
International's daring in trying to gain control of National brought the
company at least forty-five million dollars in profits on the sale of its
National stock.90 After realizing the profit from the sale of its stock to
Pan Am, Texas International sought to acquire T.W.A. and currently
has C.A.B. approval to acquire Continental Airlines.91
Until the A.D.A. Air Florida was strictly an intrastate carrier.
Deregulation and an infusion of new capital permitted the once strug-
gling airline to expand its route system to the Northeast, the Carib-
bean, Central America and Europe.92 Like the other so-called Na-
tional-merger losers, Air Florida has grown and prospered more than
the "new" Pan Am.
Chronology of Events
While this article focuses on the airline regulatory process, it is
important to realize that concurrent with the C.A.B. hearings there
was a massive corporate scramble on other fronts, involving the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission and the shareholders of the involved
corporations. These are here summarized. 93
Texas International Airlines set this incredible chain of events in
motion on July 10, 1978 when it announced it had already purchased
9.2% of National's common stock. On August 22, 1978 Pan American
World Airways joined in battle against Texas International, also seek-
ing C.A.B. approval for its proposed merger with National Airlines.
Shortly thereafter Pan American and National executed a definitive
merger agreement. The C.A.B. consolidated these two merger applica-
tions, but later refused to consolidate Eastern Airlines' application,
when, on December 11, 1978, it likewise indicated an interest in ac-
quiring its chief rival on the East Coast-Florida market. Throughout,
90. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
91. See text accompanying notes 148-62 infra.
92. AIR FLORIDA SYSTEM INC., AIR FLORIDA BACKGROUND (n.d.).
93. For a full chronology, see Appendix A.
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Air Florida's only interest was the acquisition of National's interna-
tional routes and four of its DC-10's.
Meanwhile, on October 28, 1978, President Carter signed into law
the A.D.A., which not only deregulated the domestic airline industry,
but also significantly changed the rules for airline mergers. Later
I.A.T.C.A. was also enacted, much to Pan American's detriment.
Eventually an auction system was proposed and accepted by Na-
tional's shareholders, which would permit five rounds of bidding be-
tween Pan American and Eastern, should each obtain C.A.B. approval.
The Texas International, Pan American and Eastern applications were
all rejected by the respective administrative law judges. Finally the full
Board approved both Texas International's and Pan American's merger
applications, despite the fact that Texas International had informed the
Board it had already agreed to sell its National stock to Pan American
for a handsome profit. Throughout the summer of 1979 Pan American
increased its ownership of National.
In September 1979 the full C.A.B. tentatively rejected Eastern's
merger application and shortly thereafter Eastern dropped out of
contention.
President Carter formally approved the Pan American-National
merger in December 1979 and the merger became effective in January
1980. Since the merger, management problems, labor seniority meshing
problems, continued and expanded deregulation, high fuel costs and the
economy in general have all combined to raise the spectre of possible
bankruptcy. First the airline sold its New York City headquarters to
raise badly needed cash, then its profitable InterContinental Hotel sub-
sidiary. Only time will tell whether Pan American World Airways will
realize the expected benefits from its merger with National Airlines
and even whether the "new" Pan Am will survive.
C.A.B. Decisions
Although not the first merger decision after the adoption of the
A.D.A. merger tests,94 the C.A.B. decision in the Texas International/
94. The C.A.B.'s first affirmative decision created Republic Airlines from North
Central and Southern. Since the two airlines served different regions of the United
States, there was little, if any, anticompetitive effect on the airline industry. Thus the
Board opinion offered no real analysis or rationale. North Central-Southern Merger
156 6: 1981 1
60
Nova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol6/iss1/1
Airline Deregulation & Merger6:1981
Pan American-National Case95 gives the greatest expository insight
into the Board's interpretation of the A.D.A. merger provisions.
Handed down one year after the adoption of the A.D.A., this lengthy
opinion approved both the proposed acquisition of National by Texas
International and the proposed acquisition and merger of National with
Pan American, despite contrary recommendation by the administrative
law judge. 6 This Board opinion is analyzed and compared with the
earlier decision by Administrative Law Judge William Dapper. The in-
itial decision of Administrative Law Judge Richard Murphy recom-
mending denial of the Eastern-National acquisition application,9 7 the
decision of Administrative Law Judge John Vittone recommending ap-
proval of the second Continental-Western merger,9" and the C.A.B. de-
cision accepting such recommendation are also discussed below.99 The
latter Continental-Western decisions are examined because they shed
some light on the C.A.B.'s earlier decision denying the first Continen-
tal-Western merger application'"0 and because they show the changes
in the domestic airline industry since deregulation and the effect those
Case, Docket Nos. 33136 & 34430, C.A.B. Order Nos. 79-6-7 & 79-6-8 (May 15,
1979). For discussion and analysis of the first five merger/acquisition cases under the
A.D.A., see Keyes, A Preliminary Appraisal of Merger Control Under the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978, 46 J. AIR L. & CoM. 71 (1980).
95. Texas International-National Acquisition Case/Pan American Acquisition of
Control of, and Merger with National Acquisition Case, Docket Nos. 33112 & 33283,
C.A.B. Order Nos. 79-2-163, 79-12-164, 79-12-165 (Oct. 24, 1979) (hereinafter TXI/
Pan Am-National Order).
96. Texas International-National Acquisition Case/Pan American Acquisition of
Control of, and Merger with National Acquisition Case, Docket Nos. 33112 & 33283
(Decision of Administrative Law Judge William H. Dapper, Apr. 5, 1979) (hereinafter
TXI/Pan Am-National Judge Decision).
97. Application of Eastern Air Lines, Inc. for Approval of Acquisition of Control
of National Airlines, Inc. Docket No. 34226 (Decision of Administrative Law Judge
Richard J. Murphy, June 14, 1979) (hereinafter Eastern-National Judge Decision).
98. Continental-Western Merger Case, Docket No. 38733 (Decision of Adminis-
trative Law Judge John M. Vittone, Feb. 6, 1980) (hereinafter Continental-Western
Judge Decision).
99. Continental-Western Merger Case, Docket No. 38733, C.A.B. Order Nos.
81-6-1 & 81-6-2 (Mar. 31, 1981) (hereinafter Second Continental-Western Order).
100. Continental-Western Merger Case, Docket No. 33465, C.A.B. Order No.
79-9-185 (Sept. 27, 1979) (dismissing application) (hereinafter First Continental-
Western Order).
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changes have had on the C.A.B.'s consideration of merger applications.
Preliminary Decisions
Under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, the C.A.B. initially de-
termined whether the proposed merger, consolidation or acquisition was
consistent with the public interest. The Board was further required to
disapprove proposals that would result in a monopoly or monopolies.10 1
In the first post-A.D.A. decision, Administrative Law Judge Saunders
commented upon the C.A.B.'s view of its antitrust role under the 1958
Act: "Under this interpretation of the prior law, the Board's antitrust
resolve was erratic; and with the broad discretion afforded by the 'pub-
lic interest' test, antitrust policy was often ignored. 1 °2
With the adoption of the A.D.A. Congress specifically intended to
subject proposed airline mergers or acquisitions to the same antitrust
standards to which other mergers are subject, with the proviso that if
the proposed merger failed the Sherman and Clayton Act tests, it
might nevertheless be approved if it passed the public interest test and
"no reasonably available less anticompetitive alternative"10 3 existed.
101. Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973). Fed-
eral Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, tit. IV, § 408, 72 Stat. 767 as amended,
stated (before the A.D.A.):
Unless after such hearing, the Board finds that the consolidation, merger,
purchase, lease, operating contract, or acquisition of control will not be
consistent with the public interest or that the conditions of this section will
not be fulfilled, it shall by order approve such consolidation, merger,
purchase, lease, operating contract, or acquisition of control, upon such
terms and conditions as it shall find to be just and reasonable and with
such modifications as it may prescribe: Provided, that the Board shall not
approve any consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or
acquisition of control which would result in creating a monopoly or monop-
olies and thereby restrain competition or jeopardize another air carrier not
a party to the consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract or
acquisition of control. ...
102. North Central-Southern Merger Case, Docket No. 33136 at 23 (Decision of
Administrative Law Judge Saunders, Feb. 9, 1979).
103. A.D.A. Legislative History, supra note 14, at 3789.
The intent of the new section 408 of the proposed legislation is to insure
that, in light of deregulation, mergers in the air carrier industry will be
tested by the antitrust standards traditionally applied by the courts to un-
regulated industries. However, under the new section 408, even if a merger
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The public interest tests under the A.D.A. are similar to those under
Section 102(a) of the Bank Merger Act of 1966.104
Because of substantial change in Section 408 of the Aviation
Act,10 5 which effectively altered the entire antitrust philosophy and
tests applied to the airline industry, the Board and the two administra-
tive law judges dealing with the various National merger cases had to
determine the section's intent and application. The two issues were:
first, whether the public interest test was separate from the antitrust
analysis or whether the antitrust analysis was only an important part of
the overall public interest test;108 and second, what criteria or factors
should be considered for the public interest test.107 Judge Dapper,
does not meet the antitrust standards of the Sherman and Clayton Acts it
may nonetheless be approved if it meets 'significant transportation needs of
the community to be served,' and if there is no 'reasonably available less
anticompetitive alternative' to the merger. These latter tests only apply if a
merger or similar transaction does not meet the Sherman and Clayton
standards. The 'public interest' standard in section 408(b) of the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958 is retained in the new section, but the standard must
now be interpreted in light of the intent of Congress to move the airline
industry rapidly toward deregulation. The foundation of the new airline
legislation is that it is in the public interest to allow the airline industry to
be governed by the forces of the marketplace. Consistent with the premise,
mergers of air carriers should be governed by the same standards that are
applied to mergers of other firms.
The Sherman and Clayton Acts are more fully explained at notes 23-24 supra.
104. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1976 & Supp. 1979). See generally 54 AM. JUR 2d
Monopolies § § 198-205. Accord, TXI/Pan-Am-National Judge Decision at 40, and
Eastern-National Judge Decision at 21.
105. 49 U.S.C. § § 1301-1504 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
106. TXI/Pan Am-National Judge Decision at 40-45. Pan Am, TXI and the
Department of Justice all took the position that if the proposed acquisitions or mergers
passed both the Clayton Act Test and the Sherman Act Test, that there was no need to
subject them to the public interest tests. The factors listed in section 12(a) of the Bank
Merger Act would only come into play if the antitrust tests are not passed. National
and others contend that even if the proposed mergers pass the antitrust tests, they
could still be disapproved if they fail to pass the public interest test. Id. It would ap-
pear that the first position is supported by the Legislative History, which states: "These
latter tests (public interest tests) only apply if a merger or similar transaction does not
meet the Sherman and Clayton Act Standards." A.D.A. Legislative History, supra
note 14, at 3789 (emphasis added).
107. TXI/Pan Am-National Judge Decision at 40-45.
591
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whose Texas International/Pan Am-National decision provided the
first interpretation of Section 408, concluded that antitrust analysis was
only an important part of the overall public interest standard, and that
the factors for public interest listed in Section 102(a) of the A.D.A.
should be considered, but were not exhaustive. 10 8 Specifically:
The analysis proceeds as follows: a determination is made concern-
ing whether a proposed merger is anticompetitive or not (The Clay-
ton Act Test). If the conclusion is that the transaction is not an-
ticompetitive then other public interest factors are evaluated. The
antitrust and other public interest factors are then weighed and
balanced against each other and an ultimate determination is
made. Thus, the merger may pass muster under antitrust criteria
but offend overriding public interest considerations on the other
hand. In that event the merger must be disapproved. Finally, if the
merger fails under the antitrust criteria it may still be approved
pursuant to section 408(b)(1)(B) if it meets significant transporta-
tion needs.109
Applying this analysis, Judge Dapper concluded with respect to
each airline that the proposed transactions were violative of the Clay-
ton Act test;110 applying the public interest test as applied under the
Bank Merger Act of 1966, he concluded that neither airline had met
its burden of proof in establishing that such a merger would meet "sig-
nificant transportation conveniences and needs of the public."",1
108. Id. at 43.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 82-91.
111. Id. at 114-127. TXI's principal argument was that it was a more aggressive
and better-managed company than National, that subsequent to the merger TXI's low
cost fares could be introduced system-wide and overall management would be improved
to the benefit of the consumer. Judge Dapper declined to accept this thesis. He also
noted several negative factors that he considered: 1) a long period of cross-ownership
would have detrimental effects on National; 2) TXI might lose its citizenship because
of the foreign debenture device it used to raise money for the acquisition; 3) approval
of this acquisition would be a signal that might cause other acquisitions or mergers; 4)
it would be better for the consumer if TXI expanded internally rather than acquired
another airline externally and 5) TXI violated section 408 when it initially acquired
more than 10% of National stock without Board approval. Id. at 82-91. Likewise,
Judge Dapper disagreed with Pan Am's main contention that it would be in the public
interest to permit Pan Am to rapidly acquire a domestic feeder system and thereby
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Several months later, Judge Murphy in the Eastern-National case
determined that there were three separate tests to be considered under
the A.D.A.: 1) the public interest test, 2) the Sherman Act Test and 3)
the Clayton Act Test." 2 He concluded that each of the three tests must
be passed for approval, rather than the alternative propositions Judge
Dapper considered. Thus, even though he concluded that the proposed
acquisition would "not be inconsistent with the public interest," 113 and
that it would pass the Sherman Act Test,1 4 because it failed the Clay-
ton Act Test, he recommended disapproval.1 15
C.A.B. Decision in the Texas International/Pan Am-National
Merger Application
In October 1979 the full C.A.B. interpreted for the first time the
applicability and interrelationship of the various tests under Section
408 of the A.D.A. First the Board decided that the public interest stan-
dard was separate and independent from the antitrust standard. How-
ever the Board refused to read subsection 7, condemning monopolies
and other anticompetitive acts, out of the public interest factors of sec-
tion 102(a). Despite including antitrust or anticompetitive factors in
the public interest test, the Board noted that the effect would be the
same as pre-A.D.A. analysis using the Clayton Act Test and the Bank
Merger Act of 1966, since the Clayton Act envisaged a broad inquiry,
subsuming this independent public interest inquiry.11 6 In making a de-
termination under the Clayton Act, the Board decided that a "func-
tional analysis" of the acquisitions, taking into account the "structure,
history and performance of the industry," was more appropriate than
"static statistical analyses of market shares and concentration ra-
support its position as the primary U.S. flag carrier, rather than require it to slowly
build such a domestic feeder system. The Judge also listed three negative public inter-
est factors: 1) the merger would be inconsistent with U.S. international aviation policy
which supports more international competition, 2) internal growth is preferable and 3)
approval would trigger other mergers. Id. at 114-127.
112. Eastern-National Judge Decision at 5-6, 12.
113. Id. at 21.
114. Id. at 59.
115. Id. at 62.
116. TXI/Pan Am-National Order at 58-60.
I
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tios. '1 1 The Board ultimately disagreed with Judge Dapper, determin-
ing that there were no anticompetitive problems with either merger or
acquisition, other than on the United States-London market, 118 and
further found that both applications were in the public interest, subject
to labor protective provisions.119
In the Board's functional Clayton Act analysis, it agreed with
Judge Dapper that the "product market" was "scheduled air transpor-
tation." 120 Actually Judge Dapper had more narrowly defined the ap-
plicable product market as "scheduled passenger air transportation be-
tween a specific origin point and a specific destination point."1 21,
Looking first at the Texas International proposal, Judge Dapper
determined the applicable geographic markets were those city-pairs
where Texas International and National actually competed, those
where one of the two airlines actually operated and the other might be
a potential entrant and those where both airlines might be potential
entrants. 22 Although the Board agreed that city-pairs deserved analy-
sis, it deemphasized the importance of statistical market share analysis
relative to such city-pairs. It based its Clayton Act determination upon
a historical, structural and prospective analysis of the industry, particu-
larly in view of deregulation. 23 Specifically, Judge Dapper determined
117. Id. at 6 and 59.
118. Id. at 3-7. See text accompanying note 138 infra.
119. TXI/Pan Am-National Order at 3-7.
120. Id. at 10.
121. TXI/Pan Am-National Judge Decision at 52-55 citing Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), Judge Dapper stated, "In that proceeding, the
Court stated that the key factor in identifying the product market was the 'reasonable
interchangeability of use or the cross elasticity of demand between the product itself
and substitutes for it." TXI/Pan Am-National Judge Decision at 53. It would appear
that the difference in terminology between Judge Dapper and the Board shows the
Board's emphasis upon a more functional analysis, partially occasioned by the changed
competitive conditions brought about by the A.D.A.
122. Id. at 57.
123. TXI/Pan Am-National Order at 12-16, citing United States v. General Dy-
namics, 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
We believe the Judge erred in not accepting TXI's invitation to make a
thorough examination of this market .... Under this functional ap-
proach the likely effect on performance should be examined as well as sur-
face structural changes .... We believe that we should apply antitrust
law functionally and in the light of the recent and ongoing deregulation of
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there would be a substantial and continuing two-firm concentration ra-
tio in the Houston-New Orleans market should the proposed merger be
approved, which would violate the Clayton Act. 2  Skeptical about
market shares analysis in general, the Board decided Texas Interna-
tional's rapid market growth and Southwest Airlines' ability to enter
the market with apparent ease belied the conclusions drawn by Judge
Dapper.1 25 The Board concluded that the loss of National in this mar-
ket would not be anticompetitive. 2 '
Courts have divided potential competition into "perceived" and
"actual" potential competition.127 Judge Dapper examined sixteen city-
pairs radiating from Houston or New Orleans and determined that ei-
ther National or TXI would be an actual potential competitor, having
deconcentrating effects upon the markets they entered. 128 Disagreeing
with this conclusion, the Board noted the Judge's underlying assump-
tion, that "concentration gives rise to poor competitive performance," is
legally challengeable.129 Concluding that none of these southern tier
markets faced any anticompetitive challenge from the proposed acquisi-
tion, the Board decided that no commercial (or special) barriers would
prevent other airlines from entering these markets, should the acquisi-
tion be approved.'30 It emphasized the changed conditions under the
A.D.A.:
the airline industry. The case law just reviewed reveals a reemphasis of the
Supreme Court's belief that a thorough review of competitive circum-
stances is advisable.
TXI/Pan Am-National Order at 16.
124. TXI/Pan Am-National Judge Decision at 62-70.
125. TXI/Pan Am-National Order at 17-19.
126. Id. at 19.
127. TXI/Pan Am-National Judge Decision at 71:
An actual entrant is a company which does not serve the relevant market.
However, it has the 'available feasible means' for entering the relevant
market other than by acquisition; and those means offer a 'substantial like-
lihood of producing deconcentration in that market or other significant
procompetitive effects.' A perceived potential entrant is a company which
does not serve the relevant market. However, it is perceived by the compet-
itors in the relevant market as likely to enter that market if anticompeti-
tive practices develop.
128. Id. at 75-80.
129. TXI/Pan Am-National Order at 23.
130. Id. at 20-31.
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A more general examination of entry conditions must begin with
the recognition that the most significant barrier to competitive en-
try in the domestic system was a regime of restrictive licensing and
that has been eliminated by the passage of the A.D.A. In imple-
menting its provisions we have adopted a policy of granting wide-
spread authority to all fit applicants, and of allowing substantial
freedom to reduce fares and engage in price competition." 1
In considering the Pan Am application, the administrative law
judge chose five city-pairs where National was actually operating and
where Pan Am was an actual potential competitor. He concluded,
based upon the high concentration ratios and the competitive effect Pan
Am's entry into these markets would have, the proposed merger would
violate the Clayton Act in all such markets.3 2 Rejecting his recommen-
dation, the Board again decided it was necessary to go beyond market
share and concentration ratios, and determined all five markets were
substantial markets that would draw other capable competitors should
the merger be approved. 33
Internationally, city-pairs are not as important because consumers
are more price sensitive and less time sensitive, willing to substitute
destinations and origins when economically advantageous. The airline
industry and C.A.B. have recognized this unique situation. Thus both
Judge Dapper and the Board concluded, with respect to the Pan Amer-
ican-National merger, that the United States-Western Europe market
should be the applicable international market, with United States-
London as a sub-market.l&4
With respect to the United States-Western Europe market, Judge
Dapper determined that National and Pan Am were actual competitors
in a concentrated market, that National had become the third largest
United States carrier crossing the Atlantic and moreover, was a vigor-
ous competitor; therefore, its loss under the contemplated merger would
be anticompetitive and violative of the Clayton Act.135 The Board, on
the other hand disagreed that National had been a vigorous competitor
131. Id. at 27.
132. TXI/Pan Am-National Judge Decision at 110-114.
133. TXI/Pan Am-National Order at 55-57.
134. Id. at 32-34, 44-46, and TXI/Pan Am-National Judge Decision at 94-101.
135. TXI/Pan Am-National Judge Decision at 104-109.
64 Nova Law Journal
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and disagreed that the merger would have any effect on a healthy and
increasingly competitive transatlantic market.1 36 Further the Board
noted:
Competitive conditions in the United States-Western Europe mar-
ket have changed markedly in recent months, and we believe that
as a result the reduction by one of the number of United States
scheduled carriers will have little impact on competition. Over the
past few years the United States government has promoted and en-
couraged liberalized entry in international aviation. The results of
this effort are now being seen in the form of bilateral agreements
with some European nations which permit United States carriers,
unrestricted in number, to fly to virtually any major point (city) in
those nations.1317
The Board agreed with Judge Dapper's analysis of the United
States-London submarket. Transferring National's Miami-London cer-
tificate would increase the Pan American market share and would be
anticompetitive. Rather then veto the merger as the Judge recom-
mended, the Board conditioned approval on the loss of the Miami-
London route, making that route subject to separate route
proceedings. 3 8
Since the Board disagreed with the Judge on the public interest
test, it approved both the Texas International and the Pan American
applications.1 39 Before the A.D.A. such approval would automatically
clothe the acquisition or merger with antitrust immunity. But the
Board noted congressional policy had changed under the A.D.A. Im-
munity must now be specifically conferred by the Board, if the Board
determines under section 414 of the A.D.A. that immunity is required
136. TXI/Pan Am-National Order at 35-43.
137. Id. at 37. This decision was written before I.A.T.C.A. became law; this has
further increased competition on the Transatlantic routes.
138. Id. at 44-54 and TXI/Pan Am-National Judge Decision at 109-110. Even-
tually the Board was forced to return the route permanently to the new Pan Am, be-
cause it was the only U.S. carrier that could continue to fly into Heathrow under the
terms of amendments to the Bermuda II Treaty, imposed by the British. Russell,
London Run Is Pan Am's: CAB Cities Heathrow Flap, Miami Herald, Apr. 8, 1980,
§ A, at 1, col. 3.
139. TXI/Pan Am-National Order at 3-7.
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in the public interest. Additionally, the Board required the applicants
to show the merger would not go forward without such immunity.
Neither applicant made the showing; therefore, the Board declined to
grant antitrust immunity.140 Without such immunity it is conceivable
that the merger may be subject to collateral attacks by the Government
or other airlines, which could subject the resulting airline to treble
damages and other penalties."4
Despite arguments that labor protective provisions were not justi-
fied under the philosophy of the A.D.A., the Board nevertheless condi-
tioned its approval on acceptance of the standard labor protective
provisions first enunciated in the Allegheny-Mohawk Merger Case.142
Other Post-A.D.A. Decisions
No formal C.A.B. opinion was prepared in the Eastern-National
merger case, because Eastern dropped out of competition after receiv-
ing the initial unfavorable Board opinion.1 43 It is useful nevertheless to
compare briefly the administrative law judge's initial decision in East-
ern with the Board decision in the TXI/Pan Am-National Merger.
Noting the vigorous actual competition between Eastern and National
on the East Coast and Sun Belt Routes, Judge Murphy concluded the
applicable geographical markets for the Clayton Act test were groups
of routes (rather than city-pairs). 4 He placed much emphasis on mar-
ket share and firm concentration ratios; and, despite misgivings en-
genderred by General Dynamics, concluded those statistics, though
generated prior to the A.D.A., proved the merger would be anticompe-
140. Id. at 73-77.
141. See generally Beane, The Antitrust Implications of Airline Deregulation,
45 J. AIR L. & COM. 1001 (1980).
142. TXI/Pan Am-National Order at 65-69. See text accompanying notes 168-
69 infra.
143. Application of Eastern Air Lines, Inc. for Approval of Acquisition of Con-
trol of National Airlines, Inc., Docket No. 34226, CAB Order No. 79-12-74 (Dec. 17,
1979) (dismissing the application).
144. Eastern-National Judge Decision at 22-32. The routes were: 1) New York-
Florida Routes, 2) Washington-Florida Routes, 3) Intra-Florida Routes, 4) New York-
Washington Routes and 5) Sun Belt Routes. With very little discussion, the Judge
accepted the relevant product market as "scheduled passenger air transportation." Id.
at 22.
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titive.145 After examining the effects of various barriers on potential
competitors, it was his opinion that such barriers precluded entry by
other airlines in four of the five markets; therefore, Eastern had failed
to rebut the merger opponents' prima facie case.148 Thus the proposed
merger failed the Clayton Act test. Therefore even though it passed the
Sherman Act test and the Public Interest test, Judge Murphy recom-
mended disapproval. 47
Both administrative law judges premised their decisions on tradi-
tional, historically-slanted market share analysis. They were less in-
clined to include the effects of the A.D.A.'s deregulatory philosophy.
The Texas International/Pan Am-National Board decision, which
came several months later, more willingly predicted the market and
competitive effects of the year-old A.D.A.
Continental Airlines and Western Airlines have twice submitted
joint applications for approval of proposed mergers. Even though the
administrative law judge in the first application recommended ap-
proval, the full Board voted to disapprove.1 48 It filed no formal opinion
because the Continental Board of Directors withdrew from the merger
agreement. In the Order Dismissing Application, the Board indicated
the proposed merger would fail the Clayton Act test, since both airlines
were aggressive actual competitors in at least twelve city-pairs and po-
tential competitors in many other western cities.149 Further, the Board
expressed concern about barriers caused by crowded conditions at some
Western United States airports which would bar potential competitors
even in a deregulated situation.1 50 Another factor was the possibility of
145. Id. at 33-36 citing United States v. General Dynamics, 415 U.S. 486
(1974).
146. Id. at 37-51. While there were no regulatory barriers, and temporary but
not insurmountable capital barriers, there were landing slot restrictions at some East-
ern U.S. airports that might constitute barriers, and similar but less serious gate
problems in Florida. Fuel sources were not a problem. But route efficiency and the
marketability of the alternatives might constitute barriers in certain markets. Cumula-
tively there would be problems of entry in all but perhaps the Sun Belt market and
therefore Eastern had not rebutted the prima facie case against it. Id.
147. Id. at 62.
148. See First Continental-Western Order.
149. Id. at 1.
150. Id. at 2.
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duopolistic control by the new airline and United Airlines.151 The
Board did not accept some of the asserted public benefits,152 and thus
disapproved the application.
In instituting proceedings on the second case, the Board asked the
parties and the administrative law judge to specifically address those
concerns it voiced over the first application and to relate them to the
forseeable effects of the A.D.A. 53 Judge Vittone addressed five issues.
First, evidence clearly showed competition in the airline industry na-
tionwide was increasing. 5 Second, since the implementation of new
routes under the A.D.A., competition between the two airlines had sub-
stantially declined.1 55 But third, in those two city-pairs where the
merger would cause decline in competition, there were sufficient poten-
tial competitors.1 58 With respect to concentration Judge Vittone wrote:
Similarly I have concluded that the loss of one of the applicants
upon the merger will not adversely affect the balance of perceived
potential competition in the west. The structure of the air transpor-
tation industry has changed significantly since deregulation and the
Western United States has been the scene of many such changes.
Carriers traditionally confined to the east have entered western
routes since deregulation. Mergers have strengthened the networks
of formerly limited western carriers. . . . Concentration in the
west is declining.157
Fourth, significant improvements had taken place to remove those bar-
riers previously a problem . 58 Finally he determined that the resultant
carrier and United would not be able to exert duopolistic control in
light of deregulation.159 Judge Vittone also extensively examined the
151. Id.
152. Id. at 3.
153. Continental-Western Judge Decision at 1.
154. Id. at 9.
155. Id. at 9-11. Of the twelve original city-pairs where the two airlines were
actual competitors, only four remained that were still served by both. One new city-
pair had been added.
156. Id. at 12-19, 25.
157. Id. at 25.
158. Id. at 27-36.
159. Id. at 37-43.
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relevant product markets."1 0 He finally concluded the proposed merger
would pass all three A.D.A. merger tests.161 The Board adopted his
decisions as its own.162
The Board's three decisions are best viewed and explained in light
of geographic markets served by the various airlines involved in the
mergers at the time the A.D.A. was passed. On the east coast there
was National, Eastern and Delta; an Eastern-National merger would
result in a duopoly between the resultant airline and Delta. In the vast
western United States there was Continental, Western and United; a
Continental-Western merger would result in a duopoly between the re-
sultant airline and United.
But Texas International was largely a Texas-Mexico-southwestern
United States local service carrier and Pan American was strictly an
international carrier, while National was a small trunk line with some
east coast, sun belt and transatlantic traffic. Its merger with either of
the latter applicants would not result in the same potentially duopolistic
market that the first Continental-Western merger or the Eastern-Na-
tional merger would have caused. In the few years since the A.D.A.,
this potential for duopolistic control in a regional market has generally
disappeared because of the liberalized route application proceedings. 1 8
Labor Issues
As previously mentioned, the A.D.A. established a ten year protec-
tion program to assist employees adversely affected by deregulation.
Monthly payments for up to 72 months, relocation assistance and prior-
ity in hiring at any certificated airline, after that airline's furloughed
employees have been called back, are the three major provisions. 1"
Nonetheless the Board prescribed labor protective provisions in the
TXI/Pan National merger as a condition for merger approval.165 The
Board put all interested parties on notice that while special provisions
would not be automatic in future mergers, until unions and labor con-
160. Id. at 44-75.
161. Id. at 87.
162. Second Continental-Western Order.
163. 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
164. 49 U.S.C. § 1552 (Supp. III 1979).
165. TXI/Pan Am-National Order at 65-69 and Appendix III-Labor Protective
Provisions.
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tracts had an opportunity to adjust to the A.D.A., provisions would be
applied as they had since 1950.166 These provisions provide for the inte-
gration of seniority lists in a fair and equitable manner; the payment of
displacement allowances or differential pay for a three year period, if
an employee is adversely affected by the merger; a dismissal allowance
equal to 60% of the average monthly compensation of the employee for
anywhere from six to sixty months, depending on total length of service
and relocation assistance for employees forced to move because of the
merger.1 67
The Pan American-National merger caused many labor problems
based on the different nature of the two airlines and on the different
types of airplanes being used. Labor problems prevented management
from using and mixing equipment in the most advantageous manner.6 8
Eventually an arbitrator had to decide the integration method for pilots
and flight engineers using a complex formula.'69
In the second Continental-Western case, the administrative law
judge found that even two years after the adoption of the A.D.A. most
of the eleven labor agreements binding the applicants had been con-
cluded or substantially delineated prior to the Board's National-Pan
Am decision.17 0 Thus the "notice" given in that decision did not pre-
pare the parties for a merger free of labor protective provisions. The
judge recommended provisions similar to those in the National-Pan Am
166. Id.
167. TXI/Pan Am-National Order at Appendix III-Labor Protective Provisions.
168. See, e.g., Feazel, Labor Problems in Merger May Lead to Arbitration, Av.
WEEK & SPACE TECH., Apr. 21, 1980, at 26; Meshing Problems for Pan Am and
National, Bus. WK., Jan. 21, 1980, at 56; Union Issues Big Problem Facing Pan Am
in National Merger, Aviation Daily, Apr. 15, 1980, at 249 and Teamsters Outline
Problems in Pan Am-National Merger, Aviation Daily, Apr. 16, 1980, at 261.
169. In Re: Merger of Pan Am and National Airlines Flight Deck Crew Mem-
ber Seniority Lists, (Arbitrator Lewis M. Gill, Mar. 12, 1981) and In Re: Merger of
Flight Deck Crew Member Seniority Lists. Pan Am and National Airlines, (Arbitrator
Lewis M. Gill, May 5, 1981). Possibly inspired by a similar attempt by Continental
employees to purchase a controlling interest of their airline's stock and thereby pre-
clude a takeover attempt by Texas International, a group of Pan American employees
unsuccessfully tried a similar approach with Pan American in an effort to install their
own management. See Continental's Crusade to Stop Frank Lorenzo, Bus. WK., May
11, 1981, at 110; Merzer, Group Seeks a Takeover of Pan Am, Miami Herald, May
21, 1981, § A, at 1, col. 6.
170. Continental Western Judge Decision at 81.
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decision.171 The Board agreed with this analysis, and adopted the labor
protective provisions in its order.17 2
A clearer picture of the future of these provisions was to have been
supplied by the Texas International-Continental Acquisition Case, 73
where Texas International voiced opposition to the provisions. The
C.A.B. instituted a proceeding to consider the costs and benefits of the
provisions.174 On the fourth day of the hearing, however, Texas Inter-
national withdrew its opposition, citing conditions similar to those in
the Continental-Western case.175 Thus, since no evidence against the
provisions would be presented, the judge recommended ending the
hearings as useless.1' He noted that the Board wished to stop using the
provisions, but concluded that this was not the proper case for such a
decision. 7
Conclusion
The Texas International/Pan Am-National Merger Case first in-
terpreted the parameters of airline merger under the A.D.A. While the
administrative law judges tended to use traditional analytical tools in
their decisions, the C.A.B. took a broader view. Recognizing that the
A.D.A. was meant to change the traditional patterns of growth in com-
mercial aviation, the Board rejected only those mergers that would pro-
duce a duopoly of control in an area. As deregulation proceeds, compe-
tition should increase in all areas of the country, with the possibility of
duopolistic control lessening everywhere. Perhaps the last years of
C.A.B. control will approach the "decontrol" the A.D.A. aspires to.
The limits to merger will be the pressures of economy, often difficult to
predict. As in the Pan Am-National merger, an unsuccessful merger
attempt may be more financially rewarding than a completed one. Only
time will tell if Pan Am was the winner in its endeavors.
171. Id. at 82.
172. Second Continental-Western Order at 16 and Appendix B.
173. C.A.B. Docket No. 39285 (1981).
174. Texas International-Continental Acquisition Case, Docket No. 39285,
C.A.B. Order 81-3-100 (Jan. 3, 1981).
175. Texas International-Continental Acquisition Case, Docket No. 39285, at 2
(Partial Decision of Judge Kane, Jr., May 22, 1981).
176. Id. at 3.
177. Id. at 4-5.
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Appendix A
The following abbreviated citation form is used: A.W. = Aviation
Week & Space Technology; B.W. = Business Week; M.H. = Miami
Herald; N.Y.T. = New York Times; W.S.J. = Wall Street Journal.
7/10/78 TXI announces it bought 790,700 shares of NAL's 8.6 mil-
lion shares of common stock between June 12, 1978, and
July 7, 1978, for $14,355,780.45 including brokers' commis-
sions. It is considering the possibility of seeking control.
N.Y.T., July 11, 1978, § D, at 1, col. 1, W.S.J., July 11,
1978, at 2, col. 2; A.W., July 17, 1978, at 28.
7/28/78 TXI files with C.A.B. to seek control of NAL. Also notifies
S.E.C. of intent to buy not more than 25% of NAL common
stock. Stock to go in voting trust. C.A.B. Bureau of Con-
sumer Protection notifies TXI that such purchases would be
a "knowing and willful" violation of Federal Aviation Act.
TXI has no definite plans for the acquisition. N.Y.T., July
29, 1978, § A, at 23, col. 3; W.S.J., July 31, 1978, at 3, col.
4.
8/8/78 NAL asks C.A.B. to delay approving TXI request to
purchase more NAL stock and also asks that TXI be forced
to detail its takeover plan. N.Y.T., Aug. 9, 1978, § D, at 1,
col. 6; W.S.J., Aug. 9, 1978, at 11, col. 3.
8/16/78 TXI's Netherlands Antilles financing subsidiary announces
offering of $25 million convertible subordinated debentures
paying 72% convertible into TXI common stock at the rate
of one share per $14.50 of debentures. Proceeds will be used
to buy additional NAL stock. W.S.J., Aug. 8, 1978, at 35,
col. 2; W.S.J., Aug. 17, 1978, at 29, col. 1.
8/22/78 Pan Am files application with C.A.B. for permission to
merge with NAL. Announces that it has acquired 411,600
shares or 4.8% of NAL's stock. Offers $35/share or approxi-
mately $286 million for acquisition. Pan Am also asks that
it be allowed to purchase up to 25% of NAL stock. A.W.,
Aug. 28, 1978, at 30; W.S.J., Aug. 24, 1978, at 3, col. 1;
W.S.J., Aug. 25, 1978, at 2, col. 3.
8/25/78 C.A.B. enters order tentatively allowing TXI to purchase up
to 25% of NAL common stock. Requires that all stock in
excess of 10% be placed in a voting trust device, with stock
172 Nova Law Journal 6:19811
76
Nova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol6/iss1/1
6:1981 Airline Deregulation & Merger 73 1
to be voted in same proportion as all non-TXI held NAL
stock. Recommends that all such stock be placed in voting
trust. Thirty days for comments before order is confirmed.
TXI-NAL Acquisition Case & Enforcement Investigation,
Docket No. 33112, Order 78-8-150 (Aug. 25, 1978); see
also W.S.J., Aug. 18, 1978, at 6, col. 4.
8/28/78 C.A.B. permits Pan Am to purchase up to 25% of NAL
common stock on same conditions as TXI. TXI case as-
signed to administrative law judge. N.Y.T. Supp. Mat.,
Aug. 29, 1978, at 12; W.S.J., Aug. 29, 1978, at 4, 1.
8/29/78 TXI has purchased 1,553,300 shares or approximately
18.2% of NAL stock for a total acquisition cost of
$42,193,501. TXI also announces foreign debenture sale
completed. A.W., Sept. 4, 1978, at 36; W.S.J., Aug. 31,
1978, at 27, col. 4.
9/5/78 U.S. Justice Department announces its intent to intervene
and files Petition for Intervention with the C.A.B. W.S.J.,
Sept. 5, 1978, at 2, col. 3.
9/6/78 Directors of Pan Am and NAL hold merger discussions in
Miami, Florida. W.S.J., Sept. 6, 1978, at 2, col. 2; W.S.J.,
Sept. 7, 1978, at 5, col. 5.
9/7/78 C.A.B. consolidates TXI and Pan Am merger cases. Pan
Am announces that it has a definitive merger agreement
with NAL whereby Pan Am would purchase NAL for $41/
share or about $350 million and would rename NAL Pan
American U.S.A. W.S.J., Sept. 8, 1978, at 6, col. 4; TXI-
NAL Acquisition Case/Pan Am Acquisition Case, Docket
Nos. 33112 and 32283, Order Consolidating Cases 78-9-24
(Sept. 7, 1978).
9/11/78 TXI announces it has bought an additional 165,000 shares
at a price per share of $34.08. TXI has 1,718,300 shares at
a total cost of $48,816,076.45 or $28.41 per share. W.S.J.,
Sept. 11, 1978, at 12, col. 3.
9/14/78 TXI petitions C.A.B. to permit it to acquire control of
NAL. Eventually TXI expects a complete amalgamation of
the two carriers, but has no specific plans at present. W.S.J.,
Sept. 15, 1978, at 38, col. 5.
9/15/78 U.S. Justice Department urges C.A.B. to prohibit further
purchases of NAL stock by either Pan Am or TXI. Pan
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Am discloses details of the Pan Am-NAL merger
agreement and that it has lined up $300 million of the
$350 million credit needed for the purchase. Pan Am also
has acquired 1,614,000 shares of NAL stock or 18.9% for a
total purchase price of $55,406,297. A.W., Sept. 25, 1978,
at 21-22; W.S.J., Sept. 18, 1978, at 10, col. 2; W.S.J.,
Sept. 19, 1978, at 34, col. 2.
9/25/78 TXI asked by NAL if it expects to make an offer better
than Pan Am's. W.S.J., Sept. 26, 1978, at 1, col. 2.
9/29/78 Frank Borman, EAL President, states that EAL would
have to seek merger if either Pan Am or TXI are permitted
to merge with NAL. EAL urges C.A.B. to disapprove both
mergers. A.W., Oct. 2, 1978, at 33.
10/16/78 Pan Am files documentation with C.A.B. B.W., Nov. 6,
1978, at 67.
10/20/78 C.A.B. approves continued use of voting trusts by TXI and
Pan Am. TXI-NAL Acquisition Case/Pan Am Acquisition
Case, Docket Nos. 33112 & 33283, Order 78-10-100 (Oct.
20, 1978).
10/24/78 President Carter signs the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978, PUB. L. No. 95-504, 92 STAT. 1705 (amending 49
U.S.C. § 1301 et seq.); W.S.J., Oct. 25, 1978, at 2, col. 3.
10/31/78 Hearing before Judge Dapper begins and lasts until Janu-
ary 12, 1979. Exhibits and transcripts total over 12,000
pages. Opening briefs filed by 25 organizations. TXI-NAL
Acquisition Case/Pan Am Acquisition Case, Docket Nos.
33112 & 33283, Decision at 5 & 7 (Apr. 5, 1978).
11/3/78 TXI purchases 76,500 more shares of stock at $22.34/
share for a total holding of 1,969,000 shares, or $54.5 mil-
lion. TXI has acquired 23% of NAL at a per share average
of $27.45. A.W., Nov. 6, 1978, at 34.
12/11/78 EAL announces that it too will seek approval to merge
with NAL. EAL offers $50/share or $425 million for
NAL. Criticized as a defensive move. Financing may be
difficult because of a high debt-equity ratio. A.W., Dec. 18,
1978, at 29; B.W., Dec. 25, 1978, at 35; N.Y.T., Dec. 12,
1978, § D at 1, col. 6; W.S.J., Dec. 12, 1978, at 3, col. 1.
12/13/78 EAL files application for merger approval with C.A.B. and
requests that case be consolidated with the other two NAL
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merger cases. EAL Acquisition Case, Docket No. 34226,
Decision at 1 (June 14, 1979).
12/15/78 NAL management unsure what it will recommend to its
stockholders relative to the EAL merger attempt. Before
EAL offer, NAL planned to recommend the lower Pan Am
offer. W.S.J., Dec. 18, 1978, at 17, col. 1.
12/21/78 Despite contrary recommendation by Judge Dapper,
C.A.B. denies EAL Petition to Consolidate all NAL
merger cases. W.S.J., Dec. 22, 1978, at 8, col. 1.
12/22/78 S.E.C. investigation into adequacy of TXI's and Pan Am's
public disclosures reported. EAL not affected. N.Y.T.,
Dec. 23, 1978, § 1, at 29, col. 5; W.S.J., Dec. 26, 1978, at
7, col. 1.
12/29/78 EAL announces that Chase Manhattan Bank has agreed to
provide $100 million of $425 million purchase price.
W.S.J., Jan. 1, 1979, at 19, col. 4.
1/22/79 U.S. Department of Justice files brief with C.A.B. opposing
both TXI and Pan Am merger proposal on antitrust
grounds. D.O.J. argues such mergers would have anticom-
petitive effects and would violate standards set by the Air-
line Deregulation Act of 1978. U.S. Department of Trans-
portation, on the other hand, files briefs supporting both
airlines. W.S.J., Jan. 23, 1979, at 48, col. 1.
1/25/79 Pan Am proposes amendment to its offer which would al-
low bidding between EAL and Pan Am if they receive final
approval to merge with NAL. N.Y.T., Jan. 27, 1979, § 1,
at 29, col. 4; W.S.J., Jan. 29, 1979, at 18, col. 2.
2/8/79 NAL announces auction plan whereby Pan Am and EAL
would have five rounds of bids in a 48 hour period with
Pan Am always getting the final bid. EAL states that it is
willing to forego C.A.B. antitrust immunity to expedite its
merger effort with NAL. N.Y.T., Feb. 9, 1979, § D, at 5,
col. 1; W.S.J., Feb. 9, 1979, at 2, col. 3.
2/20/79 TXI makes formal bid to NAL of consideration that would
be worth at least $50/share composed of cash, debt securi-
ties, equity securities or a combination. W.S.J., Feb. 20,
1979, at 4, col. 2.
2/21/79 Air Florida asks C.A.B. approval to purchase NAL inter-
national routes and four of its DC-10 series 30 airplanes at
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same price that the purchaser of domestic route pays. Air
Florida urges that Pan Am be given domestic route and
Air Florida be given the international route. W.S.J., Feb.
22, 1979, at 29, col. 1.
3/9/79 NAL rejects TXI offer and says that after merger NAL
shares would not be worth $50 each because of TXI financ-
ing arrangements. W.S.J., Mar. 12, 1979, at 2, col. 2.
4/5/79 Administrative Law Judge Dapper files opinion in which he
finds that the application of TXI to merge with NAL
should be denied, further finds that TXI has violated 49
U.S.C. § 1378 by acquiring control of NAL without prior
C.A.B. approval and finally recommends that Pan Am's
application also be denied. TXI-NAL Acquisition Case/
Pan Am Acquisition Case, Docket Nos. 33112 & 33283,
Decision (Apr. 5, 1978); see also W.S.J., Apr. 6, 1979, at
7, col. 3.
4/25/79 NAL tells shareholders in supplementary proxy material
that they, in effect, would be loaning TXI the money with
which to buy NAL. Both the U.S. Departments of Justice
and Transportation tell the C.A.B. they oppose the acquisi-
tion bid of EAL because it would reduce competition.
W.S.J., Apr. 26, 1979, at 2, col. 2.
5/2/79 Pan Am formally raises its merger offer to $50/share.
M.H., May 3, 1979, § C, at 7, col. 3.
5/16/79 NAL shareholders approve Pan Am's revised merger offer
at annual meeting. They also approve the management rec-
ommended auction plan which would give Pan Am the
final bid should the C.A.B. approve Pan Am and EAL
merger. TXI merger offer is rejected. Palm Beach Post,
May 17, 1979, § C, at 5, col. 3.
6/14/79 Administrative Law Judge Murphy finds that the EAL ap-
plication for merger with NAL should be denied because it
would substantially lessen competition. EAL Acquisition
Case, Docket No. 34226, Decision (June 14, 1979). See
also M.H., June 15, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 5.
7/10/79 C.A.B. unanimously enters a preliminary order instructing
its staff to prepare a final order permitting both TXI's ap-
plication to acquire and Pan Am's application to merge.
Preliminarily the Board finds that neither application is in-
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consistent with the public interest or anticompetitive under
the standards prescribed by 49 U.S.C. § 1378. Further the
C.A.B. lifts its 25% limits on the purchase of stock by both
carriers because it does not want to preclude either carrier
from purchasing the NAL stock at its present, possibly
lower price. TXI-NAL Acquisition Case/Pan Am Acquisi-
tion Case, Docket Nos. 33112 & 33283, Order (July 10,
1979); M.H., July 11, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 5.
7/21/79 C.A.B. turns down Continental-Western merger proposal
despite recommendation of administrative law judge. Many
on Wall Street see this as signal that the Eastern proposal
will also be rejected because of similar anticompetitive fac-
tors. M.H., July 24, 1979, § C, at 4, col. 1; M.H., July 25,
1979, § A, at 12, col. 2; A.W., July 30, 1979, at 22.
7/23/79 Pan Am announces that it has bought 95,000 shares of Na-
tional the preceding week and 900,000 shares today for to-
tal holdings of 3.1 million shares or 36% of NAL stock.
M.H., July 24, 1979, § C, at 4, col. 5.
7/24/79 NAL's stock topped the N.Y.S.E. active list with
1,191,400 shares traded. Pan Am confirmed it was buying,
but refused to reveal numbers. Nine large blocks of stock
totaling 911,400 shares were sold today and assumption is
Pan Am was the buyer. If true then Pan Am had at least 4
million shares of National or roughly 47% of the total
stock. M.H., July 25, 1979, § A, at 12, col. 2.
7/26/79 Pan Am publicly acknowledges that it is the majority
shareholder in NAL, having purchased 4,398,500 shares in
all for a total purchase price of about $186 million or a per
share average price of $42.25. Eastern owns only about 100
token shares. Speculation is that TXI would make about
$45 million for its shares. M.H., July 27, 1979, § A, at 1,
col. 6.
7/29/79 Pan Am and TXI announce Pan Am will buy NAL stock
owned by TXI for 3 million dollars plus $50 per share.
TXI will realize pre-tax profit of $45,780,000 on the sale of
2.9 million shares and Pan Am will own 75.9% of NAL.
Palm Beach Post Times, July 29, 1979, § A, at 24, col. 1.
7/30/79 TXI President Lorenzo informs C.A.B. by letter that TXI
will sell stock to Pan Am. TXI-NAL Acquisition Case/Pan
77 I1
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Am Acquisition Case, Docket Nos. 33112 & 33283, Deci-
sion 79-12-163; 79-12-164; 79-12-165 at 61 (Oct. 24,
1979).
8/10/79 NAL announces fiscal year profit of $24.22 million or
$2.83 per share. Palm Beach Post Times, Aug. 11, 1979, §
A, at 19, col. 5.
9/13/79 N.Y.S.E. halts trading in T.W. Corporation (T.W.A. par-
ent company) stock. Trading rapid because of TXI attempt
to acquire T.W.A. through purchase of 1.6 million shares.
TXI attempt rebuffed by T.W. Corporation. A.W., Sept.
19, 1979, at 26; N.Y.T., Oct. 29, 1979, § D, at 1, col. 3.
9/27/79 Informal C.A.B. decision disapproves Eastern merger bid
with National. Anticompetitive effects cited. A.W., Oct. 1,
1979, at 23.
10/5/79 Eastern announces it will-halt its pursuit of NAL in view
of the C.A.B. decision. A.W., Oct. 8, 1979, at 29.
10/24/79 Formal 77 page C.A.B. decision issued approving both
Texas International and Pan Am merger applications and
setting out the detailed rationale of the Board. TXI-NAL
Acquisition Case/Pan Am Acquisition Case, Docket Nos.
33112 & 33283, Decision 79-12-163; 79-12-164; 79-12-165
(Oct. 24, 1979); A.W., Nov. 5, 1979, at 32; M.H., Oct. 30,
1979, § A, at 1, col. 1; N.Y.T., Oct. 30, 1979, § A, at 1,
col. 4.
12/7/79 Hearings to begin on London-Miami service proposals.
Eleven airlines, including Pan Am, Eastern and Air Florida
had filed proposals. A.W., Dec. 3, 1979, at 31.
12/22/79 President Carter approves TXI and Pan Am merger pro-
posals. Letter from President Jimmy Carter to C.A.B.
Chairman Marvin Cohen dated December 22, 1979. M.H.,
Dec. 23, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 1; N.Y.T., Dec. 23, 1979, §
1, at 12, col. 2.
12/26/79 C.A.B. grants Pan Am exemption for Miami-London route
until permanent route decision made. Pan Am Acquisition
Case, Docket No. 33283, Order 79-12-166 (Dec. 26,
1979).
12/31/79 Pan Am net income for the last full year of operation
before acquiring National was reported as $76.128 million,
which was down from the $118.801 million net income
178 6: 1981 1
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from the year before. PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS,
INC., ANNUAL REPORT 1979 at 2 (1980).
1/7/80 Formal acquisition of National by Pan Am. B.W., Jan. 21,
1980, at 56.
1/18/80 National certificates of public convenience and necessity
formally transferred to Pan Am. Pan Am Acquisition
Case, Docket No. 33283, Order 80-1-125 (Jan. 18, 1980).
1/29/80 U.S.-Great Britain bilateral talks begin. Gatwick over
Heathrow is seen as a major issue. A.W., Jan. 21, 1980, at
31.
2/15/80 International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979
signed into law by President Carter. Deregulates interna-
tional aviation to extent possible. PUB. L. No. 96-192, 94
Stat. 35 (Feb. 15, 1980).
2/22/80 Administrative Law Judge Elias Rodriguez recommends
Eastern get Miami-London route. M.H., Feb. 23, 1980, §
A, at 1, col. 8.
3/5/80 U.S.-British bilateral agreement initiated. All new London
service, whether British or American, to be through
Gatwick. A.W., Mar. 17, 1980, at 26.
4/3/80 D.O.T. announces it would support legislation for C.A.B.
sunset in 1982 rather than 1985. A.W., Apr. 7, 1980, at
32.
4/7/80 Full C.A.B. gives Pan Am the Miami-London route be-
cause Pan Am was the only route applicant that could con-
tinue to serve Heathrow Airport under bilateral agreement.
A.W., Apr. 14, 1980, at 24; M.H., Apr. 8, 1980, § A, at 1,
col. 8; Palm Beach Post, Apr. 8, 1980, § B, at 9, col. 5.
7/1/80 Pan Am will be unable to meet the deadline for a fully
completed merger because of labor problems caused by
merger. A.W., Apr. 21, 1980, at 26.
7/28/80 Pan Am announces that it had agreed to sell its 59 story
headquarters building in New York City to Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company for a total sales price of $400 mil-
lion. Airline will continue to occupy the 15% of the build-
ing it was using. B.W., Aug. 11, 1980, at 25; TIME, Aug.
11, 1980, at 50.
10/6/80 Pan Am announces that Teamsters unions have reached
agreement as to the integration of seniority lists for certain
79 1
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ground personnel. A.W., Oct. 6, 1980, at 36.
10/26/80 Pan Am and National officially become one completely
merged airline operating solely under the Pan Am name.
A.W., Oct. 6, 1980, at 36; PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIR-
WAYS, INC., 1980 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (1981).
12/31/80 Sale of Pan Am building officially recorded, which resulted
in a gain of $294.4 million. The company also showed an
operating loss of $87.819 million, compared to an operat-
ing income of $112.703 million for the previous year. Be-
cause of the gain on the sale of the building, the net in-
come for the year was $80.266 million versus $76.128
million for the previous year. Id. at 27.
3/12/81 Arbitrator Lewis M. Gill issues Award in In Re: Merger of
Pan Am and National Airlines Flight Deck Crew Member
Seniority Lists and thereby resolves the seniority integra-
tion problems. See also A.W., Mar. 2, 1981, at 38.
4/7/81 Pan Am founder and former C.E.O., Juan Trippe dies.
TIME, Apr. 13, 1981, at 81.
5/11/81 Arbitrator Lewis M. Gill issues 59 page Opinion in In Re:
Merger of Flight Deck Crew Member Seniority Lists, Pan
Am and National Airlines, to explain and support his ear-
lier Award.
5/20/81 Former National pilots group announces intent to organize
all Pan Am employees in an effort to buy the controlling
interest in the company. M.H., May 21, 1981, § A, at 1,
col. 1.
6/30/81 Revenue passenger miles for first half of 1981 down 9.1%
over same period in 1980 and Pan Am has a $217.6 million
operating loss for the first six months of 1981 versus a total
1980 operating loss of $126.9 million. A.W., July 20, 1981,
at 27; M.H., Aug. 15, 1981, § A, at 5, col. 1.
7/7/81 William Waltrip appointed President of Pan Am to suc-
ceed William Seawell. Pan Am changes to a holding com-
pany, with three divisions, one of which is the airline.
A.W., July 13, 1981, at 30; M.H., July 8, 1981, § A, at 1,
col. 1; M.H., July 19, 1981, § F, at 1, col. 1.
7/14/81 Pan Am announces 10% reduction in operations and the
reduction of the payroll by 3,000 jobs. Operations in New
York City will only be at J.F.K., rather than there and at
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Newark and LaGuardia. M.H., July 15, 1981, § A, at 1,
col. 1; M.H., July 19, 1981, § F, at 1, col. 1.
8/3/81 P.A.T.C.O. strikes and causes disruptions in flight sched-
ules and causes further losses. TIME, August 17, 1981, at
14; NEWSWEEK, Aug. 24, 1981, at 52.
8/15/81 Miami Herald reports that well placed sources indicated
Pan Am might move its headquarters back to the former
National headquarters at the Miami International Airport
to take advantage of all the unused space that is available
and to further reduce operating expenses. M.H., Aug. 15,
1981, § A, at 1, col. 5.
8/20/81 Earlier this week Pan Am announced that its profitable In-
ter Continental Hotel subsidiary or division is for sale. Di-
rectors are assembled today to allegedly consider approxi-
mately $500 million offer for the 83 hotel chain in 48
countries from Grand Metropolitan Ltd., a giant British li-
quor and hotel company. PALM BEACH POST, Aug. 21,
1981, § D, at 9, col. 4.
8/21/81 Pan Am agrees to sell Inter Continental Hotel Corp., sub-
sidiary to Grand Metropolitan Ltd. of London for $500
million. Sale to be consummated on September 30, 1981.
A.W., Aug. 31, 1981, at 29.
9/1/81 C. Edward Acker, chief executive officer of Air Florida, be-
comes chairman and chief executive officer of Pan Am. Eli
Timoner to replace Acker at Air Florida. A.W., Aug. 31,
1981, at 29.
9/7/81 Pan Am announces 67% unrestricted fare cuts on many do-
mestic routes to increase traffic. A.W., Sept. 14, 1981, at
34.
9/11/81 Pan Am signs formal agreement with syndicate of banks
led by Citibank for a $200 million line of credit. Unions
required to take 10% pay cut as condition of loan. A.W.,
Aug. 24, 1981, at 31.
10/5/81 Senate Commerce Committee drafts further C.A.B. sunset
legislation, which would require the C.A.B. to cease to ex-
ist by April 1, 1983. Thereafter mergers to be handled by
Department of Justice as with any other industry. A.W.,
Oct. 5, 1981, at 49.
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10/12/81 President Reagan gives final approval to TXI takeover of
control of Continental Airlines, Inc. TXI owns 50.3% of
stock for which it paid $96.6 million. B.W., Oct. 26, 1981,
at 182.
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Tax-Free Fringe Benefits and Social Security: Is It
Time to Change the Rules?
Gail Levin Richmond*
[I]f benefits were keyed to wages earned, there would be something
of a check upon the demands which might be made as to amounts
of pensions, and. . . the method in which benefits were made de-
pendent upon wages earned would fit the benefits somewhat to the
circumstances of life of the beneficiary, because presumably his
way of living would be fixed by the wages he had been in the habit
of receiving; and his benefit would be fixed upon the same basis.,
When then Assistant Attorney General Jackson made the above
argument in defense of the social security system, economic conditions
were vastly different from those faced by Congress and the Court in
1981. There was no minimum wage, although a twenty-five cent per
hour minimum was subsequently enacted in 1938.2 The act under at-
tack in Helvering v. Davis provided for a tax of only one percent, levied
on no more than $3,000 of an employee's annual wages, and its mod-
est retirement benefits were hardly surprising.4 Fringe benefits, the sub-
* Associate Dean and Associate Professor, Nova University Center for the Study
of Law; J.D., Duke University, 1971; M.B.A., University of Michigan, 1967; A.B.,
University of Michigan, 1966.
1. Opening Argument of Robert H. Jackson before the Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937), reprinted in S.
Doc. No. 71, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1937).
2. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 6, 52 Stat. 1062, upheld in
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
3. Social Security Act, ch. 531, tit. VIII, §§ 801, 811(a), 49 Stat. 636, 639
(1935). Employers paid a like amount. Id. § 804, 49 Stat. 637.
4. Monthly benefits ranged from 1/2 of 1% of the first $3,000 aggregate covered
wages to 1/24 of 1% of wages exceeding $45,000. The maximum benefit allowed was
$85 per month. Id. tit. II, § 202, 49 Stat. 623.
The minimum wage has always lagged behind the FICA wage base. In 1940, for
example, the thirty cents per hour minimum wage yielded annual earnings of only
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ject of this article, were of minor importance; indeed, the Revenue Act
of 1936 virtually ignored them.5
Several events occurred in 1981 which, considered as a group, sug-
gest a re-examination of the continuing validity of the argument quoted
above. The Supreme Court in Rowan Cos. v. United States invalidated
a Treasury regulation imposing social security (FICA) tax on the value
of meals and lodging furnished employees for the employer's conve-
nience.7 Congress excluded from income the use of an employer-pro-
vided day care center,8 extended the time period during which em-
ployer-provided legal 'assistance plan benefits would be excludible, 9 and
continued until 1984 the moratorium preventing the issuance of Trea-
sury regulations governing the tax status of fringe benefits. 10 And, in a
move that has proven highly controversial,"' that body accepted a Rea-
gan administration proposal to eliminate the minimum benefit paid re-
cipients of social security pensions. 12 Such a re-examination is particu-
$600; the FICA wage base was then $3,000; in 1981, the amounts involved were, re-
spectively, $6,700 and $29,700.
5. The only "fringe benefit" excluded by that act was a rental allowance pro-
vided ministers of the gospel. Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 22(b)(6), 49 Stat. 1658.
The 1936 Act repeated the broad language of the 1913 Act taxing "compensation for
personal service . . . in whatever form paid . . . ." Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, §
II(B), 38 Stat. 167; Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 22(a), 49 Stat. 1657.
6. 101 S. Ct. 2288 (1981), rev'g 624 F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1980). Rowan invali-
dated Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(a)-l(f) (1956). Also invalidated was a comparable provi-
sion interpreting wages for purposes of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA),
Treas. Reg. § 31.3306(b)-l(f) (1956). Although the problem discussed also affects the
computation of that tax, the $6,000 wage base provided in I.R.C. § 3306(b)(1) limits
its application in most instances.
7. These items are excluded from gross income by I.R.C. § 119.
8. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 124(e), Daily Tax
Report, Aug. 3, 1981 (Supp.) (signed Aug. 13, 1981). This provision will be codified as
I.R.C. § 129.
9. Id. § 802 (extending I.R.C. § 120 through 1984).
10. Id. § 801.
11. See, e.g., House Panel Challenges Administration over Minimum Benefit
Data, Daily Tax Report, Sept. 10, 1981, at G-2.
12. Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2201, 95 Stat. 830; cf. H.R. 4331, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981). See also H.R. 4342, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
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larly timely since further cuts in social security benefits, including the
percentage of pre-retirement income they will replace, are currently
under study.13
Development of the Income Tax Rules
Congress did not exclude any fringe benefits from taxation until
192114 and then acted very slowly in exempting additional benefits.,,
Thirty-three years later, the 1954 Code excluded only employee death
benefits,16 amounts received under employer-financed health and acci-
dent plans17 (and the amounts paid to fund such benefits 8), meals and
lodging furnished for the employer's convenience,19 and a minister's
rental allowance. 20 Furthermore, legislative activity between 1954 and
1976 served primarily to reduce the favorable tax treatment granted
certain benefits.21 Only after the Treasury Department issued its 1975
Discussion Draft of proposed fringe benefits regulations22 did Congress
wake up and begin enacting exclusions.
Noting that "[t]he status of most other fringe benefits is not an-
swered expressly by statute, '23 the Treasury Department proposed
13. Daily Tax Report, May 12, 1981, at X-1; The Battle over Repairing Social
Security, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 28, 1981, at 116; STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE,
97TH CONG., 1ST SEss., REPORT ON SOCIAL SECURITY FINANCING (Comm. Print
1981).
14. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 213(b)(11), 42 Stat. 227, enacting present
I.R.C. § 107 (rental allowance furnished to a minister of the gospel). This provision
overruled the IRS position expressed in O.D. 862, 4 C.B. 85 (1921).
15. The IRS excluded several benefits on its own, however. See, e.g., O.D. 265, 1
C.B. 71 (1919); L. Op. 1014, 2 C.B. 88 (1920); O.D. 514, 2 C.B. 90 (1920); O.D. 915,
4 C.B. 85 (1921).
16. I.R.C. § 101(b).
17. Id. § 105.
18. Id. § 106.
19. Id. § 119.
20. Id. § 107.
21. I.R.C. § 79, enacted in 1964, limited an exclusion previously granted by the
Treasury Department. Compare Revenue Act of 1964, Pub.-L. No. 88-272, § 204, 78
Stat. 36, with Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(2), T.D. 6272, 1957-2 C.B. 21.
22. 40 Fed. Reg. 41,118 (1975) (proposing Treas. Reg. § 1.61-16) [hereinafter
cited as 1975 Discussion Draft].
23. Id. at 41,119.
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three exclusion categories. Many benefits would be excluded because
they arose from the employer's business and the employer incurred no
substantial additional costs in providing them;* examples included
stand-by travel privileges for flight attendants and employee discounts
on merchandise.2 ' Other benefits, such as bodyguards provided the
president of a multinational company, qualified under a nine-item
"facts and circumstances" test.2 5 Finally, an exclusion was proposed for
any benefit "so small as to make accounting for it unreasonable or ad-
ministratively impractical." 26 These proposals, which were withdrawn
in 1976,2 7 resurfaced several years later.28 By then, however, the list of
statutory exclusions exempt from such regulations had been signifi-
cantly expanded.
As befitted its title, the Tax Reform Act of 197629 was less than
generous to fringe benefit recipients. Thus, Congress substantially nar-
rowed the tax-free status of most employer-financed disability income
payments,30 basing eligibility to some extent on a needs test.31 The only
new exclusion enacted, that for employer-financed legal assistance,"
even carried its own sunset provision.3 3
Several 1978 acts contained fringe benefits provisions. The Reve-
nue Act of 1978, for example, excluded from gross income educational
assistance program benefits.3 Meals and lodging furnished an em-
ployee's spouse and dependents, a benefit whose tax status had never
24. Id.
25. Id. at 41,119-20.
26. Id. at 41,120.
27. 41 Fed. Reg. 56,334 (1976).
28. Fringe Benefits Discussion Draft of Jan. 15, 1981, STAND. FED. TAX REP.
(CCH) 8991 (not filed in Fed. Reg.) [hereinafter cited as 1981 Discussion Draft].
See also Discussion Draft Bill, [1979] 10 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 1 6156 (pro-
posing statutory rules).
29. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520.
30. Id. § 505(a), 90 Stat. 1566 (I.R.C. § 105(d)).
31. Id.
32. Id. § 2134(a), 90 Stat. 1926 (I.R.C. § 120).
33. Id. 2134(e). The exclusion, granted for 1977 through 1981, was extended
another three years by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34,
§ 802, Daily Tax Report, Aug. 3, 1981 (Supp.).
34. Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 164, 92 Stat. 2811 (I.R.C. § 127).
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been resolved by the Internal Revenue Service, s were excluded from
income by the Tax Treatment Extension Act of 1977.3 That same act
imposed a moratorium, extended in yet another 1978 act, preventing
the issuance of fringe benefits regulations until 1980. Finally, the En-
ergy Tax Act of 1978 added an exclusion for group transportation pro-
vided employees between home and work."
Each of the 1978 benefits can be defended as furthering a particu-
lar policy objective. Not only is a well-educated work force presumably
more productive, but education is viewed by most people as a route to
job advancement.39 Tax laws have frequently been drafted to benefit
families; thus, it is not surprising that Congress chose to ease the tax
burden of individuals forced to live on the employer's business premises
or live apart from the family-member employee. 0 Likewise, groups of
employees traveling together in one vehicle presumably reduce traffic
congestion (and the resulting accident rate), cause less highway deteri-
oration, and use less fuel.4 1 Nevertheless, each of these benefits would
have been taxable if the 1975 Discussion Draft regulations had become
final. Each involves an employer outlay which could easily involve sub-
stantial additional cost; none of them is so small that accounting for it
is unreasonable or impractical; and none of them qualifies under the
facts and circumstances test. 2
35. Jacob v. United States, 493 F.2d 1294 (3d Cir. 1974).
36. Pub. L. No. 95-615, § 205, 92 Stat. 3107 (1978) (amending I.R.C. §
119(a)).
37. Id. § 3, 92 Stat. 3097 (Oct. 1, 1977, through June 30, 1978); Act of Oct. 7,
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-427, § 1, 92 Stat. 997 (May 1, 1978, through December 31,
1979). A further extension was imposed by the Act of Dec. 29, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-
167, § 1, 93 Stat. 1275 (1979) (until May 31, 1981).
38. Pub. L. No. 95-618, § 242, 92 Stat. 3193 (redesignating I.R.C. § 124 as
§ 125 and inserting a new § 124).
39. The Senate Finance Committee was particularly concerned that the then-
existing rules constituted a disincentive to upward mobility. S. REP. No. 1263, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 101 (1978).
40. The Tax Treatment Extension Act of 1977, of which this was but one provi-
sion, dealt in large part with employees working outside the United States.
41. The Senate Finance Committee stated its desire .to encourage this energy-
saving activity. S. REP. No. 529, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1977). At the same time, it
noted that expected energy savings were negligible. Id. at 60.
42. Several of the examples contained in the 1975 Discussion Draft, while not
exactly on point, provide useful analogies. Example (8) excluded reimbursements for
1 6: 
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In early 1981, the Treasury Department again proposed regula-
tions to govern items not mentioned in the Code.43 This version would
have taxed employees when they obtained or used any property, service
or facility in connection with the performance of services; exceptions
were provided only for benefits which constituted working conditions or
which were excludible on grounds of administrative convenience."
While many examples in the 1975 proposals reappeared, 5 several 1981
items were far more onerous.46 Thus, Congress' decision to extend the
regulations moratorium through December 31, 1983, is hardly
surprising. 47
dinner and taxi fare paid to an employee who works several hours past normal quitting
time because of the press of business. At the same time, Example (9) taxes chauffeur
service used in transporting top executives to and from work. While Example (9) might
be distinguished from the van-pooling allowed by I.R.C. § 124 because the former was
limited to top executives, Example (8) would still prove troublesome as I.R.C. § 124 is
not limited to overtime situations. See also Examples (11)-(15). In judging the exclu-
sion for meals and lodging furnished relatives of an employee, see Examples (5)(c) &
(6), which provide exclusions where no additional employer costs are involved for the
family members.
Although an argument can be made on behalf of the educational benefits, which
could enhance job performance, I.R.C. § 127 is not phrased in such narrow terms.
Indeed, the only educational benefits it prevents from qualifying are those "involving
sports, games, or hobbies." I.R.C. § 127(c)(1). Thus, an unlimited exclusion could eas-
ily frustrate the policy behind Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b). See Example (19), where the
same argument is made with regard to employee use of the employer's day care center
and the limitations of I.R.C. § 214 (which was repealed in 1976 and replaced with
I.R.C. § 44A).
43. 1981 Discussion Draft, proposing Treas. Reg. § § 1.61-17 to -20.
44. Id. § 1.61-17(a).
45. E.g., 1981 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-18(d)(4) and 1975 Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.61-16(0(7) (taxi fare for safety reasons); 1981 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-18(d)(7)
and 1975 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-16(0(13) (bodyguards).
46. Compare 1981 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-19(b)(1) with 1975 Prop. Treas.
Reg. § 1.61-16(0(3) (employee discounts). Compare 1981 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-
18(d)(9) & § 1.61-20(c)(3) with 1975 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-16(0(6) (family mem-
bers accompanying employee on business trips at no extra cost to employer). The 1981
proposals are reminiscent of language in S. REP. No. 768, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 161,
165-68 (1974), involving the examination of then President Nixon's tax returns; cf.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. No. 463, TRAVEL,
ENTERTAINMENT AND GIFT EXPENSES 4 (rev. Nov. 1980); Rev. Rul. 56-168, 1956-1
C.B. 94 (example 3).
47. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 801, Daily Tax
6: 1981 1
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Congress also took the opportunity in 1981 to "grandfather in" a
new exclusion48 and to re-enact an expiring one.4 9 There thus remain
few fringe benefits which are not currently excluded from income by
statute and, therefore, immune from the scope of any proposed regula-
tions which may be forthcoming in 1984.50
Effect of Exclusions
While an employee receiving compensation in kind is in no worse a
position than his counterpart who receives cash and uses it to purchase
the benefit,51 this discussion is limited to those compensatory benefits
which are excluded from the employee's income.52 Such benefits allow
the employee to improve his economic situation over that of the worker
receiving cash and purchasing the benefit. The extent of this enrich-
ment varies, as is shown in the following example, with the tax conse-
quences attendant upon the purchase.
This discussion involves Employee X, whose employer will pay him
a salary of $20,000 in 1982.51 The employer will also purchase Blue
Cross health insurance coverage for X, pay tuition for X to attend law
Report, Aug. 3, 1981 (Supp.). Although the moratorium ended May 31, and the act
was not passed by Congress until August, the Treasury Department acceded to Con-
gressional warnings to promulgate no regulations during this period. See Daily Tax
Report, June 17, 1981, at G-2.
48. Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 124(e). I.R.C. § 129, which this provision added, is
discussed in notes 65-66 infra.
49. Id. § 802, extending the I.R.C. § 120 exclusion for group legal assistance
plans through December 31, 1984.
50. But see S. 1479, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (adoption subsidies). As there
is a large group of tax practitioners supporting Congressional, rather than administra-
tive, resolution of the fringe benefits problem, the 1984 rules may instead be statutory.
See, e.g., Discussion Draft Bill, [1979] 10 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 6156.
51. If the benefit is taxable, he will have gross income equal to that of his coun-
terpart receiving cash, and any deduction allowed for such purchase will reduce the
amount of his income. If the benefit is excludible, he will have no increase in his taxa-
ble income whether or not he could have deducted the purchase.
52. As the discussion thus far indicates, those items are substantial in number.
See I.R.C. § 125, which allows an employee to be taxed with reference to the benefits
he chooses, rather than the benefits he could have chosen, when his employer offers a
choice among benefits; cf. I.R.C. § 305(b)(1).
53. This example is based on the law in effect during 1982.
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school part-time, and allow X's child to stay in the day care center
connected to its office. Each of these benefits is worth $600 to X, who is
a widower and has no other source of income.
Because X's employer will deduct its cost for all these items," any
item excluded by X will be one on which neither party is taxed. While
such omissions may result in a higher level of tax rates overall, 55 that
issue does not concern X. He would rather know if any of the in-kind
benefits are taxable and whether his tax consequences would have dif-
fered had his employer increased his salary by $1,800 and offered no
benefits."8
Only the cash salary will be included in X's 1982 income.57 Thus
X will have a gross income of $20,000 if he receives the fringe benefits
in kind, and $21,800 if he instead receives their cash value. In the lat-
ter instance his tax liability will increase unless he can offset the addi-
tional $1,800 by deductions or credits arising from his purchasing the
benefits himself.
Code Section 213 provides a deduction for medical care expenses,
including premiums for insurance designed to reimburse the taxpayer
for costs incurred.58 Because the Section 213 deduction is computed
with reference to a taxpayer's income, X may be limited to a deduction
of only $150 and be left with a residual tax liability.59 In fact, unless X
itemizes his deductions, he will receive no relief at all.e"
Regulations covering allowable trade or business expense deduc-
tions are relevant to the tuition benefit.6' Because Code Section 162
54. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1).
55. See, e.g., Ott, Ott & Turner, Burden Distribution of a Broad-Based Per-
sonal Income Tax System and Its Implications for Tax Reform Discussions, 34 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 805 (1969).
56. See Martin v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 1133, 1134 (5th Cir. 1981)
(Goldberg, J., dissenting) for a discussion of this issue in the context of a different
fringe benefit, an interest-free loan from employer to employee.
57. I.R.C. §§ 106, 127, 129.
58. Id. § 213(e)(1)(C).
59. Medical expenses are deductible only to the extent they exceed 3% of ad-
justed gross income; insurance premiums can be deducted without regard to that floor
to the extent they do not exceed the lesser of $150 or one-half of the premiums. Id.
§ 213(a).
60. Id. § 63(b) & (c).
61. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5, as amended by T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 36.
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allows deduction of expenses incurred in carrying on a trade or busi-
ness, these ?egulations forbid a deduction for education expenses which
would qualify the taxpayer for a new trade or business.8 2 If X is al-
ready an attorney pursuing post-graduate studies, a deduction will be
allowed; if he is seeking a J.D. degree, he could not deduct his tuition.63
Moreover, because he is not self-employed, X must itemize to take any
deduction otherwise allowed."
Child care costs incurred so that a taxpayer can work are allowed
as credits whether or not the taxpayer itemizes deductions, but Code
Section 44A limits the credit to twenty percent of the amount paid.65
Thus, while payment by X of $600 would save him $120 in tax, includ-
ing that $600 in his income results in a larger tax increase.6 6
As the above example illustrates, a taxpayer receiving benefits in
kind will frequently be better off financially than a taxpayer receiving
cash remuneration who purchased comparable benefits. Even in those
instances where their income tax consequences are identical, the former
is further benefited by the in-kind payment because it saves him the
trouble of reporting an item of income and offsetting it on his tax re-
turn by the allowable deduction or credit.
Employment Taxes
The question involved in Rowan was not one of gross income, but
rather one of employment taxes. The particular benefit, meals and
lodging for employees, had been subjected to FICA and FUTA, but not
withholding taxes despite similar statutory language in the three provi-
62. Id. § 1.162-5(b)(3).
63. The Tax Court has denied a New York attorney a deduction for a bar review
course undertaken to qualify him for practice in California. Sharon v. Commissioner,
66 T.C. 515 (1976), aff'd, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941
(1979).
64. Compare the varying treatments of § 162 deductions granted by I.R.C. §
62(1) (self-employed individuals) and § 62(2) (employees).
65. Had X's 1982 income been substantially lower, the credit might have been as
high as 30%. I.R.C. § 44A(a)(2). Because X has only one dependent, the amount
against which the percentage is applied is limited to $2,400. Id. § 44A(d).
66. Based upon 1982 rates for an unmarried head of household, his marginal
rate would exceed 20% so long as his taxable income exceeded $11,800. Id. § § l(b)(1),
2(b).
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sions. 7 A brief discussion of these provisions' evolution will aid in un-
derstanding the Court's opinion.
The federal government first instituted a withholding system for
taxes when it established the social security system in 1935. 68 Because
that tax was imposed at a flat rate, with no exemptions for low income
taxpayers, and because a matching contribution was due from employ-
ers, this method of collection was more efficient for the government
than that used for the income tax since its 1913 enactment. In fact, the
relative ease of using withholding as a collection device led Congress to
adopt it for the income tax in 1942 when World War II forced a "dras-
tic increase in rates." 69
As the Court noted in Rowan, certain exceptions to the definition
of wages found in the 1942 legislation were identical to exceptions in
the social security provisions.70 However, the Senate Finance Commit-
tee justified these exceptions as a means of relieving farmers, house-
wives and certain other groups of the burden of collecting and account-
ing for small amounts.71 This justification would be inapplicable to
remuneration paid in kind by an employer who was already withhold-
ing tax on cash remuneration."
The Rowan Litigation
Although the general statutory scheme for withholding and em-
67. Id. § § 3121(a) (FICA), 3306(b) (FUTA), 3401(a) (income tax with-
holding).
68. Social Security Act, ch. 531, tit. VIII, 49 Stat. 636 (1935).
69. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1942). Congress was also
interested in promoting a more uniform application of income' tax law; reducing the
administrative problems of collection; and reducing inflation through restricting spend-
ing. Id. at 14-15. See also Hearings on Withholding Provisions Before a Subcomm. of
the Senate Comm. on Finance, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 125-36 (1942) (statement of
Milton Friedman, Division of Tax Research, Treasury Department) (confidential
Comm. Print).
70. S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 166 (1942); 101 S. Ct. at 2293.
71. S. REP. No. 1631, supra note 70, at 166. The government itself would be
relieved of the "administrative burden and cost of collection entailed in the handling of
numerous returns involving only nominal amounts." Id.
72. The Act clearly included non-cash compensation within its coverage. Reve-
nue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 172(a), 56 Stat. 884, 887; S. REP. No. 1631, supra note
70, at 166.
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ployment taxes still treats non-cash remuneration as wages, 7 Congress
has specifically excluded from coverage many of the fringe benefits pre-
viously discussed. 74 The particular benefit provided in Rowan was not
among these exclusions.
Rowan Companies (Rowan) operated drilling rigs, some of which
were as far as sixty miles offshore. Because transporting employees be-
tween land and these rigs was more costly than feeding and housing
them at the worksite,75 Rowan provided meals and lodging at that
site.76 The company did not treat the value of these items as wages
subject to withholding; nor did it consider them wages for purposes of
computing FICA or FUTA tax contributions." Acting in accord with
its regulations,7" the Internal Revenue Service claimed that the latter
two taxes were due. Rowan paid the amount in dispute and sued for a
refund. Although the government prevailed in district court as well as
in the Fifth Circuit,79 Rowan's position was upheld by the Supreme
Court. 0
The Court described in great detail the development of Code and
regulations provisions defining wages."' Although the challenged regu-
lations originated in 1940, the government's inconsistencies in interpre-
tation negated its use of the re-enactment doctrine to refute Rowan's
claim that Congress intended a uniform definition of wages for income
and employment taxes.8 2 More important, in the Court's view, was the
fact that wages are defined in substantially the same terms for purposes
73. I.R.C. 9 § 3121(a) (FICA), 3306(b) (FUTA), 3401(a) (income tax with-
holding).
74. Id. § 3121(a)(2), (17) & (18); § 3306(b)(2), (12) & (13); § 3401(a)(14) &
(19).
75. 101 S. Ct. at 2290.
76. Only employees assigned to offshore rigs received this benefit. Id.
77. Id.
78. Treas. Reg. §§ 31.3121(a)-l(f), 31.3306(b)-1(f) (1956).
79. 624 F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1980) (a.f'g an unreported grant of summary judg-
ment by the district court for the Southern District of Texas).
80. 101 S. Ct. at 2288.
81. Id. at 2293-97.
82. Id. at 2296. "The differing interpretations were not substantially contempo-
raneous constructions of the statutes .... Nor is there evidence of any particular
consideration of these regulations by Congress during re-enactment." Id. at 2297.
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of withholding and employment taxes,83 particularly since the withhold-
ing statute was the last of the three enacted. 84 Finally, the Court was
impressed with an idea expressed by it in an earlier decision,8 5 that
"wages" is a narrower concept than "income";86 an item excluded from
a taxpayer's income could thus not be included in his wages. 87
The inconsistencies the Court noted are very real. But they be-
come somewhat less important when it is remembered that Congress
did not merely re-enact the employment and withholding tax provisions
in 1954 and then stop legislating. Between 1954 and 1967, the first
year litigated in Rowan, Congress made several changes in the statu-
tory rules governing fringe benefits and thus had ample opportunity to
express displeasure with Treasury regulations interpreting the defini-
tions of wages. 88 Further, while the Court is correct in stating that the
three definitions of wages are substantially the same, the coverage of
these taxes has never been identical.89 Indeed, in view of the different
Congressional goals, differences should be expected. Employment taxes
are designed to finance replacement of income during periods of unem-
ployment, voluntary or otherwise; if an employee's fringe benefits also
cease during such periods, he will need more than a mere percentage
replacement of cash wages to maintain his life style.
As it clearly reduces the employer's and employee's reporting re-
quirements (as well as their tax liabilities), the Court's determination
that an item excluded from income cannot be included in wages is ap-
pealing from an administrative standpoint. Any other determination
would be nonsensical for purposes of income tax withholding, since an
excluded item is never taxed and the withheld amount would eventually
be refunded to the taxpayer. But for purposes of the employment taxes,
83. Id. at 2293.
84. Id.
85. Central IlI. Pub. Serv. Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 21 (1978).
86. Id. at 25. See Rev. Proc. 80-53, 1980-2 C.B. 848, providing for reporting
items excluded from withholding as "other compensation" on the Form W-2 issued by
the employer.
87. 101 S. Ct. at 2293.
88. For example, Congress enacted I.R.C. § 79 in 1964. Revenue Act of 1964,
Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 204(a)(1), 78 Stat. 36.
89. E.g., Students employed by their universities are not subject to FICA tax
withholding, but they are subject to income tax withholding. I.R.C. § 3121(b)(10) has
no counterpart in § 3401.
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that rationale need not apply to compensatory items.90 Not only do em-
ployment taxes have a different purpose, but on several occasions Con-
gress itself has used language indicating that it considers the concepts
of income and wages to be intersecting, rather than concentric.91
Conclusion
Rowan is a troublesome case in terms of employment taxes. Both
the magnitude of the particular type of fringe benefit in relation to
monetary wages, and the fact that the statute did not clearly exclude
these items from wages, are arguments justifying a different result.92
However, Rowan involves one particular exclusion from employment
taxes. In no way does it diminish other exclusions which have a statu-
90. If the item is not compensatory in nature, there is no justification for the
employer's deduction. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1). See H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. 32 (1935), rejected by the Rowan Court as ambiguous. 101 S. Ct. at 2295.
91. In the Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, 43 Stat. 253, Congress provided a tax
credit for earned net income. In so doing, it defined earned income to include "wages,
salaries, professional fees, and other amounts received as compensation for personal
services actually rendered . . . ." Id. § 209(a)(1), 43 Stat. 263. That definition was
changed in 1934 to include the following language: "but does not include any amount
not included in gross income. . . ." Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 25(a)(5)(A), 48
Stat. 692. The Senate made specific mention of this change and included by way of
example "a taxpayer whose entire earned income consists of a salary which is exempt
from tax . . . ." S. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1934).
Likewise, in 1976 Congress enacted § 120, but it did not make the conforming
amendment, § 3121(a)(17), until 1978. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455,
§ 2134(a), 90 Stat. 1926; Act of Oct. 17, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-472, § 3(b), 92 Stat.
1333. Moreover, I.R.C. § 3401(a) contains no comparable language.
Finally, the Senate Finance Committee Report accompanying the Revenue Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763, contains the following language: "Remunera-
tion is not necessarily excluded from the definition of employment tax wages for pur-
poses of employment taxes and income tax withholding simply because it is excludible
from gross income under some other section of the Code." S. REP. No. 1263, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 100 (1978). While the above language does lend credence to the
Court's argument that wages is defined the same way for purposes of each tax, it also
shows that Congress was not troubled by the idea that income was sometimes narrower
than wages.
92. Unlike the exemptions for group legal services plans and educational benefits
programs, there is no statutory language excluding meals and lodging from any of the
three taxes.
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tory basis; those items would still have been excluded even had the gov-
ernment prevailed in Rowan.93
The impact of these exclusions reaches beyond the taxpayer's cal-
culations for a particular year. To the extent an individual bases his life
style upon items of compensation9 4 which are not included in the tax
base for social security benefits, he is likely to find his post-retirement
life style inferior to that which he maintained during his working years.
While individuals whose includible compensation exceeds the applica-
ble wage base upon which FICA contributions are assessed are ex-
pected to encounter this phenomenon,95 lower-paid workers may en-
counter a more acute problem. Although some benefits may be
continued by the former employer,97 and others may be available
through government transfer programs,9 the retiree must self finance
or forego the remainder. Before it extends tax-free status to any addi-
tional fringe benefits, Congress should consider whether subjecting such
benefits to FICA tax now would result in significantly higher future
benefits for individuals presently earning less than the FICA wage
base. Perhaps it is time to rewrite Code Section 3121(a), not merely to
reverse the result in Rowan, but to restore meaning to its definition of
wages.99
93. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 3121(a)(2), (17) & (18).
94. Although excluded from gross income, these items still constitute "compensa-
tion." See, e.g., id. § 119(b)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(a)(1), T.D. 6220, 1957-1 C.B.
56-57.
95. Individuals whose salaries exceed $29,700 are presumably better able to save
for retirement than are individuals earning the minimum wage.
96. Particularly hard hit will be workers who are not covered by an employer-
financed pension plan.
97. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 79(b)(1); Rev. Rul. 75-22, 1975-1 C.B. 49.
98. E.g., Medicare and Legal Aid.
99. The Internal Revenue Service has already issued a ruling effectuating the
holding in Rowan but warning taxpayers that, meals and lodging which do not satisfy
the I.R.C. § 119 tests are subject to FICA. Rev. Rul. 81-222, 1981-39 I.R.B. 8.
196 Nova Law Journal 6: 19811
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Commentary
Bringing It All Back Home: Toward a Closer Rapport
Between Lawyer and Layperson
Michael L. Richmond*
"Everyone strives to reach the Law," says the man, "so how does it
happen that for all these many years no one but myself has ever
begged for admittance?"'
The public has never harbored any great love for the legal profes-
sion, yet it has openly avowed deep respect for and deference to the law
itself.2 For some reason, the public fails to translate its admiration for
the law into an esteem for attorneys. Recently, manifestations of this
public discomfort with the profession have exhibited themselves in mov-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Nova University Law Center, Fort Lauderdale,
Florida. A.B., Hamilton College; J.D., Duke University; M.S.L.S., University of North
Carolina. The author wishes to thank Professor Gail Levin Richmond of the Nova
faculty and Ms. Diamond Litty for their attention to the manuscript.
1. F. KAFKA, Before the Law, in THE COMPLETE STORIES 4 (Schocken Books
1971).
2. One can'hardly deny the truth of this dichotomy. A simple glance through the
pages of BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS (13th ed. 1955) will serve to demonstrate
both the contempt felt for lawyers and the esteem for the law. See Kupferberg, An
Insulting Look at Lawyers Through the Ages, JURIS DOCTOR, Oct./Nov. 1978, at 62
for a compendium of literary attacks on attorneys from Luke's "Woe unto ye also, ye
lawyers!" to Will Rogers' "Lawyers make a living out of trying to figure out what other
lawyers have written." See also Richmond, Book Review (A. HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE
MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS, THE COLONIAL PE-
RIOD), 3 NOVA L.J. 339 (1979). A remarkably thorough survey conducted in 1960
concluded that, as compared to other professions, the general reputation of lawyers (as
a group in the community) was virtually at the bottom, even though as individuals
attorneys were highly regarded. MISSOURI BAR PRENTICE-HALL SURVEY: A MoTIvA-
TIONAL STUDY OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES AND LAW OFFICE MANAGEMENT 41 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as MISSOURI BAR SURVEY].
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ies, television shows, and highly popular literature. This attitude toward
lawyers, rather than improving over the years, remains just as poor to-
day as ever.
One recent film, And Justice for All, perhaps exemplifies the prob-
lem as well as any. As the film opens, the attorney-hero finds himself
imprisoned for contempt of court. Since he came to this unfortunate
state of affairs by insulting a judge during an overzealous representa-
tion of his client, the film from its very outset requests the viewer to
accept that the only "good" attorney has no respect for the system it-
self. Assuming we can fairly judge from this showing, the public still
conceives of laywers as negative figures, put on earth to hinder rather
than effectuate the course of justice.
Nor should we lightly dismiss the impact of nonscholarly works,
since a great demand exists for popular works about the law. And Jus-
tice for All was a highly popular production, as were The Paper Chase
and its film version.3 However, these films do not portray the lawyer as
those in the profession would wish. Attorneys appear as petty, bicker-
ing individuals with narrow minds and low morals. The attorney-hero
must fight the other members of the profession, or at least demonstrate
disgust and dismay at their antics. The entertainment industry, at least,
views attorneys as fit objects for criticism and ridicule, but for little
else.'
While fiction about lawyers fares well at the bookseller's, nonfic-
tion also receives considerable public attention. Despite fairly wide-
spread criticism in legal literature, The Brethren made a good deal of
3. J. OSBORNE, THE PAPER CHASE (1971). The television version did not fare as
well. However, despite its relatively weak showing (it was aired in direct time conflict
with two highly popular comedies), it still had an average viewing audience of 8.5
million households every week and was warmly received by television critics. House-
man, Kingsfield's Folly: The Death of The Paper Chase, STUDENT LAW., Jan. 1980,
at 36. Even with The Paper Chase, which presented a sympathetic view of one law
student's efforts to gain a legal education, the public received a negative view of attor-
neys. The blocking characters placed in the path of the student - his professors, his
fellow classmates - continued to demonstrate all of the negative stereotypes which
have plagued the profession in popular depictions. Osborne's 1977 work, The Associ-
ates, also sold well as a novel but met a sadder fate as a television comedy series.
4. See Cohen, Has the Media Ruined the Image of Lawyers?, NOVA PERSPEC-
TIVE, Fall 1980, at 9. But see MISSOURI BAR SURVEY, supra note 2, at 191.
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money for its authors and publisher." Virtually every major figure in-
volved in the Watergate affair has published a book, some analyzing
the situation from a close legal perspective.6
Quite simply, the public wants to learn more about the legal pro-
fession - the way attorneys conduct themselves, the way the law is
fashioned, the way justice proceeds. Unfortunately, what they learn has
not come in packaging designed to display the profession at its best. In
1977, only 27% of those surveyed in the Gallup poll rated the honesty
and ethical standards of attorneys as being high or very high. In con-
trast, 62% of those surveyed gave such a rating to the clergy and 52%
to physicians.1 In terms of public confidence in the profession, a Harris
poll taken the same year showed only 16% of those surveyed had a
great deal of confidence in law firms - a drop from 24% in 1973.8
These public opinions are danger signals. Lawyers need to exert
more leadership in community affairs, and lawyers who are in-
volved in community affairs should be identified as lawyers. Fi-
nally, the organized Bar must assume an active role in making
more clear to the public the nature and necessity of a lawyer's ser-
vices, and the manner in which he charges for his services.9
If the profession does not heed this advice, we will continue to see even
the best intentioned plans of the bar received by the public in an unsa-
vory and negative manner.10
In Kafka's parable, which provided the introductory quotation, a
5. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME
COURT (1979). Cf. Sharp Blows at the High Bench, TIME, Mar. 10, 1980, at 48:
"Tell-it-all books on the Supreme Court may yet become a new publishing genre."
6. E.g., L. JAWORSKI, THE RIGHT AND THE POWER: THE PROSECUTION OF
WATERGATE (1976); J. SIRICA, To SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT (1979).
7. View from the Other Side of the Bar: the Public Looks at Lawyers, PuB.
OPINION, July/Aug. 1978, at 37-38. A 1981 Gallup poll shows the rating for attorneys
has slipped to 25% of those surveyed. Miami Herald, Sept. 20, 1981, § A, at 20, col. 2.
8. View from the Other Side of the Bar, supra note 7, at 36-37.
9. Thomason, What the Public Thinks of Lawyers, 46 N.Y.S. B.J. 151, 157
(1974).
10. Consider the headline of an article in a national newsmagazine, discussing
the plans of the profession to improve itself through continued education: "Message for
Bungling Lawyers - 'Shape Up!"' U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Aug. 27, 1979, at
57.
99 1
103
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1981
100 Nova Law Journal 6:1981
man from the country seeks admission to the law. The doorkeeper con-
fronting him makes him comfortable and takes his bribes, but nonethe-
less refuses him admission. At the moment the man dies, the door-
keeper tells him that the door was fashioned for him and him alone,
and will now be shut.1
This parable best summarizes the perceived relationship between
lawyer and layperson. The layperson believes he or she has the absolute
right to understand the law. Barring the way stands the lawyer who,
despite all pleading, deliberately obsecures all knowledge of the law.
Instead of appearing as a facilitator, the lawyer seems to be a blocking
figure. In such a relationship, the layperson cannot help but resent the
attorney. We thus differ from physicians, who have superior knowledge
in a field about which the layperson has no reason to know. Lawyers
have superior knowledge in a field which so pervades daily life that the
layperson feels the need to intimately understand it.
We serve ourselves poorly when we contribute, actively or pas-
sively, to perpetuate the layperson's relative ignorance of the law. In-
stead, we should assist the nonlawyer to comprehend the problems
which the attorney encounters on a daily basis. Only in this manner
can we achieve the proper balance between the professional and the
layperson - a relation in which the client comprehends the basic
ground rules and looks to the lawyer as a professional who, rather than
interpreting the rules, performs the highly skilled duties required by a
complex legal system.
The very language a lawyer uses contributes to this client
dissatisfaction.
Another thing wrong with many of us lawyers is that we conduct
our professional affairs in an impenetrable idiom, akin to the physi-
cian with his cryptic diagnoses and his inscrutable prescriptions,
written in chicken-tracks. The truth is that the doctor's cryptogra-
phy is a lesson in lucidity when compared with the lawyer's written
and oral hieroglyphics. 12
11. F. KAFKA, supra note 1. Kafka's distressing vision of the citizen, placed
innocently and unknowingly before an inscrutable legal mechanism, finds it fullest de-
velopment in THE TRIAL (1937), published in German as DER PROZESS (1925).
12. Waltz, The Unpopularity of Lawyers in America, 25 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 143,
147 (1976). See generally Richmond, supra note 2.
I
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Beyond any question, the public feels even more alienated from the law
when it cannot understand the very language in which we attempt to
communicate its concepts.
The public may be said to view law as a system of rules by which
society governs itself - a sort of complex conglomeration of regula-
tions permitting one to live as a social animal. Accordingly, the average
citizen must of necessity reach the ultimate depths of frustration when
the rules themselves are incomprehensible. When attorneys, by their
language, reinforce the public image that the law is indeed an impreg-
nable fortress whose entrance is barred by reams of obfuscating verbi-
age, that frustration leads the public to lash back at those who created
the blockage.
Again, virtually everything attorneys do, particularly on a subcon-
scious level, seems calculated to alienate the public from the law. This
problem permeates the entire system. "Trial judges . . . retreat to the
sanctity of their chambers where they can perform without embarrass-
ment, off the record. Those paneled walls provide a shelter for the
timid, the artless, the indecisive, who routinely take even the simplest
matters under advisement, rather than risk a clumsy ruling."13 This
ivory tower portrayal is compounded by the Chief Justice of the United
States who routinely shuns television reporters, to the point of refusing
to appear at a conference should cameras dare to be present. Yet in
direct contrast to this "high citadel" image, 14 "[m]ore than ever before,
the layman feels the influence of the law on his life."1 5 We must work
to improve our image with the public by improving the public's access
to the law itself. Attorneys must improve their communicative skills.16
13. Stafford, Our Tottering Legal System, 43 TEx. B.J. 207, 212 (1980).
14. Consider the recent argument for change in the hoariest bastion of legal edu-
cation, Harvard Law School. J. SELIGMAN, THE HIGH CITADEL: THE INFLUENCE OF
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL (1978).
15. Mersky, Berring & Richmond, Acquisition & Selection of Primary & Sec-
ondary Legal Material for Social Science Collections, 1 BEHAVIORAL & SOC. SCI.
LIBRARIAN 127, 127 (1979).
16. "We lawyers cannot write plain English. We use eight words to say what
could be said in two. We use old, arcane phrases to express commonplace ideas. Seek-
ing to be precise, we become redundant. Seeking to be cautious, we become verbose."
Wydick, Plain Language for Lawyers, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 727 (1978). Professor
Wydick's article and later book provide the attorney with a superb guide for improving
English prose. If members of the profession would simply use the aids available to
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Judges must be more open in their dealings with the public. 17 We must
publicly acknowledge our shortcomings, and actively work to correct
them."8 At the same time, we must affirmatively bend our efforts to
improving our image overall.
them, the general level of writing among lawyers would rise dramatically.
17. Stafford, supra note 13, at 212.
18. The area of legal malpractice deserves far greater treatment than is possible
within the confines of this commentary. It deserves mention because there can be no
greater way of breaching public faith with a profession than to have the profession
include among its members those who can practice in an unethical or shoddy manner
with little or no fear of 'censure by their peers. In this area in particular, however, great
strides have been made in the last decade.
After initial prodding by Ralph Nader in the early 1970's, the legal profession
began to examine its role in society and its own ethical superstructure. See Nader, The
Role of the Lawyer Today, MICH. ST. B.J., Nov. 1970, at 17. Continuing beyond Na-
der's preliminary considerations, Monroe Freedman raised the profession's awareness
of the serious problems with its ethical standards in his highly controversial LAWYERS'
ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975). Whatever view an attorney took of Freed-
man's depiction of an attorney, as one who acts ethically only when actively defending
the rights of a client against all comers, that attorney was certain to be discussing the
matter - perhaps for the first time in his or her entire career. Today, formulations and
reformulations of codes of ethics abound.
More to our purpose is the current dialogue on improving the quality of the profes-
sion while at the same time policing malfeasants. Most comforting is that the dialogue
takes place not only in the journals of law schools (see, e.g., Wolkin, On Improving the
Quality of Lawyering, 50 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 523 (1976)), but in the journals of state
bar associations as well. E.g., England, In Defense of Regulation by the Supreme
Court, 54 FLA. B.J. 254 (1980); Gaines, Legal Malpractice, 40 ALA. LAW. 477 (1979);
Gordon, Incompetent Lawyers? A Trial Judge's Perspective, KY. BENCH & B., Jan.
1979, at 8. Axiomatically, we must first clean our house before we can expect to open
it to company. This should not come with the negative feeling of airing dirty linen;
rather, our housecleaning chores will demonstrate to the public that we no longer wish
to hide with traditional aloofness - that we now conduct ourselves in an open and
active association with our clients.
Similarly heartening is the concept of peer review which has recently gained in
popularity, seen not in a punitive light but rather as a necessary support to strengthen-
ing the skills of practitioners. "It is aimed at helping lawyers improve the quality of
their performance and services. It is punitive only in cases of extreme incompetence
that cannot or will not be corrected." Smith, Peer Review: Its Time Has Come, 66
A.B.A.J. 451, 454 (1980).
But we must still keep in mind that thC discussion constitutes only a matrix within
which action must occur. As yet, the system has not yet developed to the point where
results will be apparent. The profession must yet demonstrate its willingness and ability
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The entire legal community is subjected to censure because, by and
large, only its most reprehensible members are continuously visible
to the general public. . . . The public rarely sees the legal profes-
sion's most competent and more scrupulously ethical practitioners.
They are too busy doing what they ought to be doing, and doing it
very well, to receive much media exposure.19
This should not require a major public relations campaign, with all
the hoopla and flag waving attendant upon a Madison Avenue produc-
tion. While individual bar associations already maintain public rela-
tions offices,20 what must happen should come from the efforts of virtu-
ally every individual connected with the legal profession. Complacency
should not guide us; rather, we must affirmatively take steps to correct
a seriously negative image in the minds of the public.21
One place we might start house-cleaning is in the area of unautho-
rized practice of law. One recent article22 presents a hypothetical dis-
cussion among a lawyer, a legislator, and a layperson. The dialogue
demonstrates lucidly how our present efforts to keep even the simplest
chores hidden behind the mask of professionalism tend to alienate and
confuse the 'public. More than this, by retaining even the most elemen-
tary tasks within the exclusive domain of the professional, we diminish
to seize upon these fine beginnings and put into practice a truly effective system for
improving the skills of its members.
19. Waltz, supra note 12, at 145.
20. Cf. M. BLOOM, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS 329 (1968).
21. It has been suggested that attorneys do quite well at blowing their own horns.
"A peculiar and quite noticeable feature ... is the profession's propensity for self-
praise.. . . Contemporary public opinion about the legal profession is such that such
image-building does not seem necessary. In public opinion polls covering several scores
of occupations, lawyers appear consistently close to the top .... ." 0. MARU, RE-
SEARCH ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION: A REVIEW OF WORK DONE 45 n.114 (1972).
Unfortunately, Mr. Maru's conclusion rests on an invalid premise: public confidence in
the attorney today is approaching the bottom of the scale. Cf. authorities cited at note
2 supra; Thomforde, Public Opinion of the Legal Profession: A Necessary Response by
the Bar and the Law School, 41 TENN. L. REV. 503 (1974). Even at the time Mr.
Maru put his pen to ink, lawyers were viewed as considerably less than saintly. M.
BLOOM, supra note 20, is replete with examples which belie Maru's conclusion. Thus,
the need for an affirmative response by the organized bar clearly exists.
22. Hunter & Klonoff, A Dialogue on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 25
VILL. L. REV. 6 (1979).
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the public's perceived need for a professional to handle all legal affairs.
In other words, we deprofessionalize our image when we maintain that
only professionals can handle rudimentary matters. Thus, it is not at all
strange that Mr. Layman, in the above-noted discussion concludes: "In
light of the discussion we've just had, I'm even more convinced than
before that the lay adjuster and my son should be allowed to handle my
legal problems. . . .I just can't see why nonlawyers should be barred
from law practice .... ,,23
More significant, perhaps, than the theoretical musings of a law
review article, is the experience of the Arizona Bar in attempting to
foreclose realtors from drafting simple preliminary documents. In State
Bar of Arizona v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co.,24 the unauthorized
practice committee of the Arizona Bar Association sought a declara-
tory judgment to prevent a prevalent practice among the realtors of the
state. Realtors drafted various legal documents relating to the sale of
real property in which they neither held nor proposed to acquire an
interest, and charged for the service. The Supreme Court of Arizona
held that this constituted the unauthorized practice of law and, on re-
hearing, made it pointedly clear that this also applied to the drafting of
a preliminary purchase agreement. 5
Rather than accept this decision, the realtors took their case to the
public. In a move destined to produce a bitterly contested campaign,
they attempted to amend the Arizona Constitution to permit realtors to
prepare all instruments incident to a sale in which they represented one
of the parties. Beyond doubt, the public knew well the issues repre-
sented by the amendment.
Every traditional campaign technique was employed on both sides:
The Bar rallying under the call of red, white and blue placards,
warning "Save the Constitution", and the realtors united under the
banner "Protect Your Pocketbook". Methods employed by both
sides included public relations firms, bumper stickers, telephone
calls, pamphlets, [etc.]. Leading newspapers took editorial stands
23. Id. at 21-22.
24. 90 Ariz. 76, 366 P.2d 1 (1961).
25. State Bar of Ariz. v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 91 Ariz. 293, 371
P.2d 1020 (1962).
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(frequently against the Bar).2
The public passed the amendment by a margin of almost four to one.27
The public had its say, and quite forcefully too. As commentators
later noted,28 the entire issue put a new perspective on the public's feel-
ings toward the legal profession. The public's image of the attorney
remained seriously deficient; but more importantly, traditional methods
used by the profession to achieve interaction with the public had
failed.29 Undoubtedly, the citizens of Arizona felt that a profession had
no right to stamp the imprimatur of "professional" on matters which
called simply for filling out some uncomplicated forms.
Has the profession taken the hint? Decidedly not. Several years
after the State Bar of Arizona decisions, the professional literature still
bemoaned the state of affairs.
Encroachments coupled with the great number of prospective law-
yers now in training create a situation in which it might not be
economically feasible to practice law. It is respectfully submitted
that in order to survive economically, many law trained personnel
will either have to work for the government or for large corpora-
tions. As a result the general public and the profession of law will
suffer.30
Six years later, those predictions of economic disaster have failed to
come true.
What we must do is relax our definition of the practice of law.
Simple matters, particularly those which nonprofessionals well versed
in the subject matter can easily handle, should indeed be ceded to those
nonlawyers. It seems absurd to have an attorney of thirty years' experi-
ence handle a simple real estate closing, when a novice realtor acting in
26. Marks, The Lawyers & the Realtors: Arizona's Experience, 49 A.B.A.J.
139, 141 (1963).
27. Id. at 141 n.ll.
28. Id. See also M. BLOOM, supra note 20, at 110 et seq.
29. Id.
30. Miller, What Others Think: Where Has the Practice of Law Gone?, 48 FLA.
B.J. 445 (1974), reprinted in 39 UNAUTHORIZED PRAC. NEWS 40, 41 (1974). See also
Resh, Unfounded Attacks on Unauthorized Practice, 40 UNAUTHORIZED PRAC. NEWS
272 (1977).
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accord with general instructions from house counsel could handle it
quite competently. In permitting - in welcoming - this result, the
profession can forcefully demonstrate to the public that it no longer
wants the role of pickpocket. The public will instead see a profession
which charges professional fees for professional work.
More and more, the public seeks alternatives to legal representa-
tion in matters which might traditionally call for an attorney. In Min-
nesota, complaints against the press are taken before the Minnesota
News Council, where a panel composed equally of press and public
hands down advisory opinions published across the state.31 There exist
"do-it-yourself kits" for divorce, probate, incorporating businesses, and
numerous other matters. Small claims courts and direct personal repre-
sentation before consumer-oriented state agencies have rapidly gained
in popularity. 32 Even the profession itself tacitly concedes that many
matters can readily be handled by a nonlawyer with the proper
training.
The use of legal assistants has proved beneficial to the attorney and
the client, in terms of economic advantages and the ability to pro-
vide more and varied legal services to a greater number of clients.
The question for most firms is no longer whether or not to hire
paralegals, but rather how can the firm best use them.33
There even exists a law school (albeit unaccredited), sans dean, sans
faculty, run entirely by one administrator and a group of highly moti-
vated students destined for careers in public interest law.34 The profes-
sion, rather than ignoring or deprecating these efforts, should take an
active role in assuring they function smoothly and properly. This would
guarantee the public adequate protection of its rights while requiring
31. Peterson, Minnesota News Council: Solving Disputes Without Courts, 66
A.B.A.J. 970 (1980).
32. The Logical Extension of the Do-It-Yourself Syndrome or "Qui Facit Per
Alium Facit Per Se", 37 UNAUTHORIZED PRAc. NEWS 111 (1973). See also Nader,
The Legal Profession: A Time for Self-Analysis, 13 AKRON L. REv. 1 (1979).
33. Guman & Ferguson, The Changing Role of Paralegals, 40 UNAUTHORIZED
PRAc. NEWS 280, 289 (1977).
34. Manna, The Other Half Goes to Law School, STUDENT LAW., Apr. 1980, at
18. See also Heflen, Preserving Professional Values in the Legal Services Marketplace
of the Eighties, 41 ALA. LAW. 157 (1980).
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that the attorney exercise only indirect supervision. The lawyer seeking
to improve the public's attitude toward the profession should instruct
nonprofessionals desiring to do this basic work or should verify the ac-
curacy of simple forms, thus ensuring the public receives competent
service at a reasonable price.
Just as attorneys should not prevent laypersons from performing
simple functions in a legal setting, they should actively assist the public
in obtaining counsel when truly needed. "A main present challenge to
the bar is to make absolutely sure that, out of the present partnership
between private and public support, there emerges a system under
which no poor person shall want for counsel." 35 Undeniably, the profes-
sion has long espoused this goal, and the American Bar Association has
certainly taken an active role in championing its realization. In 1977,
its Special Committee on Public Interest Practice put forth a forceful
report designed to stimulate discussion on the matter.3 6 Using as its
touchstone the Code of Professional Responsibility,37 the Special Com-
mittee proceeded on the basic assumption that "the professional re-
sponsibility to contribute public interest legal service is inherently an
obligation to contribute one's time - one's abilities."3 8 Now the em-
phasis has shifted again. Regrettably, the most recent proposed revision
of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility no longer de-
mands the donation of "unpaid public interest legal service" by each
member of the profession. 9 Nevertheless the concern demonstrated by
35. W. N. SEYMOUR, THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE LAWYER TO His PROFESSION 26
(1968) (25th Annual Benjamin Cardozo Lecture before the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, March 19, 1980).
36. ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INTEREST PRACTICE, IMPLEMENTING
THE LAWYER'S PUBLIC INTEREST PRACTICE OBLIGATION (1977).
37. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 2 and EC 2-25
(1978).
38. ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INTEREST PRACTICE, supra note 36, at
6.
39. Compare ABA PROPOSED MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
Rule 8.1 (1980) with ABA PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT, Rule 6.1 (1981). See generally Gilbert, The Bar's Position on Proposed
Model Rules, 54 FLA. B.J. 752 (1980). The profession should also attempt to improve
the level of its services in general, and the methodology by which the services get to the
public. See Christensen, Toward Improved Legal Service Delivery: A Look at Four
Mechanisms, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 277 (1979).
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the profession40 must be given life; each attorney should actively donate
much needed services to those financially unable to obtain them. Fur-
ther, we should take steps to make certain the public knows of our
efforts in this regard.
The effort, however, should not rest merely with the practicing
bar. All branches of the profession must join in educating the public
about the business of the lawyer, in the law itself, and in the complex
mechanics of the process as a whole. The judiciary must also take a
hand in the active supervision of the profession. One commentator sug-
gests that courts, acting perfectly within their rights to pass on the
competence of attorneys who practice before them, must exercise what
he believes is "a duty to the public to deny unqualified applicants ad-
mission [to their bars] ."41 The judges, he feels, have shirked this duty.
Beyond this, we must also acknowledge that the judiciary itself
has been the target of deserved criticism. "Judges, their black robes
once symbolic coats of armor shielding them from the barbs of public
criticism, are drawing increasing fire both for their decisions and for
the way in which they conduct their business. ' 42 Due perhaps to the
physical isolation in which the judiciary functions and the poor rela-
tions between bench and press, the public views judges with the same
jaundiced eye with which it regards attorneys. 43 "It is being said that
judges, too bound by the strictures that go with the job to respond in
kind to criticism, need mechanisms that would enable others to take up
arms in their behalf.' 44 In short, the judiciary must take pains to make
itself more available to the public - to improve its relations with the
press, to participate in and promote public discussions of the job of the
judiciary, and to educate the public in the role the bench and bar play
in society as a whole.
40. See, e.g., Palmer & Aaronson, Placing Pro Bono Publico in the National
Legal Services Strategy, 66 A.B.A.J. 851 (1980).
41. Toll, A Modest Suggestion for Chief Justice Burger, 66 A.B.A.J. 816
(1980).
42. Winter, Black Robes No Longer Shield Judges from Public Criticism, 66
A.B.A.J. 433 (1980).
43. Id. The profession itself has also placed the judiciary under fire of late. See,
e.g., Carrington, Ceremony & Realism: Demise of Appellate Procedure, 66 A.B.A.J.
860 (1980).
44. Id.
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Education of the public should go far beyond simple speeches,
newspaper columns, and occasional television and radio information
shows. Fortunately the bar is willing to participate in wider areas. For
example, the American Bar Association strongly favors an effort to
bring legal education into primary and secondary schools.' 5 This pro-
gram should receive great local support. "[E]lementary and secondary
students must be provided with an operative understanding of how our
system of law and legal institutions function."' 6 This would seem the
ideal opportunity for legal educators to aid in the process. Rather than
relying on the time and skills of practitioners (who would, perhaps, be
better used representing indigents), professional educators and law stu-
dents should shoulder the burden of developing and implementing an
effective program in the schools. Thus, still another branch of the pro-
fession can make a positive contribution to the overall effort.' 7
One commentator suggests that the duty of the law schools goes
far deeper than this. "[L]egal education generally fails to consider the
combined and often uncoordinated efforts of the several components of
the legal process to resolve particular social problems."' 8 Thus, law
schools should accept the duty of teaching students the law, not as ab-
stract theory, but rather as a unified method of resolving disputes in
society. The law should appear as a tool of social utility rather than a
means to personal gratification. Lawyers trained to accept this view
will go into practice with an outlook more conducive to better relations
with the public. "Generation after generation of students graduate
from law school without having been required to evaluate critically the
moral factors in decision-making. Even worse, they often graduate be-
lieving erroneously that morality has no place in the workings of the
45. ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON YOUTH EDUCATION FOR CITIZENSHIP, HELP!
WHAT TO Do, WHERE TO Go (1973), cited in Roche, The Three R's are Not Enough:
The Need for Law-Related Education in South Dakota, 22 S.D.L. REv. 41, 51 n.39
(1977).
46. Roche, supra note 45, at 43.
47. Some schools have made significant contributions in this area. The student-
run program at North Carolina Central University School of Law can serve as an
excellent model for schools wishing to become involved in heightening the respect for
and awareness of the legal profession among high school students.
48. Thomforde, supra note 21, at 525.
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legal process."49 In the main, legal education must accept its responsi-
bility for the lack of public confidence in the profession. It, too, must
take an active role in solving the problem.
Individual law professors can assist by bolstering a sadly deficient
body of literature which discusses the law at a level which a layperson
can readily understand. Academic and public libraries increasingly find
demand for legal material, yet must face the dilemma of too little accu-
rate material which their patrons can use without professional gui-
dance. A recent article,50 written for librarians seeking to acquire ma-
terial for social science collections, could cite only two dictionaries51
and one series of monographs 52 written by lawyers yet designed specifi-
cally for the lay audience. In contrast, a superb contribution designed
for the nonlawyer has recently appeared, which attempts
to make available as concisely as possible information about some
of the principal legal institutions, courts, judges and jurists, sys-
tems of law, branches of law, legal ideas and concepts, important
doctrines and principles of law, and other legal matters which not
only a reader of legal literature but readers in other disciplines and
indeed any person whose work or reading in any way touches on
legal matters may come across.53
Unfortunately, as The Oxford Companion to Law was designed specifi-
cally to cover British law, it contains relatively few references to the
law of the United States.54 The American public deserves a work such
49. Id. at 530. But see Taylor, Juris Pastor: A Return to the Counselor-at-Law,
31 MERCER L. REV. 545 (1980).
50. Mersky, Berring & Richmond, supra note 15.
51. S. GiFIs, LAW DICTIONARY (1975); D. ORAN, LAW DICTIONARY FOR NON-
LAWYERS (1975).
52. The LEGAL ALMANAC SERIES, published by Oceana Press, Dobbs Ferry,
N.Y.
53. D. WALKER, Preface to THE OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW at v (1980).
54. Those which appear, however, are brief and accurate, frequently revealing a
fascinating glimpse of the British view of our practice. Cardozo, for example, is de-
scribed as "one of the very greatest American judges, probably second only to Holmes
in making the judicial process creative yet evolutionary." Id. at 186. The coverage of
the United States, however, is spotty. While Cardozo and other Justices of the United
States Supreme Court appear, such leading state jurists as Roger Traynor and legal
scholars as William Prosser do not. While there is a discussion of Brown v. Board of
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as this, which attempts to describe in one or two paragraphs the es-
sence of legal concepts with which they might wish to become familiar.
Rather than writing exclusively for academic and bar publications, law
professors should contribute their writing skills to works designed for
the public at large. Law schools can assist this effort with grants and
permission for such works to qualify their authors for tenure and
promotion.
For some time, law librarians have wrestled with the problem of
supplying adequate reference services to their patrons. As indicated
earlier, these problems have begun to appear in non-law libraries as
well.55 Succinctly stated, problems arise when the librarian with legal
training attempts to assist the patron who, although not an attorney,
seeks to use legal materials. The first dilemma confronting the refer-
ence librarian, and the one with the widest ramifications, is the danger
of giving too much advice, thus running afoul of restrictions against the
unauthorized practice of law.56 Here, law librarians must tread the
straight and narrow, keeping within the confines of a narrow precept:
"[I]f no conclusion as to legal validity is made or no legal opinion is
offered, but only a statement as to the findings on a particular matter
by a nonlawyer, there is no unauthorized practice involved." 57 In prac-
tice, this can create not only problems with the organized bar, but a
breach of the code of ethics of law librarians as well.58
The librarian has "the responsibility to make the resources and
services of the library known to its potential users; he must 'seek above
all else to be an effective instrument for the dissemination of legal in-
formation.' " Thus, more than perhaps any other branch of the pro-
fession, the law librarian tries to familiarize the public (at least on an
Education, a similar treatment of Miranda v. Arizona is lacking. In assessing the value
of such a work, the American practitioner can readily see how much it reveals about
the practice of law in England.
55. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
56. Although no cases have been decided directly relating to law librarians, the
fear still exists. Schanck, Unauthorized Practice of Law and the Legal Reference Li-
brarian, 72 L. LIB. J. 47, 57 (1979).
57. Id. at 58. See also Mills, Reference Service vs. Legal Advice: Is It Possible
to Draw the Line?, 72 L. LIB. J. 179, 186 (1979).
58. Schanck, supra note 56, at 58. See also Begg, The Reference Librarian &
the Pro Se Patron, 69 L. LIB. J. 26, 31 (1976).
59. Begg, supra note 58, at 30 (citations omitted).
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individual basis) with the law. Yet the librarian has been hampered.
First, the ethical and legal problems caused by the risk of unauthorized
practice restrain the librarian. Second, the time and resources needed
to adequately inform the patron with no legal knowledge prove so great
that they may severely cripple a facility intended to support a profes-
sion, thus jeopardizing the primary mission of the law library.60 Third,
when the librarian has expended all of this time and effort, the in-
creased knowledge extends to only one person.
Without intending to minimize the very real problems the law li-
brarian faces in this regard, this branch of the profession can still do
much more to improve the public's opinion. Most significantly, law li-
brarians must not view the dissemination of information about the law
as providing legal services to the public. Rather, they should acknowl-
edge that assisting the general public is indeed their role.61 However,
this assistance should not come on an individual basis. Law libraries
can sponsor seminars, if not for the general public then for those li-
brarians who serve the general public, discussing the general rudiments
of legal research. They can maintain community bulletin boards,
sponsor public awareness programs, lectures and film societies, and
generally assist by offering their facilities for community-related activi-
ties. Finally, in conjunction with local bar associations, law libraries
can serve as clearinghouses for those seeking to retain attorneys or for
those indigents in need of legal assistance.
Conclusion
This commentary proceeds on the basic assumption that lawyers
share a general concern for the welfare of their clients and for the pub-
lic as a whole. It also accepts that lawyers as a whole follow basic ethi-
60. Id.
61. The issue of the law library and the practice of law ultimately raises
the question of what the role of the law library should be in the provi-
sion of legal services .... Law librarians who wish to do more to as-
sist in providing legal services to the public can effectively do so by
working indirectly, lecturing and teaching at graduate library schools
when asked and assisting public libraries by providing instruction in
legal bibliography and the selection of legal materials.
Id.
62. See Mills, supra note 57, at 193.
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cal precepts, and make every effort to deal fairly and honestly with
those people with whom they deal. Nonetheless, we must realize that
the legal profession, never the public's darling, has fallen into even
greater disfavor since Watergate.6 3 The problem now threatens to ex-
pand beyond bounds with which we can deal. To solve it, the profession
must immediately embark upon a major effort to improve the attitude
of the public toward the bar by instructing the public in the basics of
our legal system, in the need for skilled professionals to handle the
complexities of their legal problems, and in the qualifications and ethics
which are required of an attorney.
This conclusion is by no means novel. Some twenty years ago, the
Missouri Bar, in conjunction with Prentice-Hall, ran a thorough survey
which concluded that the bar must turn its attention toward improving
public relations through education."' The intervening years have seen
few serious attempts at meeting these objectives. Today, particularly in
the lingering light of Watergate, we find the crisis of public disfavor at
a peak. We must turn public opinion around. Otherwise, when a new
63. The severity of the problem has provoked comment in leading British law
journals as well. See, e.g., Ayer, Do Lawyers Do More Harm than Good?, 129 NEW
L.J. 1040 (1979); Cohen, Unpopularity and Criticism of Lawyers, 123 SOLICITORs' J.
499 (1979); The Legal Profession and the Public, 6 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 1 (1977).
64. While the education of the public through the client-attorney relation-
ship is deemed to be of number one importance, it is nevertheless nec-
essary that many other means of public education be employed. (1)
Development and distribution of pamphlets. (2) The development and
promotion of well organized Speakers Bureaus by local bar associa-
tions in every part of the state. (3) The development and promotion of
Public Forums on legal subjects to be conducted by local bar associa-
tions. (4) Continuing efforts to educate the public through use of infor-
mational media such as radio, television and newspapers. (5) Closer
cooperation with educational institutions so that the citizens'of tom-
morrow will be correctly informed concerning the role of the legal pro-
fession and its importance to our American System of Government. (6)
Continuing efforts through every means, including those listed above,
to develop in the public a greater appreciation for the rights and free-
doms guaranteed by the Constitution and protected by our courts.
MISSOURI BAR SURVEY, supra note 2, at 51. However, it should be noted that the
survey continued to stress that "A deluge of publicity ... will be worthless so long as
the lawyer himself, in his contact with the client, fails to lay the groundwork for a
better public image of the profession." Id. at 52.
113 1Rapport Between Lawyer & Layperson16:1981
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John Cade arises, the public may indeed heed the advice of his rebel-
lious followers: "The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers. 65
65. W. SHAKESPEARE, HENRY VI, PART II, Act IV, Scene II, Line 83 (1600).
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The District Courts of Appeal-After The 1980
Jurisdictional Amendment: A New Obligation Toward
Decisional Harmony
The purpose of this note is to explore the effect that a per curiam
affirmance by a Florida District Court of Appeal might have on deci-
sional harmony in the State of Florida. This examination focuses on
concerns raised by the new constitutional jurisdiction' of the Supreme
Court of Florida. While each of the sections of the amendment presents
special problems, specific emphasis will be placed on that portion of
Article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution which allows dis-
cretionary review of district court decisions which are in conflict.2
Effective April 11, 1980, the Florida Supreme Court's jurisdiction
was restructured to drastically reduce the volume of cases requiring its
review.3 Now, the decisions of the various district courts of appeal are
final in all but a few well delineated situations. However, in at least one
specific area, the district courts have discretionary authority to deter-
mine whether their decisions will be truly final by precluding further
appellate review in Florida, or are capable of being heard in the Florida
Supreme Court. This specific area is commonly known as "conflict cer-
tiorari ' 4 and the discretion involved is whether to write an opinion.
If a litigant finds an adverse decision at the district court "ex-
pressly and directly conflicts with a decision of another district court of
appeal, or of the supreme court on the same question of law," 5 further
1. FLA. CONST. art. V, sec. (3)(b).
2. Art. V, sec. 3(b)(3) reads in part: "(3) May review any decision of a district
court of appeal that ...expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of another
district court of appeal or of the supreme court on the same question of law."
3. "The impetus for these modifications was a burgeoning caseload and the
attendant need to make more efficient use of limited resources." FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030,
Committee Notes.
4. FLA. CONST. art. V, sec. 3(b)(3). While the amendment specifically deletes the
words "by certiorari," conflict certiorari merely refers to the Florida Supreme Court's
discretionary jurisdiction to review conflicts of decision. Id.
5. FLA. CONsT. art. V. sec. 3(b)(3).
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appellate review is available through the discretionary certiorari power
of the supreme court. However, when the district court of appeal deci-
sion is merely a per curiam affirmance without written opinion, the ap-
pellate process is halted." This occurs even if the reasoning behind that
particular decison would otherwise be in direct conflict with another
district court of appeal. Under the old jurisdictional standards, the case
must merely be "in direct conflict" with another case regardless of
whether the decision was rendered with a full written opinion. In at
least one instance," conflict was founded in a dissenting opinion to a per
curiam decision. However, since the new standard has been imposed
requiring an "express" conflict, review by the Florida Supreme Court
requires a written opinion.9
Granting certiorari in cases where particular points of law have
been decided differently in the various districts allows the Supreme
Court of Florida to prevent inconsistency in the lower courts.10 Thus,
"conflict certiorari" serves as an important tool in establishing uniform
justice. However, a decision without opinion hampers this ability to
provide a uniform application of the laws of Florida. The architect of
the new amendment, Justice Arthur England,"' has recognized the sig-
nificance per curiam affirmances have under the new rules of discre-
tionary conflict jurisdiction:
A decision not to write an opinion in any particular case may be
dispositive of the litigation. Therefore, district court judges will
play a significant role in the state's justice system by the exercise of
their judgment in this regard. No one questions the desirability of
some dispositions without opinion at the district court level, for ex-
ample, in cases which involve a straightforward application of ex-
6. See Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 1980).
7. FLA. CONST. art. V. sec. 3(b)(3).
8. Commerce Nat'l Bank in Lake Worth v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 284 So.
2d 205 (Fla. 1973); See also Huguley v. Hall, 157 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1963) (using case
citations accompanying the "affirmed" decision along with an exhaustive dissenting
opinion).
9. See 385 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 1980).
10. Id.
11. For a complete discussion of the features of the amendment see England,
Hunter & Williams, Constitutional Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Florida:
1980 Reform, 32 U. FLA. L. REV. 147 (1980).
1 116 Nova Law Journal 6:19811
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isting law to individual and non-unique fact situations. On the
other hand, the responsibility for articulating decisions on questions
of law which might have statewide importance, or which might be
in conflict with other appellate decisions, now rests more heavily on
the district courts' judges. Perhaps greater precision will also be
required of counsel to isolate, identify, and discuss the issues of law
which they present to the district courts.21
Thus, the obligation toward the appellate decision-making process is
two-fold: the responsibility of district court judges to issue opinions
where conflict would otherwise exist, and the responsibility of counsel
to assist in delineating these conflicts.
Discussion
The basis for invoking conflict certiorari jurisdiction arises when
there is a "real and embarrassing" conflict between the decisions of the
appellate courts.13 However, the question has always been, to what ex-
tent can the Florida Supreme Court search for such a conflict? Soon
after the creation of the district courts, the court recognized that
[t]here may be exceptions to the rule that this court will not go
behind a judgment per curiam, consisting only of the word 'af-
firmed'. . . . Conceivably it could appear from the restricted ex-
amination required in proceedings in certiorari that a conflict had
arisen with resulting injustice to the immediate litigant.14
The general rule referred to was overruled in effect by the decision in
Foley v. Weaver Drugs,15 which allowed the Court to examine the "re-
cord proper" to ascertain if a conflict had arisen. Although the "record
proper" analysis was never defined,"8 Foley described it as "scrutiny on
12. Id. at 198.
13. See Ansin v. Thurston, 101 So. 2d 808, 811 (Fla. 1958).
14. Lake v. Lake, 103 So. 2d 639, 643 (Fla. 1958).
15. 177 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1965).
16. See Gibson v. Maloney, 231 So. 2d 823, 832 (Fla. 1970) (Thornal, J.,
dissenting):
The majority is out-Foleying Foley .... Just once, it would be helpful if
my colleagues who follow the Foley majority would actually define what is
meant by "record proper" and "transcript of testimony." There is no clear
1 6:1981
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• ..the written record of the proceedings in the court under review
except the report of the testimony. . . . ",17 This type of analysis
merely allowed the Florida Supreme Court to inquire whether its own
decisions, or decisions of the various districts, would have decided the
case differently.18
The new jurisdictional amendment "abolishes the Foley doctrine
by requiring an 'express' as well as a 'direct' conflict of district court
decisions as a prerequisite to supreme court review."1" Consequently,
the Florida Supreme Court will no longer look behind decisions without
written opinions.
The majority opinion of Jenkins v. State,20 the major case after
the new amendment, squarely disposes of this issue:
Accordingly, we hold that from and after April 1, 1980, the Su-
preme Court of Florida lacks jurisdiction to review per curiam de-
cisions of the several district courts of appeal of this state rendered
without opinion, regardless of whether they are accompanied by a
dissenting or concurring opinion, when the basis for such review is
an alleged conflict of that decision with a decision of another dis-
trict court of appeal or of the Supreme Court of Florida."1
It leaves no doubt as to the posture of the Supreme Court in this issue.
Justice England's concurring opinion wholly supports and extends this
result, while providing a historical overview of the jurisdictional
amendment.22
The dissenting opinion,23 however, forewarns of the problems with
such a position:
We are embarking on a course which limits our jurisdiction to mat-
ters concerning deep questions of law, while the great bulk of liti-
cut definition in the books and I think our cases on the subject are ex-
tremely confusing.
17. 177 So. 2d at 223.
18. Id.
19. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030, Committee Notes.
20. 385 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 1980).
21. Id. at 1359.
22. Id. at 1360-63.
23. Id. at 1363-66 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
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gants are allowed to founder on rocks of uncertainty and trial
judges steer their course over a chaotic reef as they attempt to ap-
ply 'Per Curiam affirmed' decisions.24
Noting the potential chaos in a system in which the Florida Supreme
Court is precluded from harmonizing the district court decisions, Jus-
tice Adkins wrote that "[u]nder the construction proposed by the ma-
jority we will have well-written opinions, but the decisions of the five
district courts of appeal will be in hopeless conflict."25 In the interest of
reducing a "burgeoning caseload,"26 the amendment denies the su-
preme court any chance of reconciling this conflict. This was precisely
the thrust of the arguments against the amendment before its passage
into law. The burden of providing this opportunity for unformity now
rests with the district courts. Writing opinions in marginally conflicting
cases gives the Florida Supreme Court the choice of invoking their har-
monizing power.28
Obviously there is a place for decisions without opinion. However,
this method should be exercised only in circumstances when the case
below requires the "application of well settled rules of law,"' 29 and the
use of a written opinion would not add anything to the general body of
law in the particular area at issue. Cases which would otherwise con-
flict but for the per curiam affirmance, do not fall into this category. A
decision that might conflict with another appellate court would surely
add something to the law, albeit if only to allow the Florida Supreme
Court to harmonize the decisions. The large number of cases in which
certiorari was granted both pre and post Foley, illustrates this
proposition.3"
Moreover, in at least twenty cases, the Florida Supreme Court re-
24. Id. at 1363.
25. Id. at 1364.
26. FLA. R. App. P. 9.030, Committee Notes.
27. See England, Hunter & Williams, supra note 11, at 159.
28. Conflict jurisdiction lies within the discretionary portion of the supreme
court's jurisdiction. FLA. CONST. art. V. sec. 3(b)(3)-(9).
29. Newmons v. Lake Worth Drainage Dist., 87 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1956).
30. The Committee Notes to Fla. R. App. P. 9.030 characterized conflict peti-
tions as comprising "the overwhelming bulk of the Court's caseload and gave rise to an
intricate body of case law interpreting the requirements for discretionary conflict re-
view." Id. at 311. See Grant v. State, 390 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 1980).
1 :1 8
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viewed the "record proper" after a per curiam decision and quashed or
reversed the decision of the district.31 Carmen Bank of Miami Beach v.
R.G. Wolff & Co.32 is an extreme example where after a per curiam
affirmance by the Third District, the court reviewed the "record
proper" and reversed per curiam.3 It is ironic that a case that once
would have been summarily reversed, would now be allowed to stand
without review. Recently, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed a
United States District Court grant of federal habeas corpus to a peti-
tioner whose conviction had been per ctiriam affirmed by the Second
District of Florida. 4 These problems of silent questionable decisions
can be avoided by the district courts choosing to write opinions, how-
ever terse, in even marginally conflicting cases. This approach does not
conflict with the supreme court's goal of reducing its caseload; petitions
of review from these cases would, nonetheless, remain within the
court's discretionary jurisdiction3 5 and could be rejected unless clear
conflict is shown. Little district court labor would be expended outlin-
ing the reasons for the decision in a short paragraph accompanying the
affirmance.
The underlying rationale in denying review to affirmances without
opinion is that the decision merely affects the individual litigants, hav-
ing little, if any, effect on the overall jurisprudence in the state, regard-
31. See City of Pompano Beach v. Big Daddy's, Inc., 375 So. 2d 281 (Fla.
1979); Wills v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 351 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 1977); Carmen Bank of
Miami Beach v. R.G. Wolff & Co., 329 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 1976); AB CTC v. Morejon,
324 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1976); Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 315 So. 2d 451
(Fla. 1975); D'Agostino v. State, 310 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1975); De La Portilla v. De La
Portilla, 304 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 1974); In re Estate of McCartney, 299 So. 2d 5 (Fla.
1974); Manufacturers Life Ins. Co. v. Cave, 295 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 1974); Adams v.
Whitfield, 290 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1974); Lake Killarney Apts., Inc. v. Estate of Thomson,
283 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 1973); Dyer v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Co., 276 So. 2d 6 (Fla.
1973); Fountainbleau Hotel Corp. v. Walters, 246 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1971); Walden v.
Borden Co., 235 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 1970); Gibson v. Maloney, 231 So. 2d 823 (Fla.
1970); Balbontin v. Pirias, 215 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 1968); SAF-T-CLEAN, Inc. v. Mar-
tin-Marietta Corp., 197 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1967); Coleman v. Coleman, 190 So. 2d 332
(Fla. 1966); Kennedy v. Vandine, 185 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1966); Young Spring & Wire
Corp. v. Smith, 176 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1965).
32. 329 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 1976).
33. Roberts, Acting C.J., Adkins, Boyd, England and Sundberg concurred.
34. Hicks v. Wainwright, 633 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1981).
35. FLA. CONST. art. V, sec. 3(b)(3)-(9).
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less of the ratio decidendi. Unquestionably, this theory fails in two re-
spects. First, the affirmance settles the particular point of law for both
the district court and the trial courts below. Second, it was precisely
this perceived injustice to the individual litigant which paved the way
to the Foley38 era of "record proper" analysis.37
As to the first point, while an affirmance without opinion has no
precedential value in the sense that it will not be cited or used by fu-
ture courts, it does reflect the attitudes of the appellate court on those
specific points of law. Whether they are precedent, these decisions will
be the model for future appellate decisions. Concerning the trial courts,
a summary affirmance merely encourages a trial judge to believe his or
her application of the law was proper. Foley recognized this theme:
"Nor can we escape that in common parlance, an affirmance without
opinion of a trial court by a district is generally deemed to be an ap-
proval of the judgment of the trial court, and becomes a precedent,
certainly in the trial court rendering the judgment." 38 The law thus
settled becomes subject to straight-forward application resulting in fur-
ther per curiam affirmances. A particular type of case could become
subject to peculiar treatment in one district, while the other districts or
the Supreme Court of Florida could decide the same type of case in a
different fashion. Notwithstanding the Hoffman v. Jones"8 prohibition
against the districts rendering decisions which conflict with the settled
law of the Supreme Court of Florida, many cases have been granted
certiorari for just such a conflict.4 It is poor policy for the supreme
court to be precluded from protecting its own decisions.-
Secondly, even though a per curiam affirmance only directly af-
36. 177 So. 2d at 223.
37. See Lake v. Lake, 103 So. 2d 639, 641 (Fla. 1958).
38. 177 So. 2d at 225-26.
39. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
40. See Wills v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 351 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 1977); Courtelis v.
Lewis, 348 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 1977); Williams v. State, 340 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1976); De
La Portilla v. De La Portilla, 304 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1974); In re Estate of McCartney,
299 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1974); Manufacturers Life Ins. Co. v. Cave, 295 So. 2d 103 (Fla.
1974); Adams v. Whitfield, 290 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1974); Lake Killaney Apts., Inc. v.
Estate, 283 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 1973); Escobar v. Bill Currie Ford, Inc., 247 So. 2d 311
(Fla. 1971); Walden v. Borden, 235 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 1970); SAF-T-CLEAN, Inc. v.
Martin-Marietta Corp., 197 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1967); Coleman v. Coleman, 190 So. 2d
332 (Fla. 1966).
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fects the individual litigant, it was this type of "resulting injustice to
the immediate litigant" that prompted the supreme court to begin "re-
cord proper" analysis. Originally it took nine years after the advent of
the district courts for the Foley type of exception to arise. A system
such as the present one may pave the way to its own exception to the
strict rule of no review without a written opinion.
In order to protect against loose use of per curiam decisionmaking,
briefing and argument by counsel at the district court level should not
only address the merits of their case, but also the possible conflicts that
may arise from a decision on these merits.4 1 This would help to pro-
mote "reckonability of result" 42 by alerting appellate judges to the pos-
sible conflicts which may arise, and ease the burden of fruitless appeals
from the trial courts. Moreover, it is generally recognized that petitions
for rehearing or clarification should now be more freely granted in the
district courts, thus providing another avenue for full written review.4 3
For example, if a case originally disposed of by per curiam affirmance
is granted either rehearing en banc44 of given clarification, 45 the written
opinion, if any, flowing from such a procedure might support conflict
jurisdiction. This, of course, would require the written opinion to be
"express" in its reasoning.48 It may also be argued that as an alterna-
tive to conflict certiorari jurisdiction, a litigant might seek to invoke the
extraordinary writ jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court.'
Conclusion
As a matter of policy, the courts of Florida should strive to obtain
decisional harmony at the district court level. Although the new juris-
dictional amendment was a hard fought battle, access to the Florida
41. Lake v. Lake, 103 So. 2d 639, 643 (Fla. 1958).
42. See LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION-DECIDING APPEALS 26
(1960).
43. See England, Hunter & Williams, supra note 11, at 198.
44. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.330.
45. Id.
46. FLA. CONST. art. V, sec. 3(b)(3).
47. FLA. CONST. art. V, sec. 3(b)(7)-(9). But see St. Paul Title Ins. Corp. v.
Davis, 392 So. 2d 1304 (Fla. 1980) (holding that petitioner seeking review of per
curiam affirmance with our opinion, cannot invoke "all writs" provision of art. V, sec.
3(b)(7)).
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Supreme Court should still be available in all deserving cases. Justice
England rightly describes this aspect of the process as an obligation:
Section 3(b)(3) now places an increased obligation on district court
judges who again have some ability to control a party's right to
supreme court review. Now, as was originally intended, these
judges must keep a wary eye on the broad import of their decisions
before issuing an affirmance without opinion. It goes without saying
that the press and the public will keep a wary eye on them.48
Karl Llewellyn in The Common Law Tradition"9 saw "recognition
of doubt" 50 as an important aspect of an appellate judge's responsibility
in formulating opinions. Under the new Florida constitutional scheme,
district court judges should consider "recognition of doubt" in deter-
mining whether to use per curiam affirmances. If there is any doubt
regarding the potential for conflict, the courts should discard the option
of a per curiam decision without opinion, and write an opinion, no mat-
ter how brief, which permits Florida Supreme Court resolution of hon-
estly arguable conflicts.5
Victor Lance
48. England, Hunter & Williams, supra note 11, at 181.
49. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 42.
50. Id. at 12.
51. In a recent article, Justice England reviews the percentages of per curiam
affirmances without opinion following the adoption of the jurisdictional amendment.
Finding them substantially unchanged with respect to statistics of earlier years, he
makes this observation: "The district courts apparently did not seize upon the amend-
ment to expand the percentage of their dispositions without opinions during calendar
1980." England, A. & Williams, R., Florida Appellate Reform One Year Later, 9
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 223, 256 (1981). This seems to be an attempt at providing ad hoc
evidentiary support to an observation made in Florida Greyhound Owners & Breeders
Ass'n Inc. v. West Fowler Assoc., 347 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1977): "The foul assumption
which underlies any review is that the district court perpetrated an injustice which it
could not explain away in an opinion. I refuse to indulge that assumption." Id. at 411
(concurring opinion). However, both observations miss the mark. It would be ludicrious
to assert that district court judges would ever attempt to "hide their mistakes". Yet,
because of the complexity of the issues in various cases, conflicts arise all too often.
This is aptly demonstrated by the unintentionally created conflicts reviewed during the
Foley era. See notes 31 & 40 supra.
Nonetheless, the thrust of this article is merely to point out the need for careful
123 116:1981
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consideration by the district courts of possible unstated conflicts. Inasmuch as Justice
England finds that the rate of per curiam affirmances has remained virtually un-
changed, it may be argued that the district courts have not recognized their "obliga-
tion" in this respect. It can be asserted that the percentage of per curiam affirmances
should decrease in proportion to the rate that review was formerly granted by the Su-
preme Court for review of per curiam affirmances during the Foley era.
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M'Naghten: Right or Wrong for Florida in the
1980s? It Flunks the Test
The members of the jury listened solemnly as the judge instructed
them on the law." The defendant was charged with murder in the first
degree. There was ample evidence indicating that the defendant had,
indeed, committed the crime. In fact, he did not deny doing it. The
defense relied exclusively upon insanity to support the pleading of not
guilty. "Due to his mental condition," the defense attorney argued, "he
did not have the ability to form an intent." Psychiatrists testifying for
the defense stated that, due to his mental impairment, the defendant
could not control his actions. The prosecution, through its medical ex-
perts, countered that the defendant knew his actions were wrong.
With this testimony in mind, the jury would wrestle with the ulti-
mate decision of the sanity of the accused. In deciding the extent of the
defendant's criminal responsibility, the jury would apply the law as in-
structed by the judge.
The judge continued his charge:
A person is sane and responsible for his crime if he has a sufficient
mental capacity when the crime is committed to understand what
he is doing and to understand that his act is wrong. If at the time
of the alleged crime a defendant was by reason of mental infirmity,
disease or defect, unable to understand the nature and quality of
his act or its consequences, or, if he did understand it, was incapa-
ble of distinguishing that which is right from wrong, he was legally
insane and should be found not guilty by reason of insanity.2
Thus, the jury faced the dilemma of deciding whether the defendant
was mentally infirm to a degree which rendered him unable to recog-
nize the wrongfulness of his act. If the jury should find that the ac-
cused was infirm, but still knew the difference between right and
1. This is merely hypothetical and is not intended to represent any actual case.
2. Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, approved in In re
Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 327 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1976).
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wrong, they would have no choice but to convict.
This colloquy is intended to illustrate the diverse and difficult
choice thrust upon the unwary juror deciding the insanity question in
M'Naghten3 jurisdictions. The difficulty results from the rigidity of the
M'Naghten test, which confines juror alternatives. It permits a finding
of insanity only if the accused did not know (or understand) that his
act was wrong. The test is directed toward the accused's ability to
form the required mental intent (mens rea). Mental intent must be
demonstrated if the accused is to be held responsible for his act. This
test effectively cloaks the fact finder with judicial "blinders": it pre-
cludes jurors from considering any evidence showing the defendant la-
bored under a mental disease or defect which, while not rendering him
incapable of distinguishing right from wrong, affected his ability to ra-
tionally control his behavior. This all-or-nothing approach, sometimes
referred to as the "mad or bad" doctrine,4 ignores the existence of the
grey area between sanity and insanity. According to the M'Naghten
criteria, mentally ill persons failing to meet the rigid standards of the
"right-wrong" test would be determined criminally responsible despite
their infirmities.
Florida still clings to the M'Naghten teste in deciding on the sanity
of its criminals. The rationale for continued adherence to a test deemed
unacceptable by so many medical and legal scholars, is that the court
is not convinced the rule is not the best available for measuring an
accused's mental condition., Thus, despite its intrinsic infirmities and
3. 10 Clark & Fin. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843) wherein the court
stated:
[T]o establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly
proved that at the time of the commission of the act, the party accused
was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind as
to not know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did
know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong.
4. Note, Insanity-Guilty But Mentally Ill-Diminished Capacity: An Aggregate
Approach to Madness, 12 J. MAR. J. OF PRAC. AND PROC. 351 (1979).
5. Arnella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility Defenses:
Two Children of a Doomed Marriage, 77 COLJM. L. REv. 827 (1977).
6. See, e.g., Wheeler v. State, 344 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
924 (1979).
7. See notes 58-68 infra.
8. Piccotte v. State, 116 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 1959), appeal dismissed 364 U.S. 293
1 126
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backhanded support, the M'Naghten test still reigns supreme in the
State of Florida.
This note advocates the abrogation of this rule, which, in the opin-
ion of this writer, has failed to weather the passage of time, and which
was based on faulty premises, outmoded even at the time of the rule's
inception. This note will review the history of the M'Naghten rule and
its application in Florida. Additionally it will consider the reasoning
which necessitates abrogation. Of course, one cannot merely advocate
abrogation of one doctrine without supporting implementation of a suc-
cessor. Therefore, an examination of the potential alternatives which
have supplemented or replaced M'Naghten in other jurisdictions will
follow this analysis.
I. M'Naghten-The Best Test Available or History's Mistake?
Pre-M'Naghten Tests
The M'Naghten test has origins dating back to the Eirenarch era
of 1582 wherein William Lombard of Lincolns' Inn declared that "[i]f
a mad man or a natural fool, or a lunatic in the time of his lunacy, or a
child who apparently has no knowledge of good nor evil do kill a man,
this is no felonious act. . . for they cannot be said to have any under-
standing will." Even in this period, the law recognized that one could
not be culpable if he could not, due to mental infirmities, form the
intent to commit the crime. This attempt at civility evolved into the
"wild beast" test, which provided for exculpation if the defendant "be
wholly deprived of his understanding and memory," to such an extent
that he "doth not know what he is doing no more than . . . a wild
beast." 10 A later rule developed, formulated by the humane Sir Mat-
thew Hale, which based criminal responsibility on whether the accused
at least had the understanding of a normal child of fourteen.,,
Prior to M'Naghten, no clear formulation had emerged as a uni-
formly accepted test of criminal responsibility. Prior cases had been
decided according to the "right-wrong" dichotomy, a school of thought
(1960); Van Eaton v. State, 205 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 1967).
9. Moore, Jr., M'Naghten is Dead - Or Is It? 3 Hous. L. REv. 58, 62 (1965).
10. Rex v. Arnold, 16 How. St. Tr. 685, 764 (1724).
11. 1 Hale P.C. as cited in Annot., 44 A.L.R. 584 (1926).
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strongly influenced by beliefs in witchcraft, phrenology, and monoma-
nia. 2 Monomania, which was predicated upon the assumption that one
idea could dominate the other cognitive aspects of the mind, was a ba-
sic precept upon which the "right-wrong" test was premised. Thus, it
was reasoned, if a person had an insane delusion, it would totally con-
trol that person.
At that point in time, however, the accuracy of these concepts was
already being questioned. Many of the legal and medical scholars rec-
ognized the intrinsic shortcomings created by such a simplistic test.
M'Naghten's case offered those scholars the opportunity to reject the
"right-wrong" test and adopt a more modern approach.
Yet in perhaps the cruelest irony in the history of the common
law, the M'Naghten court was forced to adopt these ideas (which it
recognized as being outdated) due to intense political pressure applied
by the Queen. Because no clear test had previously been promulgated,
the court's reluctant endorsement of the "right-wrong" test crystallized
the fallacious concepts into the virtual vacuum of legal precedent.13
Thus the test was outdated as it was being adopted.
M'Naghten's Case4
Daniel M'Naghten has become infamous as one of history's most
unproficient lunatics. A victim to some degree of mental impairment,
he suffered from delusions of persecution.15 He thought he was being
pursued, unjustly accused of crime, and in danger of being murdered.16
12. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 616 (2d Cir. 1966), particularly nn.
23 & 24. See also BIGGS, THE GUILTY MIND 61 (1955).
13. Id.
14. 8 Eng. Rep. 718. The name "M'Naghten" is sometimes incorrectly spelled as
"M'Naughton". When this error was committed by The London Times, Justice Frank-
furter wrote to the editors correcting them. The Times replied that its spelling was
based on the spelling "signed by the man himself" in signing a letter. The Justice
replied, in typical Frankfurtian humor, "To what extent is a lunatic's spelling of his
own name to be deemed an authority?" OF LAW AND LIFE AND OTHER THINGS THAT
MATTER: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER, 1956-1963 1-4 (Kurland
ed. 1964). See also 357 F.2d at 608.
15. See Ellison & Haas, A Recent Judicial Interpretation of the M'Naghten
Rule, 4 BRIT. JOUR. OF DELINQUENCY 129 (1953).
16. This diagnosis was reached by GUrTMACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY
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As a result of these delusions, in which Robert Peel, the English Prime
Minister was the chief culprit, M'Naghten was driven to murder. To
carry out his plan, M'Naghten stalked the Prime Minister and waited
for him outside his carriage. However, in his effort to kill the Prime
Minister, M'Naghten instead shot and killed Peel's secretary, Drum-
mond, who happened to be riding in the carriage of the Prime Minister
that day.
The obvious defense was insanity. Unbeknownst to those involved,
the methods used and result reached by the M'Naghten court would
influence similar defendants for over a hundred years. This trial be-
came the setting for an attempt to utilize new psychological studies
which, it was felt, would aid in creating a realistic formula for deter-
mining criminal responsibility. M'Naghten's defense counsel relied
heavily on a recent psychological work which contained new ap-
proaches to the subject of criminal responsibility in general, and in par-
ticular, criticized the "right-wrong" test.17 This work impressed Lord
Chief Justice Tindal with its logical insight into the workings of the
human mind, as well as its theories on behavior. This convinced him of
M'Naghten's incompetency to such an extent that he practically di-
rected a verdict for the accused.""
As a consequence of the finding of "not guilty by reason of in-
sanity," the Queen, who was quite angry with the verdict, summoned
the court before the House of Lords to clarify the law in such cases.
Her motivation stemmed from a rash of assassination attempts on the
Royal Family, including three aimed at the Queen herself. Faced with
an atmosphere of intense pressure,19 Lord Chief Justice Tindal spoke
for the court. In responding to queries submitted by the House of
Lords, Tindal reaffirmed the "right-wrong" test20 despite the fact that
AND THE LAW 403 (1952).
17. The famous work relied upon was I. RAY, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF IN-
SANITY (1838).
18. 357 F.2d at 617. See BIGGS, supra note 12, at 102.
19. Id. citing to S. GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 162-
63 (1925).
20. The Lord Chief Justice stated:
We have to submit our opinion to be that the jury ought to be told in all
cases that every man is to be presumed to be sane, and to possess a suffi-
cient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary
1 :1 
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he felt it outmoded. In so doing, he turned his back on the work of Dr.
Ray2 which had impressed him so greatly at the trial. As a result, the
strides science had made in attempting to more adequately understand
the mind were virtually nullified, and the legal test for insanity in crim-
inal cases continued to focus on the accused's knowledge of right from
wrong. Thus, this brave attempt to forge a more significant and accu-
rate legal test was frustrated. In time, this test was adopted in every
state 2 except New Hampshire," whose supreme court was also im-
pressed with the work of Dr. Ray.
be proven to their satisfaction; and that to establish a defense on the
ground of insanity it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the com-
mitting of the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of
reason from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of
the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was
doing what was wrong. The mode of putting the latter part of the question
to the jury on these occassions has generally been, whether the accused at
the time of doing the act knew the difference between right and wrong,
which mode, though rarely, if ever, leading to any mistake with the jury, is
not, as we conceive, so accurate, when put generally and in the abstract, as
when put with reference to the party's knowledge of right and wrong in
respect to the very act with which he is charged. If the question were to be
put as to the knowledge of the accused solely and exclusively with refer-
ence to the law of the land, it might tend to confound the jury by inducing
them to believe-that an actual knowledge of the law of the land was essen-
tial in order to lead to a conviction; whereas the law is administered upon
the principle that everyone must be taken conclusively to know it, without
proof that he does know it. If the accused was conscious that the act was
one which he ought not to do, and if that act was at the same time con-
trary to the law of the land, he is punishable; and the usual course, there-
fore, has been to leave the question to the jury whether the party accused
had a sufficient degree of reason to know that he was doing an act that was
wrong; and this course, we think, is correct, accompanied with such obser-
vations and explanations as the circumstances of each particular case may
require.
8 Eng. Rep. at 722. See Annot., 44 A.L.R. 584-85 (1926) for a general discussion.
21. See note 17 supra.
22. The United States Supreme Court recognized the test in Davis v. United
States, 165 U.S. 373 (1897).
23. State v. Pike, 6 A.R. 533, 49 N.H. 399 (1870). See also State v. Jones, 50
N.H. 369 (1871), wherein the court stated that the defendant was not guilty by reason
of insanity if his crime "was the offspring of product of mental disease .... "Id. at
398.
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But the die had been cast. Despite its receding acceptability in the
scientific community, the "right-wrong" test, now synonymous with
M'Naghten, was chisled into the stone of the common law. Thus sanity
was, and is, being decided according to psychological understanding
circa 16th century!
M'Naghten - Florida's Test
The M'Naghten test was expressly adopted in Florida in 1902.24
Despite periodic attacks 5 the courts have continued to lend vitality to
the doctrine as "the best available rule for determining the question of
the legal accountability of the accused for his criminal act . . ."26
This adherence has not been evidenced by a wholehearted commit-
ment, however. For example, in 1973, when the court was again asked
to review M'Naghten's viability, the test received a backhanded affirm-
ance because of a "lack of a better alternative. 27
While virtually unchanged since its inception, the M'Naghten test
was altered by the inclusion of the terms "disease or defect"28 in defin-
ing the types of infirmities which would, if affecting the person's ability
to differentiate right from wrong, deny criminal responsibility. In light
of the current criticisms of the test's rationality, this judicial attempt to
resuscitate the doctrine seems belated and misses the mark. Despite
several strong challenges, the test remains intact.29 The first of these
occurred in Reid v. Florida Real Estate Commission."0 The Second
24. Davis v. State, 44 Fla. 32, 32 So. 822 (Fla. 1902).
25. See notes 58-68 infra.
26. Campbell v. State, 227 So. 2d 873, 877 (Fla. 1969), cert. dismissed, 400
U.S. 801 (1970). But see Anderson v. State, 276 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1973) (Ervin, J.,
dissenting). Justice Ervin, who had previously concurred in Campbell, proposed aban-
doning M'Naghten in favor of the MODEL PENAL CODE test.
27. 276 So. 2d at 18.
28. See Wheeler v. State, 344 So. 2d 244, 246 (Fla. 1977) cert. denied, 440 U.S.
924 (1979). The terms "disease or defect" were part of the MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 4.01(1) (Final Draft 1966).
29. See Van Eaton v. State, 205 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 1967); Wheeler v. State, 344
So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1977); Campbell v. State, 227 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1977); Anderson v.
State, 276 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1973).
30. 188 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966). This opinion was later ex-
pressly disapproved of. 205 So. 2d 298 (1967).
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District Court of Appeal stated:
A person otherwise sane and competent may nevertheless be under
a lawful mental disability so as to be incapable of formulating a
rational intent to do a particular act at a particular time. Thus
legal 'insanity' which incapacitates from civil responsibility and ex-
onerates from crime is a mental deficiency with reference to the
particular act in question, although it may not be a general
incapacity.
[A] person is entitled to acquittal on the ground of mental incapac-
ity if at the time of the commission of the act he either did not
know the difference between right and wrong or he was unable to
refrain from doing wrong. . . . Thus if it is established from the
evidence that as the result of some mental defect or disease a per-
son was unable to refrain from doing wrong . . . he could not be
held criminally responsible notwithstanding he did not deny . . .
that he knew the difference between right and wrong.31
This was a radical stand in view of the historical rigidity with
which the state supreme court had clung to M'Naghten. The court not
only utilized the irresistible impulse rationale, 2 but also allowed that
the incapacity need only be partial. This nonconformance may be par-
tially explained by the sympathy evoking fact situation. Kathleen Reid,
a 49 year old real estate broker, was arrested and convicted of shoplift-
ing after lifting a three dollar steak from a supermarket. Apparently,
the woman was suffering from mental infirmities created by the onset
of menopause. As a result of her conviction, the Florida Real Estate
Commission had revoked her broker's license. The appellate court
reversed the conviction concluding that she lacked the capacity to form
the requisite legal intent and her license should not, therefore, be
suspended.
Although this decision contained elements which modified the
M'Naghten test in a positive manner, and could have opened the door
for a more modern approach to the conundrum, the Florida Supreme
Court nevertheless disapproved unanimously.33
Most of the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal have dis-
31. Id. at 854 (emphasis supplied)(footnotes omitted).
32. See notes 69-72 infra.
33. 205 So. 2d 298.
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carded M'Naghtens4 with the Fifth Circuit joining the fold in Blake v.
United States decided in 1969. 35 In Blake, the court attempted to find
a definition of insanity "more nearly attuned to present day concepts of
psychiatry." 36 There the defendant had been charged with bank rob-
bery37 and relied on the defense of insanity. The lower court had
charged the jury according to the standard definition of insanity.38
However, the appellate court felt the M'Naghten test was outmoded
and sought to replace it with the "substantial capacity" language of the
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code (M.P.C.) Test. 9
After carefully considering the alternatives, the court adopted the
M.P.C. test because, "[m]odifying the lack of mental capacity by the
adjective 'substantial', still leaves the matter for the jury under the evi-
dence, lay and expert, to determine mental defect vel non and its rela-
tionship to the conduct in question. A substantial lack of capacity is a
more nearly adequate standard." 40
As a result of this decision, a defendant who commits a federal
offense will be judged according to the more liberal insanity test. The
divergent results thus created exemplify the ludicrous inconsistency
precipitated by utilizing such different tests."1
34. Those circuits which have replaced M'Naghten with a modified or complete
version of § 4.01 of the MODEL PENAL CODE are: United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d
969, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 624 (2d Cir.
1966); United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 774 (3d Cir. 1961); United States v.
Chandler, 393 F.2d 920, 926 (4th Cir. 1968); Blake v. United States, 407 F.2d 908,
915 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720, 727 (6th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680, 685-88 (7th Cir. 1967); United States v. Fra-
zier, 458 F.2d 911, 917 (8th Cir. 1972); Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64, 65 (9th
Cir. 1970); Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420, 430 (10th Cir. 1963).
35. 407 F.2d 908.
36. Id. at 909.
37. This was a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1964).
38. This standard definition was based upon dictum in Davis v. United States,
165 U.S. 373 (1897), and was adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Howard v. United
States, 232 F.2d 274, 275 (5th Cir. 1956)(en banc).
39. See notes 79-84 infra.
40. 407 F.2d at 915. Also, the court adopted the alternative term "wrongfulness"
to be used instead of "criminality."
41. Section 4.01 of the MODEL PENAL CODE could be adopted by either the
courts or by the legislature. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-2 (Smith-Hurd
1962).
1331M'Naghten in Florida
137
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1981
134 Nova Law Journal 6:1981 1
The next frontal attack on M'Naghten occurred in 1973 as a
closely divided Florida Supreme Court again affirmed the doctrine.
The case of Anderson v. State,42 was not factually unlike any other
challenge which had arisen in the past. In this instance, however, three
members of the seven member panel dissented, finding the current test
outmoded as applied.43 Relying heavily on the logic asserted in United
States v. Freeman,4 the dissenters attempted to vitiate the test and
proposed the adoption of the M.P.C. test.45 The opinions of Justices
Ervin and Boyd indicated strong discomfort with M'Naghten. Justice
Ervin felt that:
In this age of increasing psychiatric sophistication, it is naive to
believe a determination as to a person's sanity can be made solely
on the basis of his ability to distinguish right from wrong. A jury
should be given a defendant's entire mental record if he raises the
issue of his sanity. . . .In addition, the jury should be charged in
a manner which would allow it to find a defendant not guilty by
reason of insanity not only when he does not know what he is doing
is wrong but also when he cannot control his actions because of a
mental disease. I believe the time has come to discard M'Naghten
46
Similarly, Justice Boyd concluded: "[s]urely with all the modern
advances in court procedures and the abandonment of antiquated ap-
proaches to justice the time has come to adopt a better standard than
the M'Naghten rule . . . . "4 Interestingly enough, despite Justice
Boyd's strong dissent, when the question was again raised in Wheeler v.
State,4 he concurred with the majority leaving Justices Adkins and
England (two additions since the Anderson decision) as the only dis-
senters. In Wheeler the court retained M'Naghten but supplemented it
with the "disease or defect" language from the M.P.C.49
42. 276 So. 2d 17.
43. Id. at 19 (Ervin, J. dissenting).
44. 357 F.2d 606.
45. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (final draft 1966) at note 80 infra.
46. 276 So. 2d at 23.
47. Id. at 24.
48. 344 So. 2d 244.
49. See note 28 supra.
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In 1973, M'Naghten was challenged on constitutional grounds.
The appellant in Walker v. State5" urged that the M'Naghten test was
arbitrary, unreasonable and denied an accused his substantive due pro-
cess rights. The court dismissed this argument in cursory fashion. Thus
another attempt at abrogating the test had fallen short of the mark.
In 1977 the Florida legislature attempted to make the insanity is-
sue clearer for the jury by creating the bifurcated trial system. 1 The
bifurcated trial system had been tried in'several states52 in an effort to
provide greater safeguards for the defendant. The system provided that
the issue of guilt-innocence be tried prior to the issue of insanity, in a
completely separate hearing, thereby avoiding the potential prejudice
50. 284 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
51. FLA. STAT. § § 921.131 [918.017] (1977). Section one of this statute reads:
Separate proceedings on issue of insanity.
(1) When in a criminal case it shall be the intention of the defendant
to plead not guilty and to rely on the defense of insanity, no evidence of
insanity shall be admitted until it is determined through trial or by plea
whether the defendant is guilty or innocent of committing or attempting to
commit the alleged criminal act. Advance notice of intention to rely upon
the defense of insanity shall be given by the defendant as provided by rule.
Upon a finding that the defendant is guilty of the-commission or attempted
commission of the cirminal act, a trial shall be promptly held, either by
the same trial jury, if applicable, or by a new jury, in the discretion of the
court, solely on the question of whether the defendant was sane at the time
the criminal act was committed or attempted. The defendant shall have
the option, with approval of the court, of waiving the jury trial on the issue
of insanity and allowing the determination of sanity to be made by the
judge. Evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems
relevant to the issue of sanity regardless of its admissibility under the ex-
clusionary rules of evidence, except as prohibited by the Constitutions of
the United States or State of Florida; provided, however, that the defen-
dant is given the opportunity to rebut any such evidence. If the jury or the
judge shall determine that the defendant was guilty of committing or at-
tempting to commit the criminal act and was sane at the time, then the
court shall proceed as provided by law. If it is determined that the defen-
dant was guilty of committing or attempting to commit the criminal act
but was insane at the time, the court shall adjudicate the defendant not
guilty by reason of insanity.
52. At one time, Arizona, California, Colorado, Louisiana, Texas, Wisconsin and
Wyoming all used the bifurcated trial system. See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. § 16-8-104
(1973).
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which could result from the introduction of the wide range of evidence
relevant to an insanity defense.53
Despite its noble intent, the Florida Supreme Court struck down
the statute concluding that it violated a defendant's due process
rights."4 The court pointed out that under the statute
[s]anity is, in effect presumed, giving rise to an irrebuttable pre-
sumption of the existence of the requisite intent. Thus, the state is
relieved of its burden of proving each element beyond a reasonable
doubt because the defendant is precluded from offering evidence to
negate the presumption of intent. . . . [Prohibiting] the introduc-
tion of any or all evidence bearing on proof of insanity at the trial
of guilt or innocence. . . deprive[s] a defendant of the opportunity
of rebutting intent, premeditation, and malice, because an insane
person could have none. 55
Thus another attempt at altering the insanity defense had failed.
Those relying on the defense of insanity did receive token judicial
relief in State v. Roberts,58 where the Lyles rule 57 was adopted. The
rule states that when an accused relies on the insanity defense, the jury
must be told of the consequences following a finding of "not guilty by
reason of insanity"; i.e. confinement and supervision in a mental hospi-
tal. Thus the court helped inform jurors, previously unaware, of the
consequences attaching to their verdict.
Although this additional step does make the M'Naghten test some-
what more palatable, it nonetheless fails to mollify the test's harsh re-
sults. In the final analysis, Florida retains a test to determine an ac-
cused's ability to form a cognitive mens rea - a determination which is
not medically, scientifically or legally proficient in the current era of
modern psychiatry.
53. See Comment, Due Process and Bifurcated Trials: A Double-Edged Sword,
66 Nw. U.L. REv. 327 (1971).
54. Boyd v. Green, 355 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1978). See State v. Shaw, 106 Ariz.
103, 471 P.2d 715 (1970), and Sanchez v. State, 567 P.2d 270 (Wyo. 1977), wherein
both courts invalidated the bifurcated trial system on similar grounds.
55. 355 So. 2d at 79.3-94 (citations omitted).
56. 335 So. 2d 285.
57. Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
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The Critics Attack
The most fundamental criticism of the M'Naghten test is the nar-
row scope of behavior it addresses: the cognitive, rather than volitional,
aspects of an accused's personality are the sole factors considered in
determining sanity.58 Thus, sanity is gauged according to whether the
accused knows the difference between right and wrong while the degree
of his awareness and the ability to control his behavior are rendered
immaterial. "This is an anathema to modern psychiatry."5 9 It creates
a situation in which the jury may acquit, and thereby hospitalize, only
those who are unable to distinguish between right and wrong. Those
who suffer from mental infirmities and are unable to control their be-
havior must be found guilty.
The net result is a disservice to society. Mentally deficient people,
not insane according to M'Naghten, are incarcerated rather than
treated in hospitals and return to the mainstream of society untreated.
In recognizing this principle, it was stated that:
Because M'Naghten unrealistically considered mentally ill only
those who are unable to distinguish right from wrong, many defen-
dants with severe mental defects receive guilty rather than not
guilty by reason of insanity verdicts. This does nothing to accom-
plish the two goals of criminal punishment, the maximum rehabili-
tation of criminals, and the protection of society, against crime
... . [Thus mentally] ill defendants are found guilty ...and
placed in prisons without psychiatric facilities; mental rehabilita-
tion is impossible. When they have finished serving their sentences,
they are released to society uncured and ready to unwittingly com-
mit another crime.60
This potential for recidivism is a problem inherent in the treatment
afforded those failing the test, and can only be corrected by a more
58. See, e.g., Note, Criminal Law The A.L.I. Model Penal Code Insanity Test
44 TUL. L. REv. 192 (1969), Note, The Legal Standard for Determining Criminal
Insanity: A Need for Reform, 20 DRAKE L. REV. 353 (1971), Platt, Choosing a Test
for Criminal Insanity, 5 WILLAIETTE L.J. 553 (1969); 276 So. 2d at 22.
59. 276 So. 2d at 22.
60. Id. at 22-23, citing Diamond, Criminal Responsibility of the Mentally Ill, 14
STANFORD L. REv. 59 (1961). See, e.g., BIGGS, supra note 14, at 24.
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liberal application of standards in determining criminal responsibility.
A secondary defect which further debilitates the effectiveness of
M'Naghten results from the unnecessarily great demarcation of expert
psychiatric testimony. 1 As a result,
[w]hen the law limits a testifying psychiatrist to stating his opinion
whether the accused is capable of knowing right from wrong, the
expert is thereby compelled to test guilt or innocence by a concept
which bears little relationship to reality. He is required, thus to
consider one aspect of the mind as a 'logic tight compartment in
which the delusion holds sway leaving the balance of the mind in-
tact .... '62
Psychiatrists who must couch their responses in the "right-wrong"
context when testifying, find themselves in a frustrating, if not profes-
sionally onerous situation. The test is too confining for a science as infi-
nite as psychiatry. This sentiment was illustrated by Dr. Lawrence
Kolb who stated that "answers supplied by a psychiatrist in regard to
questions of rightness or wrongness of an act or 'knowing' its nature
constitute a professional perjury."6 The "right-wrong" dichotomy does
not adequately lend itself to the complicated diagnosis which the craft
demands.
This leads to another deleterious effect M'Naghten has on the effi-
ciency of psychiatric testimony, that being inhibition in communicating
knowledge concerning the accused's disease or defect. Too often this
results in the psychiatrist talking about mental illness and the attorney
talking in terms of "right and wrong. 64 This can only serve to further
confuse the jury, making its task of ultimately deciding on the defen-
dant's sanity that much tougher.
The unpopularity of the test became evident when a group of psy-
chiatrists was polled.6 5 Seventy-nine percent believed the M'Naghten
61. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966).
62. Id. at 619 citing GLLIECK, supra note 19, at 169-70.
63. Remarks, Annual Judicial Conference, Insanity as a Defense, 37 F.R.D. 365,
387 (2d Cir. 1964).
64. United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 766 (3d Cir. 1961). See Gutt-
macher, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness, 22 U. Cmi. L. REv. 325 (1955).
65. The poll was conducted through a questionnaire on medical problems sent to
members of the American Psychiatric Association. In view of the unscientific nature of
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test to be unsatisfactory.6" In a similar questionnaire, eighty-seven per-
cent felt the test did not present a realistic and adequate statement of
the medical facts.67 Dissatisfaction of that magnitude clearly indicates
that many in the field of psychiatry would concur in the test's abroga-
tion and would not find such a movement vituperative.
Perhaps the most pernicious result of limiting expert testimony to
the confines of the rigid "right-wrong" formula" is not that "psychia-
trists will feel constricted in artificially structuring their testimony but
rather that the ultimate deciders - the judge or the jury - will be
deprived of information vital to their final judgment."68 It can only re-
sult in a disservice for all concerned if jurors continue to render ver-
dicts based on inadequate expert testimony. In this respect, an unedu-
cated jury surely is an ignorant jury. In view of the state of the science,
inadequate education of the jury is both unfortunate and unnecessary.
Whether Florida will recognize these criticisms and relinquish ad-
herence to M'Naghten remains to be seen. In light of the strong attacks
of test opponents, the question will no doubt be raised again. As alter-
natives to M'Naghten withstand the test of time, or if some new test
evolves which evokes support, proponents will urge its adoption here.
The crux of this dilemma centers not on whether M'Naghten should be
replaced, but on what should take its place.
The Alternatives
One alternative, penned by the respected Chief Justice of the
Massachusetts Supreme Court, gained judicial impetus soon after
M'Naghten was decided. In what came to be known as the irresistible
impulse doctrine, an entirely new element, intended as a supplement to
the M'Naghten instruction, was added to the test. Chief Justice Shaw
stated:
If then it is proven to the satisfaction of the jury, that the mind of
the survey, the author recognizes the inherent inadequacies of the poll. It is cited, how-
ever, not to stress any exact formulation of opinion, but to show the basic contempt
with which many psychiatrists view the M'Naghten test.
66. Appendix B to § 4.01 of the MODEL PENAL CODE (final draft 1966).
67. 276 So. 2d at 22.
68. 357 F.2d at 620.
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the accused was in a diseased and unsound state, the question will
be, whether the disease existed to so high a degree that for the time
being it overwhelmed the reason, conscience and judgment, and
whether the prisoner, in commiting the homicide, acted from an
irresistable and uncontrollable impulse; if so, then the act was not
the act of a voluntary agent, but the involuntary act of the body,
without the concurrence of a mind directing it."
The "irresistible impulse" focus shifts away from a pure "right-
wrong" dichotomy, exculpating the defendant who acted from an inter-
nal impulse resulting from an actual existing disease of the mind,
which he could neither resist nor control. It was not intended to encom-
pass irresistible impulse produced entirely by emotion, although the
two were often mistakenly intermingled. If it could be shown (despite
an accused's knowledge that his act was wrong) he was acting on an
internal impulse caused by a diseased mind, and that he was unable to
control this impulse, grounds for acquittal were established. Despite its
acceptance in many states as a supplement to M'Naghten, this test also
received criticism as some courts questioned the viability of the
doctrine.70
Many courts view the -test, which attempted to ameliorate the
harmful results of M'Naghten, as inherently inadequate. An additional
criticism of "irresistible impulse" enunciated a doubt that the concepts
upon which the test were based even existed.71 The term implies that a
crime impulsively committed was necessarily the result of an uncontrol-
lable urge. Thus, "the 'irresistible impulse' test is unduly restrictive be-
cause it excludes the numerous instances of crimes committed after ex-
cessive brooding and melancholy by one who is unable to resist psychic
compulsion or to make any real attempt to control his conduct."72 This
leads to inconsistent verdicts where the manner in which the crime was
perpetrated becomes more important than the accused's state of mind.
69. Commonwealth v. Rogers, 7 Metc. 500, 502 (1844), as cited in WEINREB,
CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS 393 (2d ed. 1975) (emphasis added).
70. State v. Maish, 29 Wash. 2d 52, 185 P.2d 486 (1947); State v. Witt, 342 So.
2d 497 (Fla. 1977); 357 F.2d 606. See also Hall, Psychiatry and Criminal Responsi-
bility, 65 YALE L.J. 761 (1956).
71. 357 F.2d 606.
72. Id. at 620-21. See also Wechsler, The Criteria of Criminal Responsibility,
22 U. CHI. L. REV. 367 (1955).
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Shrewd defense counsel were able to confuse juries and thus vitiate any
improvement this test had over M'Naghten.
In finding "irresistible impulse" unsatisfactory, one court con-
cluded that the test was "little more than a gloss on M'Naghten, rather
than a fundamentally new approach to the problem of criminal respon-
sibility."'73 This view forced some courts finding M'Naghten too rigid,
to look elsewhere.
In 1954, Judge Bazelon opined in Durham v. United States4 that
a defendant was not criminally responsible "if his unlawful act was the
product of mental disease or defect." This concept not only removed
the limitations which had previously burdened expert testimony, but
encouraged the psychiatrist to fully report all relevant information con-
cerning the accused's sanity.
The Durham test completely replaced M'Naghten in those juris-
dictions which adopted it. Because it deemphasized the cognitive ele-
ment, looking instead to the accused's volitional makeup on a subjective
basis, its advantages over M'Naghten were clearly apparent. However,
despite its great improvement over the M'Naghten test, Durham too
had deficiencies rendering it unacceptable. There was recognition of an
intrinsic nexus problem, which required proving that the offense com-
mitted was a product of mental disease or defect. Moreover, the lack of
tangible guidelines to aid the fact-finder was an even greater funda-
mental flaw. This resulted in the battle of the psychiatrists which had
the effect of "usurp[ing] the jury's function. 17 5 Thus, the Durham test
fell into disfavor, being rejected by all but two states. 6 Even Bazelon's
court eventually rejected the concept."
During the year preceding the pronouncement in Durham,78 a
group of medical and legal scholars began to meet in an attempt to
create a more accurate and workable definition of criminal responsibil-
73. 357 F.2d at 621.
74. 214 F.2d 862, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
75. 357 F.2d at 621. But see Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir.
1961)(Burger, J., concurring).
76. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 102 (1980); State v. Pike, 6 A.R. 533,
49 N.H. 399 (1870).
77. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
78. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
6:1981
1411M'Naghten in Florida
145
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1981
1 142 Nova Law Journal 6:19811
ity. 9 After nine years of research, drafting and revising, the American
Law Institute adopted Section 4.01 of the Model Penal Code in 1962.
This new test held an accused not responsible for criminal conduct
which, due to a mental disease or defect renders him substantially in-
capable of appreciating the criminality of his conduct or conforming
with the requirements of the law.80 The improvement over M'Naghten
appears obvious. By using the word "substantial" the test recognizes
the difficulty implicit in demanding incapacity be total in order to find
the accused criminally responsible.
The choice of the word "appreciate" rather than "know" was criti-
cal in that "mere intellectual awareness that conduct is wrongful, when
divorced from appreciation or understanding of the moral or legal im-
port of behavior, can have little significance." '81 By modifying "crimi-
nality" in this manner, ALI authors recognized the grey area dividing
the two terms with respect to the human mind.
Another area of improvement over its predecessors was the lesser
degree of importance the ALI standard placed on expert testimony.
Although psychiatric testimony is admissible whenever relevant, it does
not pretend to encroach upon the purview of the jury. Thus the pratfall
of Durham was avoided by ALI's careful elimination of rigid
classifications.
The ALI formulation "accounts for a defendant's entire mental
condition, including both cognitive and volitional capacities, and
79. This group was headed by Professors Herbert Weshcler of Columbia Univer-
sity who served as the chief reporter, and Louis B. Schwartz of the University of
Pennsylvania.
80. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (final draft 1966):
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capac-
ity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law.
(2) The terms 'mental disease or defect' do not include an abnormality
manifested by repeated criminal or otherwise, antisocial conduct.
The drafters created a possible alternative by allowing the adopting jurisdictions to
replace the word "criminality" with "wrongfulness". See, e.g., 357 F.2d 606, 622 n.52,
wherein the court stated that "[w]e have adopted the word 'wrongfulness'. . . because
we wish to include the case where the perpetrator appreciates that his conduct is crimi-
nal, but because of a delusion, believes it to be morally justified." Id.
81. 357 F.2d at 623.
146
Nova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol6/iss1/1
M'Naghten in Florida
1 6:1981
properly recognizes that partial impairment may preclude criminal re-
sponsibility. ' 82 The recognition that a partial impairment could affect
an accused's volitional capacities was a vast improvement over
M'Naghten's total incapacity edict.
Additionally, the test is couched in simple language enabling med-
ical experts to more clearly communicate their clinical observations to
the jury.83 Because of this, the jury is able to reach its own conclusion
as to the accused's criminal responsibility, rather than accept the ex-
pert's opinion as determinative.84 Thus an additional weakness of Dur-
ham is avoided.
The Model Penal Code test is not, however, without critics. One
objection is that its "substantial impairment" requirement is vague and
therefore "susceptible to purely personal interpretation by jurors."'8 5
Judge Bazelon claims that the use of the word "result" would lead to
conclusory expert opinions in the same manner which resulted from the
product language of the Durham test.8"
Despite these criticisms, the test continues to flourish. Accepted in
the vast majority of the federal jurisdictions, 87 it is increasingly being
used to replace M'Naghten in those jurisdictions which had maintained
the older test.
Conclusion
There is little doubt that the M'Naghten test fails to adequately
consider all of those elements comprising the decision making process.
Focusing entirely on cognition, while ignoring volitional aspects of be-
havior, seems primitive in light of the current state of psychiatric sci-
ence. Because of the test's rigid limitations, defendants who are not
adjudicated insane are confined in penal institutions rather than hospi-
82. Comment, M'Naghten Rule Abandoned in Favor of "Justly Responsible"
Test for Criminal Responsibility, 14 SUFFOLK L. REV. 617, 624 (1980) (footnotes
omitted).
83. Id. at 625.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 625. See Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64, 77-78 (9th Cir. 1970)
(Trask, J., dissenting).
86. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon,
C.J., concurring and dissenting).
87. See note 34 supra.
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tals. This results in untreated mentally ill people returning to society,
providing no inhibition of recidivism.
Although the Model Penal Code test is not without drawbacks, it
appears to have a more solid foundation in current medical diagnostic
ability than any other test currently used. To say that it more nearly
reflects the state of modern psychiatry than M'Naghten is an
understatement.
Because the Model Penal Code test promotes a more liberal ap-
proach in the determination of insanity, it assures that mentally infirm
defendants will receive necessary medical treatment, and juries will be
able to make more accurate and educated decisions. This serves the
needs of society to a far greater extent than does maintenance of the
current test in Florida, which, despite minor alterations, is still a woe-
fully inadequate index of criminal responsibility.
Joseph R. Dawson
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Landlord Liability to Tenants for Crimes of a Third
Party: The Status in Florida
Introduction
In recent decisions,' Florida courts have allowed tenants to recover
damages from landlords resulting from criminal acts of third parties
which occurred on the landlord's premises. These decisions raise ques-
tions regarding the basis of the landlord's duty to provide security, the
foreseeability of the crime, and the standard of care to which the land-
lord will be held.
The decisions of Florida District Courts of Appeal which have ad-
dressed the issue share common denominators which will serve to nar-
row the focus of this note. Each of the three cases dealt with a land-
lord-tenant relationship in a residential setting where the tenant was
the victim of a violent crime.2 The criminal's access to the premises
was accomplished in each instance by entry through a common area.
The landlord in all three situations had no prior connection with the
criminal; but each landlord had some form of notice of previous crimes
on the premises or in the surrounding area.
There is a dearth of Florida casess on the issue of a landlord's
liability to his tenant for the violent crimes of a third party. The three
district courts which have addressed the issue proposed criteria, albeit
hazy, for the finding of duty and foreseeability. Equally vague are the
courts' guidelines establishing the standard of care to which the land-
1. Ten Assocs. v. McCutchen, 398 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
Whelan v. Dacoma Enterprises, Inc., 394 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
Holley v. Mt. Zion Terrace Apts., Inc., 382 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
2. The court in Holley describes these reported crimes as "class one" presumably
indicating those crimes which are typified by personal injury to the victim. 382 So. 2d
at 99.
3. Judge Letts' majority opinion expressly notes the scarcity of Florida case law
on the question of a landlord's liability to his tenants for the violent crimes of a third
party. 394 So. 2d at 507
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lord is to be held.4 In the following discussion an attempt will be made
to predict the possible responses of Florida courts to the questions of: a)
whether a landlord has a duty to provide the tenant with security in the
leased premises; b) whether the foreseeability of criminal activity on
the leased premises can be imputed to the landlord; and c) to what
standard of care is the landlord to be held.
Traditionally the landlord has been insulated from liability to his
tenant. Consideration will be given to changes in the legal relationship
between the landlord and tenant which have caused a diminution in the
traditional insulation. In addition, leading cases from other jurisdic-
tions which have addressed the issue of landlord liability will be ex-
amined along with the reaction of Florida courts to these decisions.
Background
The court's reluctance to impose liability on landlords for the
criminal acts of third parties has its discernable roots in the agrarian
based landlord-tenant relationship. 5 The nature of this relationship at
early common law centered upon the conveyance of land for a term of
years, or an estate at will6 which gave the tenant a property interest in
the land.7 Once this interest vested, the tenant acquired exclusive pos-
session of, and control over, the land. 8 With power and control came
the tenant's unfettered ability to provide self-protection., Hence, it was
unreasonable to impose upon the landlord liability for injuries occur-
ring on property over which he had no control or present possessory
interest.' 0
4. 398 So. 2d 860; 382 So. 2d at 100-01.
5. Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apt. Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 481 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
6. 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries* 140-42.
7. 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 7 221 [1] (P.J. Roahn rev.
1977); 1 CASNER, AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 1.11 (1952).
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY, Historical Perspective
(1977); see generally R. BOYER, SORVEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY (3d ed. 1981) for
a discussion of the nature of the leasehold as a mutant of personal and real property
interests.
9. R. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD TENANT § 1.3 (1980).
10. W. PROSSER, THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 63 (4th ed. 1971);
see generally AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD TENANT, note 9 supra for a thorough
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Traditional theories of tort liability for acts of a third party were
equally narrow."" The general rule, that no duty is placed on an indi-
vidual to control the behavior of a third party which results in physical
harm to another is reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.2
But, as set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the general rule
has two exceptions: when "(a) a special relation exists between the ac-
tor and the third party which imposes a duty upon the actor to control
the third person's conduct; or (b) a special relation exists between the
actor and the other which gives to the other a right to protection."13
Employing these exceptions Florida courts have limited finding the ex-
istence of a special relationship to innkeeper-guest, common carrier-
passenger, and business-invitee relationships.' 4 The landlord-tenant re-
lationship has not yet been recognized as sufficiently special for the
purpose of imposing liability on the landlord.' 5
Evolution of the Traditional Theories in Kline v. 1500
Massachusetts Avenue, Inc.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit considered the traditional landlord-tenant relationship in Kline
v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartments, Inc. 6 The plaintiff in
Kline was a female tenant residing in the defendant's high rise apart-
treatment of the agrarian tenurial relationship and its gradual progression into the con-
temporary landlord-tenant setting.
11. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 9, § 4.1.
12. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF TORTS § 315 (1965).
13. Id.
14. Orlando Executive Park, Inc. v. P.D.R., 402 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1981); Reichenback v. Days Inn of America, Inc., 1981 Fla. Law Weekly 1673
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. July 15, 1981); Werndli v. Greyhound Corp., 365 So. 2d 177
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Robart v. Jordan Marsh Co., 305 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
15. See note 42 and accompanying text infra. Although Florida district courts
have imposed a landlord's duty to take reasonable security measures in the face of
foreseeable criminal acts of a third party, the duty stems from either contract obliga-
tion, the foreseeability of the criminal acts, or a combination of both. 382 So. 2d 98;
398 So. 2d 860; 394 So. 2d 506. None of the Florida district court decisions imposing
the duty do so on the basis of a special relationship between the landlord and tenant.
Id.
16. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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ments.'7 She was robbed and assaulted in the hallway of her apartment
building and she sought compensation for the injuries she had received.
When the plaintiff initially moved into the building the defendant
provided its tenants with some security measures. There were attend-
ants by the front door and in the lobby of the building on a round-the-
clock schedule. In addition, garage attendants locked street entrances
when they went off duty in the evening. These measures deteriorated
to such a degree that, at the time plaintiff was assaulted, the building
was unattended and frequently left unlocked. As a result, criminal ac-
tivity, of which the landlord had notice, occurred on the premises. 18
Analyzing the traditional theories governing landlord liability,19
the court discussed the landlord's early common law insulation from
liability to tenants and its evolution into the present day landlord's duty
to use reasonable care in maintenance of common areas. 0 The court
noted that this duty was based on the landlord's exclusive control over
undemised areas. Furthermore, the court recognized that the landlord.
would be liable for tenant injuries caused by his failure to use reason-
able care in the maintenance and repair of common areas.21
After discussing the general rule that individuals are under no
duty to protect others from the crimes of third parties, the Kline court
17. The Kline court notes that portions of defendant's building housed office
space. Id. at 487 n.24. This fact is not determinative to the Kline court in light of the
fact that the assault on plaintiff took place well past normal business hours.
To this we add our own comment that it is unlikely ... that a patron
of one of the businesses, even if disposed to criminal conduct, would have
waited for five hours after the usual closing time to perpetrate his crime -
especially one of a violent nature. Further, although it is not essential to
our decision in this case, we point out that it is not at all clear that a
landlord who permits a portion of his premises to be used for business
purposes and the remainder for apartments would be free from liability to
a tenant injured by the criminal act of a lingering patron of one of the
businesses. If the risk of such injury is forseeable, then the landlord may
be liable for failing to take reasonable measures to protect his tenant from
it.
Id.
18. Id. at 479.
19. See notes 9-14 and accompanying text supra.
20. 439 F.2d at 480-81.
21. Id. at 481; see also Marlo Invs., Inc. v. Verne, 227 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1969).
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listed the traditional reasons for its application to the landlord-tenant
relationship:
judicial reluctance to tamper with the traditional concept of the
landlord-tenant relationship; the notion that the act of a third per-
son in committing an intentional tort or crime is a superseding
cause of the harm to another resulting therefrom; the oftentimes
difficult problem of determining foreseeability of criminal acts; the
vagueness of the standard which the landlord must meet; the eco-
nomic consequences of the imposition of the duty; and conflict with
public policy of allocating the duty of protecting citizens from
criminal acts to the government rather than the private sector. 22
Implicit in this catalogue of reasons is the court's hesitancy to establish
a duty for which a basis and standard of care are difficult to ascertain.
On the other hand the Kline court stated that "the rationale falters
when it is applied to the conditions of modern day apartment living
. . . .The rationale of the general rule exonerating a third party from
criminal attack has no applicability to the landlord-tenant relation-
ship."23 Thus, the establishment of the landlord's duty to use reasona-
ble care to protect a tenant from the foreseeable crimes of a third
party24 ultimately rests 6n the anachronistic character of the general
rule and the foundation laid by the duty to use ordinary, reasonable,
prudent care in the maintenance of common areas.
In establishing the landlord's duty, the Kline court emphasized the
landlord's control over the common areas and his power to regulate
security.25 This power and control over the common areas has shifted
from the tenant, where it rested in the agrarian relationship, to the
landlord in the contemporary setting. In the court's opinion the tenant
22. 439 F.2d at 481.
23. Id.
24. The court in Kline declines credit for creating this exception to the general
rule choosing rather to view the decision as an amplification of the holding in Kendall
v. Gore Properties, Inc., 236 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1956). Id. at 485 n.19. The court in
Kendall was faced with an issue which can be distinguished from Kline in that plain-
tiff's decedent in Kendall was strangled by an employee of the landlord. The gravamen
of plaintiff's complaint was not the landlord's failure to provide adequate security but
rather the negligent hiring and supervision of the employee.
25. 439 F.2d at 481.
!
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no longer has the control and the power necessary to adequately protect
himself against the violent crimes of third parties. This shift of power,
coupled with the landlord's notice of criminal activity on the premises
led the court to conclude that "it d[id] not seem unfair to place upon
the landlord a duty to take those steps which are within his power
[and] to minimize the predictable risk to his tenant."26 This analysis
provided the reasoning underlying imposition of tort based liability on
the landlord. It stopped short, however, of declaring the landlord-tenant
relationship as 'special' for the purpose of establishing a prima facie
duty such as found in the innkeeper-guest relationship.
The court broadly defined foreseeability in terms of the probability
and the predictability of the criminal acts of third parties.27 Other
than the broad range of conceivable situations suggested by these
terms, the Kline decision offered no guidelines as to fact patterns which
might be predictable or establish foreseeability. The court recognized
that the finding of a duty without guidelines would result in uncertain
and inconsistent application of the duty,28 but the standards it set forth,
i.e., predictability and probability, do little to alleviate these pitfalls.29
After examining the traditional property interpretation of the
leasehold interest, which it found to be anachronistic,30 the court sug-
gested an alternative basis of recovery founded on contract theory. The
basis for this alternative recovery is found in the holding of Javins v.
First National Realty Corp.31 Javins advocated departure from the
feudal based interpretation of the landlord-tenant relationship in favor
26. Id.
27. Id. at 483. The court takes issue with the looser definition set forth by the
New Jersey Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Housing Auth. of Newark, 38 N.J. 578,
186 A.2d 291 (1962) which defined foreseeability with a view towards possibilities as
opposed to probabilities. The Kline court presumably is not engaging in a semantic
discussion, but rather underscoring the thought that its decision is not a radical depar-
ture from prior case law. See note 24 supra.
28. 439 F.2d at 481.
29. See generally Selvin, Landlord Tort Liability for Criminal Attacks on Te-
nants: Developments Since Kline, 9 REAL EST. L.J., 311 (1981); Comment, The Land-
lord's Duty in New York to Protect His Tenant Against Criminal Intrusions, 45 ALB.
L. REv. 988 (1981); Note, Security: A New Standard For Habitability, 42 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 415 (1981).
30. 439 F.2d at 481. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
31. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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of one based on contract theory, recognizing "the modern trend toward
treating leases as contracts [as] wise and well considered. ' 2 In Kline,
this interpretation was the groundwork for implying that the landlord
assumed a contractual obligation to provide security.3 3 The landlord's
power and control over common areas again were found at the heart of
his obligation.34 Kline suggests that the landlord's contractual obliga-
tions to repair the common areas may be more far-reaching than those
imposed by tort theories.35 By using contract theory the court placed
"the duty of taking protective measures guarding the entire premises
and the areas peculiarly under the landlord's control against the perpe-
tration of criminal acts upon the landlord, the party to the lease con-
tract who has the effective capacity to perform these necessary acts."36
Finally, the Kline court suggested a landlord's duty to provide se-
curity might be found by analogy to recognized special relationships.
37
The court suggested an analogy to the innkeeper-guest relationship38
because of its contractual nature and the court's perception of the land-
lord-tenant relationship as one of its modern equivalents.39 The analogy
is predicated on the identical factors used in establishing foreseeability
in tort and contract based duties: power and control. The court rea-
soned that where "the ability of one of the parties to provide for his
own protection has been limited in some way by his submission to the
control of the other, . . . [the] duty should be imposed upon the one
possessing control .... "40 However, courts of other jurisdictions have
overwhelmingly found the landlord-tenant relationship to be outside the
confines of recognized special relationships. 41 " Therefore, the analogy
based duty found in Kline has had, at best, a tepid reception.42
32. Id. at 1076.
33. 439 F.2d at 481.
34. Id. at 482.
35. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
36. 439 F.2d at 482 (emphasis supplied).
37. Id. at 485.
38. Id. See also note 14 supra.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 483.
41. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 9, § 1.3.
42. Gulf Reston Inc. v. Rogers, 215 Va. 155, 207 S.E.2d 841 (1974); Ten As-
socs. v. McCutchen, 398 So. 2d 860; Whelan v. Dacoma Enterprises, Inc., 394 So. 2d
506; Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 359 A.2d 548 (Ct. App. 1976); Hall v. Frakoni, 68
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Tort and contract theories as applied in Kline present litigants
with a practicable means of establishing a landlord's duty although the
innkeeper-guest analogy has met with little success. The remainder of
this note will examine Florida's reaction to tort and contract theories,
as well as the treatment they have received in other jurisdictions.
Florida's Reaction to Kline and its Progeny
The Kline court used the modern contractual construction of the
leasehold, as suggested in Javins,4 3 to find landlord duty, and Florida
generally has accepted the same interpretation of the leasehold inter-
est.44 This approach removes the obstacles associated with traditional
property-oriented methods of lease interpretation. Holley v. Mt. Zion
Terrace Apartments, Inc. and Ten Associates v. McCutchen45 acknowl-
edged the existence of a contractual duty to provide security. In neither
case did the landlord overtly assume to protect the tenant from crimes
of third parties.46
Florida's Third District Court of Appeal, in Holley47 approved and
followed the Kline inroads to landlord liability when it set aside a sum-
mary judgment in favor of the landlord.48 In Holley the defendant
leased an apartment located in a high crime area to the plaintiffs dece-
dent.49 The defendant instituted and charged fees over and above the
Misc. 2d 470, 330 N.Y.S.2d 637 (Civ. Ct. 1972); but see Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J.
214, , 412 A.2d 436, 441 (1980) where the court in dictum indicates that reconsid-
eration of the feasibility of a special duty based on the landlord-tenant relationship
might be in order.
43. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
44. The case generally credited as Florida's acceptance of a contractual interpre-
tation of the leasehold interest is Butler v. Maney, 146 Fla. 41, 200 S. 226 (1941).
45. 382 So. 2d 98; 398 So. 2d 860.
46. Presumably since Holley and McCutchen have legitimized recovery based on
implied contractual obligations the landlord's duty would be crystalline in a factual
setting with an express assumption of the landlord's obligation to provide security. Re-
search has not divulged a landlord who was willing to expressly assume this obligation.
Id. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
47. 382 So. 2d 98.
48. Id. at 99-100. In order for the Holley court to find the existence of a genuine
issue of fact regarding the defendant's conduct which might give rise to liability, the
court first had to recognize that the landlord had a duty to provide security.
49. 382 So. 2d at 99.
6:18 !
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agreed rent for security measures it subsequently abandoned.50 The
court greatly emphasized that although the defendant continued to de-
rive income from these fees,51 none of this money was spent on security
the year plaintiff's decedent was raped and murdered.52 In finding that
a contractual duty to provide security existed, the court focused on the
defendant's continued acceptance of these additional monies. It found
that receipt of the fees raised a genuine issue as to whether the land-
lord had implicitly assumed to provide protective measures for the
tenants. The existence of this factual question required reversal of the
summary judgment; thus the cause was remanded for further
determination. 3
The Holley decision also established a duty on the landlord based
on the foreseeability of criminal acts as set forth in Kline. 4 The court
found foreseeability via its reference to the frequency of reported vio-
lent crimes on the landlord's premises. 55 The foundation for finding
foreseeability in Holley stemmed from defendant's notice of crime in
the area.56 Not only were crimes frequently reported, but the defen-
dant himself refused to accept cash for business transactions on the
premises.57
It is apparent that an individual landlord's notice58 of repeated
criminal incidents on, or near, his premises is determinative in finding
sufficient foreseeability to impose liability.59 A broad range of circum-
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 100.
54. Id. at 99.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 100.
57. Id. at 99.
58. An issue which conceivably would have a great impact on Florida's non-resi-
dent landlords deals with basing the duty to protect against foreseeable criminal acts
on constructive notice. The court in Kline refers to numerous police reports of crimes
on the landlord's premises and states that the "reports in themselves constitute con-
structive notice to the landlords." 439 F.2d at 479 n.2.
59. But see Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J. at _, 412 A.2d at 443, where, in
dictum, the New Jersey Supreme Court indicates that a landlord's duty to protect ten-
ants from foreseeable criminal acts of third persons might be founded on a breach of
an implied warranty of habitability which the court reasoned "exists independently of
... [the landlord's] knowledge of any risks, [hence] there is no need to prove notice of
1531Landlord Liability for Crimes16:1981
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stances have provided a landlord with the necessary notice for the im-
position of a duty based on foreseeability. Florida decisions indicate
that the location of the landlord's premises in a high crime area may be
sufficient to impose this duty.60 Other jurisdictions have suggested that
any of the following factual settings warrant imposition of a foresee-
ability based duty: a) previous crimes specifically on the landlord's
property; 61 b) possession of "composite drawings of the suspect and a
general description of his modus operandi" coupled with the knowledge
that prior crimes meeting this description had occurred on, or near, the
landlord's premises,62 c) the posting of a notice by the landlord inform-
ing the tenants of the commission of crimes on the premises.6 3
The question of whether the criminal attack must occur in an area
under the landlord's exclusive control apparently presents little contro-
versy. The murder in Holley did not occur in the common area, under
the landlord's exclusive control; rather, the act occurred in the dece-
dent's apartment which was entered through a window adjoining the
building's common walkway. 4 However, this fact did not preclude re-
covery where "the basis of the plaintiff's case [was] the almost undis-
puted fact that the intruder could have entered the apartment only
through the common walkway . . . . 6
such a defective and unsafe condition to establish the landlord's duty." It could be
argued that faced with the proper situation New Jersey courts would dispense with the
notice requirement found in the vast majority of other jurisdictions. For a sampling of
these holdings, see cases cited in notes 59-61 infra.
60. 398 So. 2d 860; 394 So. 2d 506.
61. Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. at -, 359 A.2d at 554. The court in Scott
"think[s] this duty arises primarily from criminal activities existing on the landlord's
premises, and not from knowledge of general criminal activities in the neighborhood."
Id.
62. O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp., 75 Cal. App. 3d 802, 142 Cal. Rptr.
487 (Ct. App. 1977). In addition, there apparently had been previous rapes in the same
building that the plaintiff inhabited. Id.
63. Sherman v. Concourse Realty Corp., 47 A.D.2d 134, 365 N.Y.S.2d 239
(App. Div. 1975); but see Dick v. Great South Bay Co., 106 Misc. 2d 686, 435
N.Y.S.2d 240 (Civ. Ct. 1981) wherein the court held that plaintiff's failure to prove
prior criminal activity did not negate her cause of action. Plaintiff sought recovery from
her landlord for injuries she suffered in a robbery in the hallway of her apartment
building. Id.
64. 382 So. 2d at 99.
65. Id. at 101. See also 75 Cal. App. 3d at -, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 490, wherein
158
Nova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol6/iss1/1
Landlord Liability for Crimes6:1981
In Florida, the related question of whether a previous crime must
be of the same specific kind as the one complained of remains unan-
swered in the context of the landlord-tenant relationship. 6 The Court
of Appeals of the District of Columbia responded to the question in
Spar v. Oboya,67 where the tenant was shot as he was walking through
an unsecured door into the foyer of his apartment building. The land-
lord argued that a record of prior robberies was inadequate to establish
that he could have foreseen a shooting. 8 The court found no merit in
this argument in light of "evidence of (a) individual apartment units of
the building being burglarized . . ., and (b) the presence of unautho-
rized persons in the building."6 The court in Spar considered these
factors collectively and concluded the prior incidents were sufficient "to
have put . . . [the landlords] on notice of the likelihood of unautho-
rized entry into the building by persons with criminal intent."'70 It is
possible that a stricter standard than that used in Spar will be required
by Florida courts. The application of a stricter standard was suggested
by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Relyea v. State.71 The plain-
tiff alleged that the assault and murder of students at a state university
was the result of inadequate security.7 2 However, plaintiff was unable
to prove the incidence of prior assaults on campus, the "similar crimi-
nal acts committed" requirement necessary for a successful recovery.73
the landlords "contend[ed] that the fact the assault took place inside [the tenant's]
apartment should absolve them, since she, not they had control over the common area.
This fact is not determinative. Failure to take reasonable precautions to safeguard the
common areas under ... [the landlord's] control could have contributed substantially,
as alleged, to [the tenant's] injuries." Id.
66. See dissenting opinion by Judge MacKinnon in Kline. He takes issue with a
finding of notice on the landlord's part arguing that evidence of "one solitary instance
of an assault and robbery is an insufficient base to support a finding that assaults and
robberies are a predictable risk from which the landlord would have every reason to
expect like crimes to happen again." 439 F.2d at 489.
67. 369 A.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
68. Id. at 177.
69. Id.
70. 'Id.
71. 385 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
72. Id. at 1383.
73. Id. The Relyea court upheld a judgment for the defendant insurance com-
pany based on the absence of prior crimes and consequently the unforseeability of the
incident complained of. Id. The State of Florida and its agents operating the university
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The sufficiency of foreseeability alone as a basis for imposition of a
duty in Florida is unclear. Holley recognized duties based on both fore-
seeability and contract theories, but the court never declared them to
be interdependent or independent. The Fifth District Court of Appeal
in Whelan v. Dacoma Enterprises, Inc.74 found a duty existed on the
part of the landlord to protect his tenant from the foreseeable criminal
acts of a third party despite the absence of any allegation of a contrac-
tual obligation. Certainly this holding suggests that the court is amena-
ble to imposition of a duty based on foreseeability alone.75 It could be
argued that this hypothesis is supported, implicitly, in Judge Beranek's
dissenting opinion in Whelan.7' He would require either the landlord's
express or implied contractual obligation to provide security prior to
in question were exempted from liability based on theories of sovereign immunity. Id.
at 1381.
74. 394 So. 2d 506. Although Whelan emanates from Florida's Fifth District,
the panel is comprised of Judges Letts, Downey and Beranek all of whom are Fourth
District judges. It could be argued that presented with a similar case the Fourth Dis-
trict would impose liability similar to that found in Whelan.
75. The court in Whelan notes the absence of any allegation of statutory viola-
tions on the landlord's part. FLA. STAT. § 83.51 (2)(a) (1973)(emphasis supplied)
provides:
Unless otherwise agreed in writing, in addition to the requirements of
subsection (1) which deals with health code violations and structural re-
quirements, the landlord of dwelling units other than a single-family home
or a duplex shall, at all times during the tenancy, make reasonable provi-
sions for:
1 . . . .
2. Locks & keys
3. The clean and safe condition of common areas ....
This portion of the Landlord Tenant Act apparently has never been presented as a
basis for recovery for injuries resulting from a criminal attack. The likelihood of suc-
cess on such a basis is limited in light of the holding in deJesus v. Seaboard Coast Line
R. Co., 281 So. 2d 198, 200 (Fla. 1973), and Beaches Hosp. v. Lee, 384 So. 2d 234,
237 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980). Both the Florida Supreme Court and the First
District Court of Appeal concluded that violation of a statute which does not impose
strict liability is not negligence per se, but rather evidence of negligence. It is interest-
ing to note that FLA. STAT. § 83.51(2)(a) requires a landlord to employ reasonable
measures. This standard presents the same difficulties as tort and contract recoveries in
failing to establish parameters of conduct for the landlord. See note 89 and accompa-
nying text infra.
76. 394 So. 2d at 508-09.
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the imposition of duty." The dissent's addition of a prerequisite con-
tractual duty suggests that Judge Beranek also viewed the majority's
decision as approval for landlord duty based on foreseeability alone.
Whether Florida will impose a duty based solely on foreseeability
is clouded by the Third District Court of Appeal in the McCutchen
opinion.7 1 The court in McCutchen imposed a duty on a landlord to use
reasonable care in providing his tenants with protection against crimi-
nal acts of third parties without stating whether this duty arose from a
tortious or contractual basis. The facts in McCutchen showed the de-
fendant's apartment complex was located in a high crime area where
thdre had been "substantial criminal activity within the year prior to
the attack on McCutchen . . . . ,,7' Furthermore, defendant's adver-
tisements specifically referred to the provision of twenty-four hour se-
curity services.8 0 Based on these facts the court concluded that the
landlord "clearly recognized and assumed the duty to protect his te-
nants from foreseeable criminal conduct." 81 Noting the presence of
both foreseeability and express or implied contractual duties the court
specifically declined to decide "whether in Florida foreseeability alone
is a sufficient basis for finding the duty, or whether, in addition, a land-
lord must expressly or impliedly assume such a duty. '8 2
The stage is set for potential conflict between at least two of Flor-
ida's five judicial districts. There is a suggestion that the Whelan court
is amenable to the imposition of a landlord's duty based on foreseeabil-
ity alone.83 The McCutchen court expressly declined to decide whether
either tort or contract theories would serve independently as a basis for
finding a duty to provide security.8 Obviously, without a duty to pro-
vide security a landlord cannot be held liable for injuries resulting from
inadequate security. As such, the basis for the landlord's duty is a criti-
cal element of an action seeking recovery for injuries resulting from
inadequate security measures and clarity of the requisite basis of the
77. Id. at 508.
78. 398 So. 2d 860.
79. Id. at 1023.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1024 n.2.
83. See note 74 and accompanying text supra.
84. See note 81 and accompanying text supra.
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duty undoubtedly would be helpful to litigants, their counsel and the
courts.
The decisions of Holley, McCutchen and Whelan 5 embrace the
landlord's duties under contract and tort theories to provide a tenant
with protection from the foreseeable crimes of a third party. The recog-
nition of the threshold requirement of duty, however, does not establish
a landlord's liability nor does it guarantee a tenant's recovery for inju-
ries suffered.88 The next question becomes: what measures must a
landlord take in order to discharge this duty? Certainly the answer to
this question is of paramount concern to the landlord, in his attempt to
avoid incurring liability, 7 and to the tenant, in his attempt to prove an
actionable breach of duty.88
As in most situations where the issue hinges upon an individual's
use of ordinary, reasonable, prudent care, Florida courts have placed
the responsibility of determining the issue on the jury.8 9 In attempting
to offer a prediction of the jury's determination of the standard of care,
85. See note 1 supra.
86. Navajo Circle, Inc. v. Developments Concepts Corp., 373 So. 2d 689, 691
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
87. "One who has performed his full duty with respect to the exercise of care is
not liable for an injury to the person of another .... " Robb v. Pike, 119 Fla. 833,
-, 161 So. 732, 734 (1935).
88. In addition to proving duty and subsequent breach the tenant should be
aware of possible defenses to actions sounding either in contract or in tort. A thorough
analysis of the possible defenses is beyond the scope of this note, however, see John's
Pass Seafood Co. v. Weber, 369 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Smith v.
General Apt. Co., 133 Ga. 927, 213 S.E.2d 74 (Ct. App. 1975); FLA. STAT. § 83.47 for
an indication of the effect of exculpatory clauses on a landlord's liability to a residen-
tial tenant. See 382 So. 2d at 101; Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 359 A.2d 548 (Ct.
App. 1976); Gibson v. Avis Rent-a-Car Sys., Inc., 368 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 1980), for
rejections of arguments seeking to dispel liability based on proximate cause where the
foreseeability of intervention and the resultant avoidable harm is the negligent conduct
in itself. See Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Blackburn v. Dorta, 348
So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977); Kuhn v. Harless, 390 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1980); 394 So. 2d at 508 for language to the effect that, in Florida, a plaintiff's com-
parative negligence would not preclude recovery.
89. "Under our system, it is peculiarly a jury function to determine what precau-
tions are reasonably required in the exercise of a particular duty of due care." 382 So.
2d at 100-01. See also Bennett v. Mattison, 382 So. 2d 873, 875 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1980).
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consideration of the findings of other courts offer little elucidation.
Other courts have suggested provisions ranging from a lock "capable of
adequately performing the function to which it was put"90 to avoidance
of conditions which are "conducive to criminal assaults." 91 The spec-
trum of reasonable care seems to range from preventive measures92 to
steps which avoid fostering the criminal's purposes. 3 In essence the
range consists of the subtle distinction between keeping an incident
from happening and not promoting its occurence.
In light of the prominent role a jury plays in finding what is cur-
rently demanded of an ordinary, reasonable, prudent landlord, it is vir-
tually impossible to accurately predict what measures will satisfy a
landlord's duty in any but the most extreme cases. The Court of Ap-
peals of the District of Columbia Circuit in Ramsey v. Morrisette ad-
dressed the question of standard of care as follows: "We by no means
suggest that there is a general legal duty on the landlord to provide full
time resident managers or to install locks on the front door of an apart-
ment house. The test is what is reasonable in all the circumstances. '94
Ultimately, as suggested by Ramsey, and alluded to by the Florida
courts, the fact finder will have to make a determination of reasonable
care considering the facts and circumstances of each individual case.
Conclusion
Under traditional property interpretations of the leasehold interest,
and tort concepts basing liability on the existence of a special relation-
ship, a landlord was exempted from liability to a tenant for the crimi-
90. Warner v. Arnold, 133 Ga. App. 174, -, 210 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1974). It is
interesting to note that the Warner court defines adequate security measures in terms
of adequacy. The definition of a word which employs the word sought to be defined
has never proven effective and serves to emphasize the elusive nature of the standard of
care.
91. Johnston v. Harris, 387 Mich. 569, 198 N.W.2d 409 (1972). This case deals
with the inadequacy of locks and illumination. Apparently the testimony of a public
lighting expert who drew corollaries between the inadequacy of the lighting and the
high incidence of crime carried some weight in the court's decision.
92. E.g., the installation of locks. 133 Ga. App. 174, 210 S.E.2d 350.
93. E.g., increasing the intensity of lighting to provide an atmosphere which dis-
courages criminal activity. 387 Mich. 569, 198 N.W.2d 409.
94. 252 A.2d 509, 512 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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nal acts of a third party. Two of Florida's district courts have limited a
landlord's exemptions and imposed upon him a duty to provide ade-
quate security measures in instances where a landlord has contractually
assumed that obligation or when criminal acts of third parties are fore-
seeable. 95 The question of whether Florida will impose a duty to pro-
vide security based on the tort concept of foreseeability alone remains
unanswered.
Even when the duty has been established, circumstances constitut-
ing foreseeability appear unsettled. Notice of prior criminal activity,
hence foreseeability, is elementary to the imposition of a duty.
Whether to constitute notice these prior activities must have occurred
on the landlord's premises and whether the incidents must be of the
same kind as the acts complained of remains unclear in the context of
the landlord-tenant relationship. 96 Furthermore, Florida decisions do
not indicate whether the landlord must have actual notice of the inci-
dents of crimes on, or near, his premises?
The determination of fulfillment of the standard of care continues
to be a factual question for the jury to decide. Cases from other juris-
dictions indicate that these decisions will be made on a case by case
basis. Florida courts have not expressly adopted the case by case ap-
proach in the context of a landlord's use of reasonable care to protect
his tenants from the criminal acts of third parties. However, applica-
tion of a case by case approach in the landlord-tenant context is proba-
ble in light of its use in other tort actions dependent on a standard of
reasonable care.
The threshold question of whether a landlord has a duty to protect
his tenants from the foreseeable criminal acts of third parties has been
answered affirmatively by two District Courts of Appeal in Florida.98
Now that a landlord is under an obligation to exercise reasonable care
in his provision of security against foreseeable criminal acts, the area of
liability resulting from a breach of this duty may be litigated more
often. With new cases will come clearer pronouncements by Florida
courts on the questions of the basis for the duty, the criteria for finding
95. Florida's Third District Court of Appeal in McCutchen and Holley, and
Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal in Whelan.
96. See note 72 and accompanying text supra.
97. See note 57 and accompanying text supra.
98. See note 94 supra.
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foreseeability, and the standards of care to be employed when address-
ing the landlord's liability to his tenants for the crimes of a third party
made possible by inadequate security.
Theresa M. B. Van Vliet
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The Impact of FIRPTA and ERTA on Florida Real
Estate Investment by a Netherlands Antilles
Corporation
Introduction
The tax advantages once granted a foreigner using a foreign cor-
poration to invest in United States real estate have disappeared. This
paper will comment on the provisions of the Foreign Investment in
Real Property Tax Act of 1980 (FIRPTA)1 and the Economic Recov-
ery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA).2
Many foreign investors will be affected by the new laws. Recently,
a study was conducted by the Secretary of the Treasury identifying
foreign investment in United States real property. Although the infor-
mation was taken from press clippings and the actual amount invested
is probably much greater, the Office of Foreign Investment found that
foreigners had invested $1,101,000,000 in United States real property
in 1978.3 Of this dollar volume, an estimated 25% was invested in Flor-
ida realty alone. As was reported in a recent edition of Florida Trend
magazine,4 $241,000,000 was invested in Miami in 1979, including an
"alarming number [of investments] traced to . . . narcotics [money],
tax evasion and currency smuggling." In view of this phenomenon,
Congress promulgated FIRPTA and ERTA in an effort to curb the use
of illicit funds in purchase of United States realty. Moreover, the legis-
lation was passed to stem the growing tide of foreign investment with
its perceived attendant influence on the American public.
1. Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 1121, 94 Stat. 2682.
2. Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 831, 95 Stat. 352.
3. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN U.S.
REAL ESTATE (May 1979).
4. Calonius, Offshore Money Floods Miami, FLORIDA TREND, at 38.
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Taxation of the United States Citizen and the United States
Corporation by the United States
Unlike citizens of other countries, United States citizens, residents
and corporations are taxed on their worldwide income. Deductions are
allowed for most of the ordinary and necessary expenses involved in the
earning of income.' Usually, gains from one activity may be offset
against the losses of another.' The allowance of deductions and the
ability to offset gains against losses are most important to the real es-
tate investor. Income from real estate investments can be reduced by
the amounts paid for operating the property,7 mortgage interest,8 insur-
ance, 9 taxes 0 and depreciation. 1
Real estate in Florida, appreciating rapidly over the last ten years,
lures investors with the promise of large capital gain. Income earned
from operating the property has not been the primary motivation for
investment in Florida real estate, since it pales in comparison to the
profits made through property resale.
When real estate which is held for more than one year is sold, the
United States taxpayer must treat the gain, up to the amount of excess
depreciation, as ordinary income and the remainder may be treated as
capital gain.12 Additionally, an individual is able to deduct sixty per-
cent of the capital gain on the sale of the property and is only required
to pay tax on the remaining forty percent.13 Thus, with a maximum tax
rate of fifty percent on ordinary income in 1982, the maximum effec-
tive rate of tax on an individual's capital gain will be twenty percent
(forty percent of fifty percent).
An individual with substantial long term capital gain may be af-
fected by the alternative minimum tax." This tax, imposed on the sum
of taxable income plus the long term capital gains deduction plus cer-
5. I.R.C. § 162.
6. Id. § 1231.
7. Id. § 162.
8. Id. § 163.
9. Id.§ 162.
10. Id. § 164.
11. Id. § 167.
12. Id. § 1238.
13. Id. § 1202(a).
14. In determining the taxpayer's total tax liability, the alternative minimum tax
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tain adjusted itemized deductions, is assessed at progressive rates up to
twenty percent. The individual's tax liability is the higher of the tax
computed by the ordinary rules, or the tax computed under the alterna-
tive minimum tax rules. In contrast, the long term capital gains of a
United States corporation are taxed, without any special deduction, as
ordinary income or at twenty-eight percent, whichever is lower.1 5
Taxation of Non-Resident Aliens and Foreign Corporations by
the United States
The United States taxes a non-resident alien 6 or a foreign corpo-
ration17 on three types of income. These include: income effectively
connected with a United States trade or business as opposed to invest-
ment income;"8 certain other income including interest, dividends, rents
and other gain from a United States source not effectively connected
with a United States trade or business;1 9 and income derived from real
property located in the United States, if an election is made to treat
that income as connected with a United States trade or business. 0
Tax Treaties
Tax treaties avoid double taxation on the income of persons, re-
sidents or corporations organized in one country, deriving income in
another.21 These treaties regulate contracting states rights to tax par-
is to be paid only to the extent that the tax exceeds the taxpayer's regular tax liability.
Id. § 55.
15. Id. § 1201.
16. A non-resident alien is "an individual whose residence is not within the
United States, and who is not a citizen of the United States." Treas. Reg. § 1.871-2(a),
T.D. 6258, 1957-2 C.B. 368.
17. A foreign corporation is a corporation, association, joint-stock company or
insurance company which is not created or organized under the laws of the United
States or any state. I.R.C. §§ 7701(a)(3), (4) & (5).
18. This income can be offset by the usual allowable deductions and is generally
taxed in the same manner as the income of a United States citizen or corporation.
19. No deductions are allowed to offset this type of income, and it is taxed at
thirty percent (or less if a tax treaty applies).
20. I.R.C. § 871 (d); Treas. Reg. § 1.871-10, T.D. 7332, 1975-1 C.B. 204.
21. Tax treaties between the United States and foreign countries greatly change
the results that would otherwise obtain under domestic tax law. See generally M.
165 11 6:1981
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ticular types of income through reciprocal concessions. Generally,
United States treaties require the United States to recognize and allow
a credit for taxes paid to the treaty partner and the United States
agrees to reduce or eliminate its tax on United States source income of
persons or corporations organized in the treaty partner's country.22 Al-
though recent treaties limit the aforementioned benefits, some of the
older conventions do not, and they may still be used by third country
residents for tax avoidance.2
In 1948, the United States signed an income tax treaty with the
Netherlands,24 the provisions of which were extended by protocol to the
Netherlands Antilles in 1955.25 A Naamloze Vennootschap (N.V.), a
limited liability company similar to the familiar United States corpora-
tion, can deduct operating expenses, property taxes, mortgage interest
and depreciation in calculating its corporate income tax.26 Additionally,
the Netherlands Antilles permits its corporations to issue bearer shares,
which allows for anonymity.27 Insofar as the United States assesses tax
against the N.V., the United States-Netherlands Antilles treaty modi-
fies the treaty partner's law in three ways which are of prime impor-
tance to the real estate investor.
Article V of the treaty states:
"Income of whatever nature derived from real property and interest
from mortgages secured by real property shall be taxable only in the
Contracting State in which real property is situated. ' 28
This provision obviates the possibility of taxation by both treaty
partners. Thus, foreign investors using an N.V. to hold title to United
States real estate are assured that they will not be taxed in the Nether-
lands Antilles. The reservation clause of Article V permits the United
States (i.e., the country in which the property is located) to tax the
LANGER, PRACTICAL INTERNATIONAL TAX PLANNING (2d ed. 1979).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. M. LANGER, THE NETHERLANDS ANTILLES-UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN-
COME TAX TREATY (1973).
25. Id.
26. See generally PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN THE NETHERLANDS
ANTILLES (1979).
27. Id.
28. See note 24 supra.
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gains derived from the disposition of real property situated in the
United States. However, in many instances, United States income pro-
ducing property does not generate United States taxable income. 9 By
taking all the allowable deductions, a real estate investor may be able
to reduce his United States tax liability to a minimum. Thus, the typi-
cal N.V. investing in United States real estate pays little or no United
States income tax, not because of the treaty, but because of normal
United States tax rules which encourage investment in real estate by
anyone as a tax sheltering device.
Article XII of the treaty states:
"Dividends and interest paid by a Netherlands Antilles corporation
shall be exempt from United States tax except where the recipient is a
citizen, resident or corporation of the United States."30
The treaty article takes priority over conflicting Internal Revenue
Code provisions.31 Consequently, this treaty provision allows interest to
be paid tax free to the foreign shareholder of an N.V., effectively
avoiding United States tax since I.R.C. Sections 1442 and 861 could
subject that foreign shareholder to United States withholding tax in
certain circumstances.32
Article X as amended by Article II of the 1963 Protocol states: "A
resident or corporation of one of the Contracting States deriving from
sources within the other Contracting State royalties in respect of the
operation of mines, quarries, or natural resources, or rentals from real
property, may elect for any taxable year to be subject to the tax of
such other Contracting State on such income on a net income basis."33
This provision of the treaty allows the N.V. to elect to be taxed, on
a net income basis, for all income derived from the rental of United
States real estate and mineral royalties. The election allows the N.V. to
29. J. BISCHEL, INCOME TAX TREATIES 405 (1978).
30. See note 24 supra.
31. I.R.C. § 7852(d). See also text accompanying notes 59 and 60 infra.
32. A shareholder of a foreign corporation will be subject to United States with-
holding tax on dividends received if fifty percent or more of the gross income of the
foreign corporation was effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business
within the United States over a certain period of time. A similar withholding tax is
applied to interest received by a shareholder of a foreign corporation. I.R.C. §§
861(a)(2)(B), (a)(1)(C) & (D).
33. See note 24 supra.
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take advantage of any deductions generated by the real property and
subjects it to a progressive income tax on its net income rather than the
flat thirty percent tax of Section 1442.
Obviously, Article X is important only when the N.V. is not actu-
ally engaged in a trade or business within the United States,3 although
the election subjects it to taxation as though it was. The guidelines are
unclear as to when a foreign corporation is engaged in a United States
trade or business as distinct from investment. It would seem that agri-
cultural land held for investment, and net leased to a farmer, would not
be considered connected with a United States trade or business. Simi-
larly, improved property, leased to a single tenant under a net lease,
should produce the same result.3 5
FIRPTA's New Rules
Extensive publicity about the large degree of foreign investment in
United States real estate, including Florida farmland and income pro-
ducing property, 6 resulted in Section 553 of the Revenue Act of
1978 .7 This provision directed the treasury department to conduct a
study of the tax treatment of gain derived from the sale of United
States real property owned by non-resident aliens and foreign
corporations.~3
From the recommendations of this study came Public Law No. 96-
499, entitled the Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act of 1980
(FIRPTA) which added Section 897 to the Internal Revenue Code of
1954. Prior to the enactment of FIRPTA, a foreign investor could
avoid United States income taxation on gain realized from the sale or
exchange of United States real property39 so long as the gain was "not
effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the
34. Garelik, What Constitutes Doing Business Within the United States by a
Non-resident Alien Individual or a Foreign Corporation, 18 TAX L. REv. 423 (1963).
35. A net lease contains a provision which requires the lessee to pay taxes, insur-
ance and maintenance in addition to rent.
36. E.g., Calonius, Offshore Money Floods Miami, FLORIDA TREND, Apr. 1980.
37. Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 553, 92 Stat. 2891.
38. See note 3 supra.
39. I.R.C. § 862(a)(5).
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United States.' 40 These avoidance devices included an installment
sale,'41 a tax free exchange for foreign real property' 2 and the sale of
corporate stock to a corporate purchaser who would transfer the cost of
the stock to the general assets of that corporation upon its liquidation.'3
The Act radically changed the way in which foreign investors are taxed
on disposition of their real property investments and contains new filing
and disclosure rules.
The new rule of Section 897 is: gain or loss from the disposition of
a United States real property interest by a non-resident alien or foreign
corporation must be reported under Section 871(B)(1) or 882(a)(1),
"as if the taxpayer were engaged in a trade or business within the
United States during the taxable year and as if such gain or loss were
effectively connected with such trade or business." 44 This provision ef-
fectively eliminates the disparity in the tax treatment of foreign and
domestic investors upon the disposition of United States real property.
Section 897 broadly defines a United States real property interest
to include any interest in real property, including an interest in a mine,
well or other natural deposit located in the United States. 45 The defini-
tion includes fee ownership, leaseholds, and options to acquire real
property, as well as personalty associated with the real estate.46 Addi-
tionally, it includes any interest in a domestic corporation holding real
property.' 7 Though an equity interest in a foreign corporation is not a
United States real property interest,' 8 the Act specifically requires the
recognition of gain by a foreign corporation on a distribution to its
shareholders of a United States real property interest including a distri-
bution in liquidation or redemption.' 9
40. Id. § § 872(a) & 882(b).
41. Id. § 453.
42. Id. § 1031.
43. Id. § § 331, 334(b)(2), & 336.
44. Id. § 897(a)(1).
45. Id. § 897(c)(1)(i).
46. Id. § 897(c)(6).
47. Id. § 897(c)(1)(ii).
48. Id. § § 897(c)(1)(i) & (ii) by negative implication.
49. The gain recognized is an amount equal to the excess of the fair market
value of the United States real property interest over its adjusted basis. Id. §
897(d)(1).
1691Impact of FIRPTA & ERTA16:1981
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Nonrecognition Provisions
Nonrecognition of gain or loss provisions are applicable to Section
897 only when there is an exchange of a United States real property
interest for an interest which would itself be taxable when sold.50 The
secretary of the treasury, charged with the task of prescribing regula-
tions necessary to prevent federal income tax avoidance, will determine
the extent to which other nonrecognition provisions will apply." Until
regulations are issued, it would be imprudent to rely on any nonrecog-
nition provisions other than Section 1031, involving like-kind exchanges
of property. 2 However, a Section 1031 exchange of a United States
real property interest for a foreign property interest will be subject to
United States taxation under Section 897 because the property received
would not be subject to future United States taxation.53
FIRPTA provides that gain will not be recognized "if the basis of
the distributed property in the hands of the distributee is the same as
the adjusted basis of such property before the distribution increased by
the amount of any gain recognized by the distributing corporation.""
However, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 198 15 amends this sub-
section to override the nonrecognition provision if the purchaser would
not be subject to taxation on a later sale or exchange of the property.
The new rule of Section 897(d)(1)(B) provides that in addition to the
carryover basis requirement, the distributee must be subject to taxation
on a subsequent disposition of the distributed property at the time the
distributee received the property. The amendment makes it clear that a
foreign corporation cannot avoid paying tax on gain from the disposi-
tion of a United States real property interest where a carryover basis
transaction is entered for the purpose of avoiding taxation.
The following example illustrates the new provisions. Sociedad
Anonima N.V., a Netherlands Antilles corporation, owns an apartment
50. Id. § 897(e)(1).
51. Id. § 897(e)(2).
52. This section provides nonrecognition treatment for the exchange of property
held for productive use in a trade or business, or for investment, solely for like-kind
property.
53. I.R.C. § 897(e)(1).
54. Id. § 897(d)(1)(B).
55. Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 831, 95 Stat. 352.
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building in Miami. The corporation exchanges this United States real
property for an apartment building in Rio de Janeiro in a Section 1031
like-kind exchange. The foreign property held by the N.V. after the
like-kind exchange would never have been subject to United States tax-
ation, as ultimately its disposition would not be that of a United States
real property interest. Nonetheless, this transaction will now be subject
to immediate United States taxation under Section 897. The result
would be different if the N.V. exchanged the apartment building in
Miami for one in Vail, Colorado. This exchange would not be subject
to immediate United States taxation, since any gain realized on the
later disposition of this property is subject to United States taxation.
Although permitted in the past, the Act specifically precludes a
foreign corporation's utilization of Section 337 liquidation provisions in
the disposition of a United States real property interest.5 6
As a result of these changes, the foreign investor is left with three
unpleasant choices. The foreign corporation can sell the property and
be taxed accordingly. Alternatively, the investor can sell the stock at a
discount reflecting the tax liability the corporation would incur when it
distributes the property. Finally, the foreign corporation can be liqui-
dated and pay the tax imposed upon the liquidation . 7
Effective Date
Section 894(a) provides that income of any kind will be exempt
from taxation to the extent required by any treaty obligation of the
United States, and Section 7852(d) precludes the application of any
Internal Revenue Code provision which would be contrary to any treaty
obligation of the United States. As previously noted, the United States
entered into a bilateral treaty with the Netherlands Antilles in 1955.51
Where no treaty exists, Section 897 is applicable to dispositions of
United States real property interests after June 18, 1980. Where treaty
obligations do exist, Section 897 will not apply until January 1, 1985.
If, before January 1, 1985, an existing treaty is renegotiated, to resolve
conflicts between the old treaty and Section 897 provisions, the new
56. I.R.C. § 897(d)(2).
57. Feder, Planning Under the Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act of
1980, 59 TAXES 81 (1981).
58. See text accompanying notes 21-35 supra.
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treaty may delay the application of Section 897 for a period not to
exceed two years after the signing of the new treaty.59
Disclosure Requirement
In 1980, Congress added Section 6039C and amended Section
665260 to provide new filing and disclosure requirements for foreign
corporations having a substantial investor in a United States real prop-
erty interest at any time during the calendar year.61 A substantial in-
vestor is defined as any person whose holdings in a foreign corporation's
United States real property interest exceed $50,000.62
The following information must be reported to the Internal Reve-
nue Service:63
1) The name and address of each substantial investor.
2) Information regarding the entity's assets.
3) Any other information that the regulations might require.
A foreign corporation which is required to file must also provide the
substantial investor with a statement containing the following:6"
1) The name and address of the foreign corporation.
2) The substantial investor's pro-rata share of the United States
real property interest held by it.
3) Any other information that the regulations may require.
Section 6039(b)(2) waives the filing requirement if the foreign
corporation furnishes the "necessary security" to ensure payment of
any taxes in connection with a United States real property interest. The
committee report, accompanying the new legislation, partially clarifies
the meaning of this term and states that the I.R.S. definition of neces-
sary security will depend on individual facts and circumstances. The
report provides illustration. A foreign corporation, whose only asset is a
59. Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act of 1980 (FIRPTA), Pub. L.
No. 96-499, § 1125, 94 Stat. 2690.
60. Id. § 1123, 94 Stat. 2687.
61. I.R.C. § 6039C(b)(1).
62. Id. § § 6039C(b)(4)(B) (i) & (ii).
63. Id. § § 6039C(b)(1)(A), (B) & (C).
64. Id. § § 6039C(b)(3)(A), (B) & (C).
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tract of undeveloped United States real property, might be required to
provide the I.R.S. with a recorded mortgage giving it a security interest
in the property or provide a guarantee of payment by a person who
would pay the tax in the event that the foreign corporation did not.
Where a corporation issues bearer shares, or the trustee refuses to dis-
close the identity of beneficial interest owners, the foreign corporation
would be required to provide the necessary security. This provision may
be used by foreign investors who are unwilling to disclose their partici-
pation in United States real property investments but who are willing
to be taxed by the United States on the disposition of such property.
Failure to report the above information when required will result
in penalties up to $25,000 per calendar year, until the information is
provided.65 Willful failure to file a return or supply information is a
misdemeanor and the offender will be subject to a maximum fine of
$10,000 and one year in prison. 6
Conclusion
The provisions of FIRPTA and ERTA seem to diminish the at-
tractiveness of investment in real estate by foreigners. Absent a novel
approach, the utilization of an N.V. as a primary vehicle for foreign
investment in Florida real estate is no longer advisable where income
tax considerations are a prominent part of the investment decision.
Although most of the obvious tax advantages once associated with
an N.V. are gone, there are several reasons foreign irivestment in Flor-
ida real estate will not diminish as rapidly as legislators believe. First,
the United States is a stable democratic nation where real estate is
unlikely to suffer great decreases in value. Second, it is unlikely that
the United States government would take privately owned property
without just compensation to the owner. These factors are attractive to
foreign investors, who may fear political instability affecting property
value, or uncompensated governmental takings, in their own countries.
Finally, while the disparate tax treatment given local and foreign treaty
investors has been minimized, United States real estate remains an ex-
65. Id. § 6652(g).
66. Id. § 7203.
1731
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cellent tax avoidance device for an investor, since United States tax law
encourages investment in real estate.
Marty Patrick
1 
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Hurricane Losses: Mandatory Practice and Taxpayer
Options
The United States has sustained more than twelve billion dollars
in hurricane damage since 1900.1 This country experiences an average
of three hurricanes, two of which are major,2 every two years. The most
vulnerable areas lie along the Gulf Coast-Florida, Alabama, Missis-
sippi, Louisiana, and Texas.3 In order to mitigate hurricane damage,
hurricane losses are accepted by the Internal Revenue Service as a de-
ductible casualty loss under I.R.C. § 165(c).
This article will discuss both the mandatory practice established
by federal tax laws, and the options of property owners with respect to
establishing the extent of their losses, compensation and gains.
Measuring the Amount of the Loss
As a general rule, the taxpayer may deduct a hurricane loss equal
to the lesser of the adjusted basis of the property4 or the difference
between the fair market value of the property immediately before and
immediately after the casualty.5 However, a deductible hurricane loss
will only be allowed to the extent that the loss is uncompensated by
"insurance or otherwise."6
1. Hurricane, 158 NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC 346 (1980).
2. A hurricane whether it be considered major or minor causes tremendous dam-
age. The taxpayer need not be concerned with the classification of a hurricane but
rather with the impact it has on their property. When Hurricanes Hit, "Complacency"
Can Kill You U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Aug. 18, 1980, at 56 (Interview with
Richard A. Flank, Administrator, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration).
3. Id.
4. The property's adjusted basis equals its original basis adjusted to the date of
damage or destruction. I.R.C. § 1011 (a); Treas. Reg. § 1.011, T.D. 6265, 1957-2 C.B.
469.
5. Solomon v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 1282 (1980); Treas. Reg. § 165-
7(b)(1), T.D. 6445, 1960-1 C.B. 106.
6. Gee v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1366 (1981), I.R.C. § 165(a). See
section of this note titled compensation for interpretation of phrase "insurance or
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If business property or property held for production of profit is
completely destroyed, the hurricane loss deduction is equal to the ad-
justed basis of the property at the time of the occurrence of the casu-
alty.7 If a taxpayer is a tenant, and is liable to the lessor to return the
real property in the same condition as received, the tenant may claim a
casualty deduction but only to the extent of his repair obligation.8
Basis
The basis of the property depends to a great extent on the manner
in which the property was acquired. Usually, a taxpayer acquires prop-
erty by purchasing it, or, in other words, at cost. 9 However, the prop-
erty may have been acquired by a different route, as by gift, inheri-
tance, or conversion of property from personal use to business use. 10
To compute the property's adjusted basis, the taxpayer begins with
the cost, or the original basis at the date of acquisition for property
acquired by gift, inheritance, or conversion."' To that he must add all
items chargeable to the capital additions account, 12 and from that sub-
tract items considered to be capital recoveries.13 The regulations define
capital additions or expenditures as expenditures which add to the
value or prolong the life of property, or adapt the property to a new or
different use.14 These expenditures include improvements, purchase
commissions, legal costs for defending or perfecting title (including title
insurance) and recording fees.' 5 The capital recoveries which must be
subtracted include depreciation, depletion, obsolescence, tax-free divi-
dends, recognized losses on involuntary conversions and deductible cas-
otherwise."
7. Shroyer v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) _, Nos. 1981-327 (June 24,
1981); Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(b)(1)(ii), T.D. 6445, 1960-1 C.B. 106.
8. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PUB. No. 547 TAX INFORMATION ON DISAS-
TERS, CASUALTIES, AND THEFTS (1980) [hereinafter TAX INFORMATION ON DISASTERS].
9. I.R.C. § 1012.
10. Only cost basis will be discussed further. For basis determination on property
acquired by gift, inheritance, or conversion see I.R.C. § 1.165-9(b)(2).
11. I.R.C. § 1011(a).
12. I.R.C. §,1016(a)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.1016-2(a) (1957).
13. I.R.C. § 1016(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.1016-3(a)(1)(i) (1957).
14. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-1(b), T.D. 6500, 1960-2 C.B. 107.
15. FEDERAL TAX HANDBOOK 167 (1980).
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ualty losses. A depreciation deduction is allowed only for business prop-
erty or property held for the production of income.16 The depreciable
property's basis must be reduced by the depreciation allowed, 17 which
may not be less than the allowable amount."8 Regardless of the extent
of capital recoveries, the adjusted basis may not drop below zero.19
Type of Property
The way a taxpayer computes his hurricane loss depends on the
type of property damaged or destroyed. The casualty loss deduction
allowed property held for personal use is computed according to the
general rule stated above except for one limitation: a $100 statutory
floor reduces the deductible amount." The $100 deduction limit applies
to the entire loss and is subtracted once for each casualty.21 However,
if husband and wife file separate tax returns, the $100 limitation ap-
plies separately to each individual's loss. 22
Personal property includes both real and personal property. The
calculation involved for each varies slightly. Real property includes
land, plants and trees that grow on land, and buildings thereon. Per-
sonal property may be defined as any property that is not real estate. 3
A taxpayer, when determining his hurricane loss deduction for person-
ally used real property, should consider all items together. In other
words, the adjusted basis and decrease in fair market value should be
calculated for the entire property-land, plants and buildings to-
gether.24 For example, an oceanfront home, which costs $80,000 (in-
cluding $10,000 for the land) several years ago, was partially destroyed
16. I.R.C. § 167(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-l(a), T.D. 6182, 1956-1 C.B. 99.
17. The amount the taxpayer actually deducts is called the allowed depreciation.
I.R.C. § 1016(a)(2)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.1016-3(a)(1)(i) (1957).
18. The allowable depreciation may be defined as the amount the taxpayer
should have deducted. Treas. Reg. § 1.1016-3(a)(1)(ii) (1957); I.R.C. § 1016(a)(2);
Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-10(a) (1956).
19. FEDERAL TAX HANDBOOK 167 (1980).
20. I.R.C. § 165(c)(3).
21. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(b)(4)(ii), T.D. 6712, 1964-1 C.B. 103.
22. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(b)(2)(iii), T.D. 6712, 1964-1 C.B. 103.
23. TAX INFORMATION ON DISASTERS, supra note 8.
24. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(b)(1), T.D. 6445, 1960-1 C.B. 106, Rev. Rul. 66-9,
1966-1 C.B. 39.
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by a hurricane in August. The value of the property immediately
before the hurricane was $100,000 ($85,000 for the building and
$15,000 for the land), and the value immediately after the hurricane
was $50,000. The taxpayer collected $10,000 from his insurance com-
pany. His deduction for the hurricane loss is $39,900, computed as
follows:2 5
(1) Value of entire property before hurricane ......... $100,000
(2) Value of entire property after hurricane ............ 50,000
(3) Decrease in fair market value of entire property .... 50,000
(4) Basis (cost, in this case) ......................... 80,000
(5) Amount of loss (lesser of 3 or 4) .................. 50,000
(6) M inus: Insurance ................................ 10,000
(7) Loss after reimbursement ......................... 40,000
(8) M inus: $100 .................................... 100
(9) Hurricane loss deduction ......................... 39,900
On the other hand, when determining hurricane losses for personal
property, each item must be considered independently and then individ-
ual losses are grouped for a deductible amount. Each item has its own
adjusted basis and decrease in fair market value.26 For instance: a hur-
ricane hit the taxpayer's home, damaged an upholstered chair and
completely destroyed a rug and antique table. There was no insurance.
The chair had cost $150; it had a fair market value of $75 before the
storm and a value of $10 immediately afterwards. The rug had cost
$200 and had a value of $50 just before the hurricane. The taxpayer
had purchased the table at an auction for $15 and then discovered it
was a valuable antique. It had been appraised at $350 before the hurri-
cane. His loss on each of these items is computed as follows: 27
25. Reproduced from TAX INFORMATION ON DISASTERS, supra note 8, at 234.
Numbers have been adjusted for ease of mathematics. Fire has been changed to hurri-
cane for reasons of continuity.
26. Id.
27. Id. Fire has been changed to hurricane for reasons of continuity.
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Chair Rug Table
(1) Basis (cost) .................... $150 $200 $ 15
(2) Value before hurricane .......... $ 75 $ 50 $350
(3) Value after hurricane ........... $ 10 $ 0 $ 0
(4) Decrease in Value .............. $ 65 $ 50 $350
(5) Loss (lessor of 1 or 4) .......... $ 65 $ 50 $ 15
(6) Total loss ........................................ $130
(7) M inus $100 ...................................... $100
(8) Hurricane loss deduction ........................... $ 30
If the damaged property is business property, the amount of the
hurricane loss incurred is computed using the general rule stated
above. 8 Property held for the production of income is treated simi-
larly. 29 However the regulations require that the taxpayer figure his
loss separately for each item. This rule is termed the single, identifiable
property rule. The losses are then combined for one deduction. For
example: four years ago the taxpayer bought a house, which he then
rented out. He paid $8,000 for the land, $25,000 for the building, and
$2,000 for landscaping. During those four years, he was allowed depre-
ciation deductions for the building totalling $5,688. In August 1981, as
a result of a hurricane, the house and landscaping were severely
damaged.
Competent appraisers determined that the house was worth
$33,500 before the hurricane, but only $13,000 afterwards. Trees and
shrubs were valued at $2,500 before but only $1,500 after. The trees
and shrubs were not covered by insurance, but the house was insured
for its fair market value. The insurance company paid $20,500 in full
settlement. The taxpayer's gain or loss from the hurricane is computed
as follows:31
28. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(b)(1), T.D. 6445, 1960-1 C.B. 106, Rev. Rul. 66-9,
1966-1 C.B. 39.
29. I.R.C. § 165(c)(1) & (2).
30. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(b)(2)(i), T.D. 6445, 1960-1 C.B. 106.
31. Reproduced from TAx INFORMATION ON DIsAsTERs, supra note 8, at 34. The
word hurricane has been substituted for the word fire for reasons of continuity.
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Building Trees and Shrubs
(1) Value before hurricane ......... $33,500 $2,500
(2) Value after hurricane .......... $13,000 $1,500
(3) Decrease in value ............. $20,500 $1,000
(4) Basis (adjusted for
depreciation) ................. $19,312 $2,000
(5) Amount of loss (lesser
of 3 or 4) .................... $19,312 $1,000
(6) Minus: Insurance .............. $20,500 $ 0
(7) Loss on trees and shrubs ...................... $1,000
(8) Gain from insurance
received for house ............. $1,188
The single, identifiable property rule tends to weaken a business
property owner's position. His allowable hurricane loss deduction will
generally be smaller than it would have been had the basis of the entire
property (land included) been taken into consideration. For example, if
land and timber were taken together the property owner would have a
larger deduction. The "timber will usually have appreciated in value
far in excess of the basis allocable thereto."32 Although it may be diffi-
cult for a property owner to determine the reduction in the fair market
value of an area partially destroyed by a casualty, the court in
Westvaco Corp. v. United States33 determined the "single, identifiable
32. GEER & GILJUN, LOSSES - CASUALTY, 274-2d TAX MNGM'T (BNA) A-21.
The court in Rosenthal v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 515 (1967) aff'd 416 F.2d 491 (2d
Cir. 1969) carried this rule one step further by only allowing recovery for that portion
of the timber totally destroyed. The Rosenthal court concluded that the adjusted basis
and fair market value of the destroyed timber should be separated from the rest of the
timber.
A casualty loss to timber, usually, is of great significance to the business property
owner for timber is often uninsurable. Additionally, "since a tract of timber is a living,
growing entity, damage to the tract may cause a greater loss than the basis of the
mature trees damaged." 83 HARV. L. REv. 478, 480. For example, a hurricane loss to
one hundred trees may decrease the fair market value of the remaining trees in that
section. For further analysis see id.
33. 639 F.2d 700 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
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property damaged by the casualty is the standing timber, merchanta-
ble, in an affected area." ' The Westvaco Corp. court does not agree
with the decision reached in Rosenthal v. Commissioner.5 Rosenthal
held that only the destroyed timber's adjusted basis and fair market
value may be taken into account when computing casualty deduction
for partially destroyed timber. The court in Westvaco Corp. considered
the fair market value of both destroyed and other standing timber in an
affected block.
If both business and personally u.ed property exist on the tax-
payer's land, he must figure his deductions as if two separate casualties
occurred.36 For example: taxpayer owns a building that he constructed
on leased land. Half of the building is used in his business and he lives
in the other half. The original cost of the building was $40,000 and he
made no further improvements or additions to it. A hurricane damaged
the entire building. The fair market value of the building was $38,000
immediately before the hurricane and $32,000 afterwards. The insur-
ance company reimbursed the taxpayer $4,000 for the hurricane dam-
age. Depreciation deductions on the business part of the building to-
talled $2,400.
The taxpayer has a deductible business causalty loss of $1,000 and
a deductible personal casualty loss of $900, computed as follows:37
Business Personal
Loss Loss
Decrease in value of building: value
before hurricane (total $38,000) ......... $19,000 $19,000
Value after hurricane (total $32,000) .. $16,000 $16,000
$ 3,000 $ 3,000
Basis of business-use portion of building
before hurricane (cost $20,000 -
depreciation $2,400) .................... $17,600
34. Id. at 717.
35. 48 T.C. 515 (1967) affid 416 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1969).
36. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(b)(2)(ii), T.D. 6445, 1960-1 C.B. 106.
37. Reproduced from TAX INFORMATION ON DISASTERS, supra note 8, at 235.
Flood has been changed to hurricane for reasons of continuity.
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Personal-use portion (basis equals cost) ............... $20,000
Amount of loss (lesser of basis or
decrease in fair market value) ........... $ 3,000 $ 3,000
Minus: Insurance ...................... $ 2,000 $ 2,000
Loss after reimbursement ............... $ 1,000 $ 1,000
Minus: $100 on property owned for
personal-use ............................ none $ 100
Deductible business loss ................. $ 1,000
Deductible personal loss ............................. $ 900
When to Report a Loss
As a general rule the hurricane loss is deducted in the year the
casualty occurred. 8 There are exceptions, however. If the taxpayer is a
lessee and is subsequently liable to a lessor for casualty damage, he
deducts the loss in the year the liability is eliminated.39 If a taxpayer
puts in a claim for reimbursement, and it can be "ascertained with
reasonable certainty" 40 that the claim will ultimately be received or
honored, then the reimbursement must be subtracted from the casualty
loss in the year the loss was sustained. 41 However, if at any future date
the taxpayer receives less, he deducts the difference in the year of reim-
bursement. If on the other hand, he receives more, the additional
amount is to be included in income in the year of its receipt.42
The taxpayer is given an option to treat the loss as if it occurred in
38. I.R.C. § 165(h) (1974).
39. TAX INFORMATION ON DISASTERS, supra note 8.
40. A reasonable prospect of recovery exists when the taxpayer has bona
fide claims for recoupment from third parties or otherwise, and when there
is a substantial possibility that such claims will be decided in his favor.
The standard for making this determination is an objective one, under
which [the] Court must determine what was a "reasonable expectation" as
of the close of the taxable year for which the deduction is claimed.
Ramsay Scarlett & Co., Inc., v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 795, 811 (1974) (citations
omitted).
41. Id. See also Johnson v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 849 (1981). Treas.
Reg. § 1.165-1(d)(2)(i) & (ii), T.D. 6445, 1960-1 C.B. 96.
42. TAX INFORMATION ON DISASTERS, supra note 8.
185
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1981
6:1981 Hurricane Losses 183
the preceding year, thereby deducting the amount in that year, if the
President of the United States designates the area of hurricane damage
as a disaster area.43 Such an election allows the taxpayer to save taxes
immediately, rather than waiting until the end of the year in which the
casualty was sustained. However, assuming the tax rates do not drop,
if his taxable income is greater in the year the hurricane loss was sus-
tained, he would pay less overall taxes if the deduction were taken in
the year of the hurricane.45
Alternatively, a hurricane loss may create a net operating loss. 46
The Internal Revenue Service permits the taxpayer to offset losses
against previous or subsequent taxable years if in the year of the loss
he does not have enough taxable income to use up the deduction.47 The
loss is applied initially to the three preceding years, and if not com-
pletely used up, the taxpayer may carry the loss forward up to seven' 8
years or until used up, whichever comes first.49
However, the taxpayer may elect not to carry back the net operat-
ing loss. He may, alternatively, carry forward the loss, if the loss was
sustained after 1975.50 Assuming the tax rates do not drop, if taxable
income is greater during post casualty years, he would pay less overall
taxes if net operating loss were carried forward.
Burden of Proof
Frequently, the Internal Revenue Service refuses taxpayer hurri-
43. I.R.C. § 165(h) (1974), Treas. Reg. § 1.165-11(a), T.D. 7522 1977-2 C.B.
64.
44. The tax rates are currently scheduled to drop under the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981.
45. TAx INFORMATION ON DISASTERS, supra note 8.
46. Net operating loss may be defined as the excess of deductions over gross
income. I.R.C. § 172(c).
47. I.R.C. § 172(d)(4)(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.172-3(a)(3)(iii), T.D. 6192, 1956-2
C.B. 138.
48. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 substitutes 15 years in the place of
7 years. The 15 year carry forward applies to taxable years ending after December 31,
1975. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, §§ 207(a)(1)&(2), 95
Stat. 225.
49. I.R.C. § § 172(b)(1) & (2) (1980).
50. I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(B).
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cane loss deductions, characteristically because taxpayers fail to meet
their burden of proof. An income tax deduction is a right granted only
to taxpayers who meet this burden. 1 The essential elements which
must be met have been outlined by the Internal Revenue Service:
A deduction is allowed ...for damages to or losses of property
owned by you. You must substantiate the amount of any casualty
loss and be prepared to submit evidence showing:
(1) The nature of the casualty and when it occurred;
(2) That the loss was the direct result of the casualty;
(3) That you were the owner of the property or were contractually
liable to the owner of the property for damage to property leased
by you.52
(4) The cost or other [adjusted] basis of the property, evidenced by
purchase contract, [checks, receipts,] etc;
(5) The depreciation allowed or allowable if any;
(6) The values before and after the casualty (pictures and apprais-
als before and after the casualty are pertinent evidence); and
(7) The amount of insurance or other compensation received or ex-
pected to be received, including the value of repairs, restoration,
and clean-up provided without cost by disaster relief agencies or
others.53
Generally, to claim a casualty deduction, the property must have
sustained actual, physical damage. But in Stowers v. United States,"
the taxpayer, was allowed a casualty loss deduction even though his
property was only indirectly damaged. In Stowers, access to and from
the taxpayer's home was obstructed as a result of neighboring land-
slides. The court based its decision on the fact that the property was
valueless in the hands of the property owner.
However, a taxpayer will not be permitted to take a casualty de-
duction when the decline in market value is solely attributable to "ad-
51. Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 319 U.S. 590
(1943), appeal denied 320 U.S. 809 (1943).
52. A tenant may claim a casualty deduction for "leasehold improvements" er-
ected by him, if damaged or destroyed. Rev. Rul. 73-41, 1973-1 C.B. 74.
53. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PUB. No. 334, TAX GUIDE FOR SMALL Busi-
NESS 113 (1979).
54. 169 F. Supp. 246 (S.D. Miss. 1958).
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verse buyer resistance. '5 5 For instance, future buyers may shy away
from homes which are located in highly vulnerable hurricane areas. If
this resistance is the sole reason for decrease in market value no deduc-
tion is allowable.
In determining the decrease in fair market value, the property
owner has several options. If it is possible, the fair market value of the
property before and after the hurricane should be ascertained by com-
petent appraisal. "This appraisal must recognize the effects of any gen-
eral market decline affecting undamaged as well as damaged property
which may occur simultaneously within the casualty, in order that any
deduction under this section shall be limited to the actual loss resulting
from damage to the property. ' 56 The appraiser should be experienced,
reliable and familiar with the taxpayer's property both before and after
the hurricane.57 Appraisals must be substantiated and are subject to
reassessment by the court.58 The taxpayer's own testimony is accept-
able evidence, but is also subject to reassessment.59 The purchase price
of property, purchased shortly before a hurricane, can be used to estab-
lish its fair market value.60
If the taxpayer chooses to repair or restore damaged property,
rather than await appraisal, he may not deduct the repair or replace-
ment cost. This cost may, however, be an indication of the fair market
value of the property.
The cost of repairs to the property damaged is acceptable as evi-
dence of the loss of value if the taxpayer shows that (a) the repairs
are necessary to restore the property to its condition immediately
before the casualty, (b) the amount spent for such repairs is not
excessive, (c) the repairs do not care for more than the damage
suffered and (d) the value of the property does not as a result of
the repairs exceed the value of the property immediately before the
55. Corby v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 21 (1980).
56. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(a)(2)(i), T.D. 6445, 1960-1 C.B. 105.
57. TAx INFORMATION ON DISASTERS, supra note 8.
58. In Breon v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1621 (1981), the court deter-
mined the appraisals performed by local real estate agents (although highly qualified)
failed to show support for their appraisal.
59. Id.; Guilbeau v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 323 (1980); Corby v.
Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 21 (1980).
60. Kahl v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1433 (1981).
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casualty.6
The taxpayer is not permitted to submit estimates for repairs but
rather is required to submit evidence of repairs actually made. In
Bidelspacher v. Commissioner,2 the tax court construed § 1.165-7 as
requiring evidence of repairs actually made. The court rejected the use
of estimates in an effort to "guar[d] against possible abuse that would
result from the use of flexible or inflated estimates of repairs, particu-
larly in situations where the repairs are never made."'63
In addition, taxpayers do not have the option of deducting the
amount spent on preventive measures to mitigate hurricane damage. In
Austin v. Commissioner, the court determined that chopping down
trees as a preventive measure cannot be used as a casualty deduction.
Similarly, the purchase and installation of hurricane shutters is also not
deductible.64
It is important to stress that, despite occasional broad interpreta-
tion as in Stowers v. United States, 5 the Internal Revenue Service
tends to limit taxpayer options in the area of hurricane losses.
Compensation
When a taxpayer figures his deduction, reimbursements received,
whether "insurance or otherwise," must be subtracted from the casu-
alty loss amount.66 Recently, the tax court, has determined the mean-
ing of the phrase "insurance or otherwise" within I.R.C. § 165(a). In
Estate of Bryan v. Commissioner,67 the court held the phrase indicated
a form of compensation received by the taxpayer which is structured to
replace what was lost.66 The burden of proof was placed on the tax-
payer to establish his right to a deduction. Furthermore, the absence of
61. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(a)(ii), T.D., 6445, 1960-1 C.B. 105, Gee v. Commis-
sioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1366, (1981); Shroyer v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH)
-, Nos. 1981-327 (June 24, 1981).
62. 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 477 (1980).
63. Id., at 483; Gee v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1366 (1981).
64. 74 T.C. 1334, No. 98 (1980).
65. 169 F. Supp. 246 (S.D. Miss. 1958).
66. I.R.C. § 165(a).
67. 74 T.C. 725 (1980).
68. Id. at 727.
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any "legal or moral obligation" resting with the agency making pay-
ment does not prevent the payment from being characterized as insur-
ance.69 Thus, it appears that a payment by an agency, in an attempt to
compensate a taxpayer for hurricane destroyed property, will clearly
constitute compensation under the "insurance or otherwise" language.70
Another issue, recently litigated, concerned the taxpayer's election
to deduct a casualty loss rather than file a claim with his insurance
company for reimbursement. The Internal Revenue Service takes this
position:
If you have insurance that would cover all or part of a casu-
alty . . . but you do not put in a claim for reimbursement, your
deduction must be reduced by any amount that you could have re-
ceived from the insurance company if you had put in a claim. Your
failure to put in a claim is the cause of that part of your loss, not
the casualty . . .
The courts, however, apply this policy inconsistently. In Miller v.
Commissioner,72 the court adhered to the Internal Revenue Service po-
sition. However, in Hills v. Commissioner," the court held if "a tax-
payer fails to pursue a right of insurance recovery, his economic loss is
nonetheless sustained and a deduction should be allowed. 7
As mentioned above, insurance is not the only form of reimburse-
ment. For example, if a taxpayer falls under the Disaster Relief Act7 5
the amount of the loan that is forgiven is considered reimbursement.7 6
Similarly, the amount of a Small Business Association loan forgiven is
considered reimbursement.77 Repairs, restoration, and clean-up services
69. Id.
70. Smith v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. , No. 39 (1981); Spak v. Commissioner,
76 T.C. -, No. 40 (1981).
71. TAX INFORMATION ON DISASTERS, supra note 8, at 233.
72. 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 528 (1980). See also Bartlett v. United States, 397 F.
Supp. 21§ (D. Md. 1975).
73. 76 T.C. -, No. 42 (1981).
74. Id.
75. Pub. L. No. 91-606, 84 Stat. 1744 Rev. Rul. 71-160, 1971-1 C.B. 75.
76. TAX INFORMATION ON DISASTERS, supra note 8.
77. Gee v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1366 (1981).
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provided by relief agencies are considered reimbursement.7 8 Relocation
payments can, when warranted, be considered compensation.79
Aside from the types of reimbursement mentioned above, grants,
gifts and other payments received after a casualty, for the purpose of
getting the taxpayer back on his feet, are only considered compensation
if "specifically earmarked to repair or replace property."80 Even where
the property owner applies payments received to replace property, pay-
ments will not be considered compensation absent appropriate condi-
tions on their use.81
Gain
If a property owner receives compensation and it is more than his
basis in the destroyed or damaged property, there is a gain from the
casualty. This gain can be reported in the year the reimbursement was
received, or reporting may be postponed. 2
If the taxpayer receives a reimbursement in the form of property
which is similar or related in service to his damaged property, post-
ponement of gain recognition is mandatory.8 3 The meaning of the
phrase "similar or related in service" depends on whether the taxpayer
is an owner-user or an owner-investor. If the taxpayer is an owner-user,
the "replacement property must function the same as ihe property it
replaces.184 On the other hand, if the taxpayer is an owner-investor,
"any replacement property must have the same relationship of services
or uses to [the taxpayer] as the property it replaced." 85 This may be
78. TAX INFORMATION ON DISASTERS, supra note 8.
79. Relocation payments if made for the purpose of reimbursing the taxpayer for
casualty losses must be considered compensation, however, if there is not a direct rela-
tionship between relocation payment and casualty loss the taxpayer will not have to
subtract payment from loss. Spak v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. -, No. 40 (Mar. 26,
1981).
80. TAX INFORMATION ON DISASTERS, supra note 8, at 233.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. I.R.C. § § 1033(a)(1)&(b) (1978); Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(a)-2(b), T.D. 6222
1957-1 C.B. 249.
84. I.R.C. § 1033(a) (1978); Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(a)-i, T.D. 6222 1957-1 C.B.,
249.
85. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PUB. No. 334, TAX GUIDE FOR SMALL BusI-
1 188 Nova Law Journal 6:19811
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done by determining; (1) whether the properties are of similar service,
(2) the nature of the business risks connected with the properties, and
(3) what the properties demand of the taxpayer in the way of manage-
ment, service, and relations to tenants. 6
The taxpayer may also postpone the gain if he purchases replace-
ment property87 which is similar or related in use to property damaged
by the hurricane. 88 The taxpayer can postpone all of the gain if the
replacement property's cost is equal to or greater than the net pro-
ceeds.8 Otherwise the property owner must recognize some or all of
the gain immediately.
The property owner faces a time limitation if he desires to
purchase replacement property with net proceeds. The replacement pe-
riod begins on the date the hurricane damaged or destroyed the prop-
erty. The taxpayer has until two years after the close of the taxable
year in which any gain is realized from the involuntary conversion to
replace the property.90
Conclusion
The preceding sections are all interrelated and therefore must all
be dealt with. In closing, the purpose of this paper is two-fold-to
make the taxpayer aware both of his responsibilities as claimant, as
well as the responsibility of the federal government as stated in the
Internal Revenue Code, Treasury Regulations and case law. The most
recent cases reveal both the basic stance of the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice and the occasional, subtle shifting of their perspective. Although
property losses due to hurricanes can be severe, there are ways to miti-
NESS 116 (1979).
86. Rev. Rul. 64-237, 1964-2 C.B. 319.
87. TAX INFORMATION ON DISASTERS, supra note 8. Property acquired by'gift or
inheritance does not qualify as replacement property.
88. I.R.C. §,1033(a) (1978); Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(a)-i, T.D. 6222, 1957-1 C.B.
249.
89. -Net proceeds equal the money plus the fair market value of unlike property
you receive in exchange for the damaged property less expenses incurred in obtaining
them. I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(a)-2(c)(1), T.D. 6222, 1957-1
C.B. 249.
90. I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(a)-2(c)(3), T.D. 7075, 1970-2
C.B. 160.
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gate some of the losses. Corrupting an old adage, "Let the Taxpayer
Beware." The burden of proof is on the taxpayer: he should follow the
guidelines, know his options and be prepared.
Gregory Ritter
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Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado: "Steering a Middle
Course" May Spell Deep Water for Business
Judgment Application in Shareholder Derivative Suits
In an attempt to strike a balance between the rights of an individ-
ual shareholder in his efforts to protect the corporation, and the rights
of the board of directors to control the litigation in which the corpora-
tion is involved, the Supreme Court of Delaware, in Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado," developed a new set of game plans for shareholder deriva-
tive suits. While Zapata is important because of its impact on procedu-
ral elements of shareholder derivative actions,2 what makes it so note-
worthy is the impact it may have on future applications of the business
judgment rules in such actions.
This comment will focus on the three cases that set the framework
for the Zapata decision. They are: Maldonado v. Flynn4 [Maldonado
I], Maldonado v. Flynn5 [Maldonado I], and Maher v. Zapata Cor-
poration.' All three cases arose from similar transactions by the
Zapata board of directors, and in each the court faced a common issue:
whether the board of directors could compel dismissal of a share-
holder's derivative suit after an independent committee, appointed by
the board, determined that the suit was not in the best interest of
Zapata Corporation. In analyzing the courts' decisions, this comment
will survey general principles governing shareholder derivative actions,
and consider the business judgment rule as it pertains to such actions.
The Trilogy - A Review of the Related Cases
In 1970, the board of directors of Zapata Corporation, a Delaware
1. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
2. For a discussion of procedures, see text at 6 infra.
3. For a discussion of "business judgment" rule, see text at 10 infra.
4. 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980).
5. 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
6. 490 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
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firm, approved a stock option plan for certain officers and directors of
the corporation. The options were to be exercised during five install-
ment periods from 1971 to 1974. Under the plan eligible officers and
directors could exercise their options to purchase Zapata's common
stock at $12.15 per share. Zapata Corporation stockholders approved
the stock option plan in 197 1.7
In 1974, the board of directors voted to accelerate the last option
date from July 14, 1974, to July 2, 1974.8 At that time most of
Zapata's directors were eligible to participate in the 1970 stock option
plan.9 By accelerating the date, the option holders expected to reduce
their anticipated tax liability.10 Therefore, on July 2, eligible partici-
pants exercised their final option."1
William Maldonado, a Zapata stockholder, initiated a share-
holder's derivative suit in the Delaware Court of Chancery in June of
1975.12 He alleged ten corporate officers and directors breached their
fiduciary duty by accelerating the option date. This "deprived Zapata
of a federal tax deduction in an amount equal to that saved by the
optionees. This occurred because the options were exercised [early],
when the price of Zapata stock was $18.8125, rather than on July 14,
1974, when the price of Zapata stock was [approximately] $24.50." 13
In 1977, Maldonado brought a second shareholder's derivative suit
in the United States District Court for the Sourthern District of New
York,14 against nine of Zapata's past and current directors for alleged
7. 413 A.2d at 1254.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Vice Chancelor Hartnett in his opinion explained:
This was so because the amount of capital gain for federal income tax
purposes to the optionees would have been an amount equal to the differ-
ence between the $12.15 option price and the price on the date of the
exercise of the option: $18-19 if the options were exercised prior to the
tender offer announcement or nearly $25 if the options were exercised im-
mediately after the announcement.
Id. at 1254.
11. Id.
12. Maldonado I, 413 A.2d 1251.
13. Id. at 1255.
14. Maldonado v. Flynn, 448 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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violations of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.15 Finding Mal-
donado had failed to state a cause of action, the district court dismissed
his complaint but granted him leave to amend.16 Maldonado appealed
the decision, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit re-
manded the case.'7 He then filed an amended complaint in the district
court.' 8 A third shareholder's derivative suit was filed against Zapata
by John F. Maher and other stockholders in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas, 19 also alleging violations of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 193420 by several Zapata board
members.
Four of the defendant directors had left Zapata's board by June of
1979.1 To fill those vacancies, the remaining directors appointed two
new directors from outside the corporation.22 After the appointment,
the board created an Independent Investigation Committee2 3 "author-
ized to investigate the claims asserted in [the three suits] and to take
any course of action it deemed appropriate in view of its findings. 24
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1034. Maldonado's initial filing alleged
that defendants (1) violated § 10(b) of the Act [Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934], 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) and Rule lOb-5 by modifying the stock
option plan without obtaining stockholders' approval, resulting in certain
directors using inside information to gain substantial personal benefits at
the Corporation's expense, and (2) violated § 14(a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(a) and Rule 14a-9 thereunder by making statements in proxy solici-
tations issued to the shareholders by the Corporation in 1975, 1976, and
1977, for the election of directors of the Corporation that were materially
misleading with respect to the earlier modification of the stock option
planned and the directors' exercise of their options thereunder.
Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1979).
17. Id.
18. Maldonado II, 485 F. Supp. at 277. "The amended complaint [sought] to
nullify the elections of directors from 1975-1979; an injunction against further mislead-
ing proxy statements; and to recover from the defendants on behalf of Zapata damages
allegedly flowing from the issuance of the claimed deceptive proxy materials." Id.
19. , 490 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
20. Id. at 349.
21. 430 A.2d at 781.
22. Id. at 781.
23. 413 A.2d at 1255.
24. Id.
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This committee was composed exclusively of the two new directors.25
After conducting its investigation "the Committee concluded, in
September, 1979, that each action should have [been] dismissed forth-
with as their continued maintenance [was] inimical to the Company's
best interest .... -26Accordingly, the Committee "instructed Counsel
for Zapata to seek dismissal of all the pending suits."' 27 The following
January, on remand, the District Court for the Southern District of
New York granted Zapata's motion for summary judgment dismissing
the Maldonado II action.28 The basis for the decision, district court
Judge Edward Weinfeld stated, was "that the Committee, composed of
independent and disinterested directors, conducted a proper review of
the matters before it, considered a variety of factors and reached, in
good faith, a business judgment that the action was not in the best
interest of Zapata. 29 Maldonado appealed to the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals.30
Zapata's attorneys were not as successful in opposing Maldonado's
state action, Maldonado L The Delaware Court of Chancery ruled that
"nothing in [the business judgment rule] grants any independent power
to a corporation board of directors to terminate a derivative suit."3 As
a result, the Court of Chancery denied Zapata's motion to dismiss the
suit. 2 Zapata filed an interlocutory appeal with the Supreme Court of
Delaware which was accepted for review in Zapata Corporation v.
Maldonado.33 Before the appeal was accepted, however, the chancery
court applied the holding of the New York federal district court in
Maldonado II and dismissed Maldonado I on res judicata principles.3
The Maldonado I dismissal was contingent upon the Second Circuit's
affirmance of the district court's decision in Maldonado 11.35 The Dela-
25. Id.
26. 430 A.2d at 781.
27. 413 A.2d at 1255.
28. 485 F. Supp. 274.
29. Id. at 286-87.
30. 430 A.2d 779.
31. 413 A.2d at 1257.
32. Id.
33. 430 A.2d 779.
34. Maldonado v. Flynn, 417 A.2d 378, 384-85 (Del. Ch. 1980).
35. Id.
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ware Supreme Court in Zapata stated, "the Second Circuit Appeal
was ordered stayed . . . pending this Court's resolution of the appeal
from April 19th Court of Chancery order denying dismissal and sum-
mary judgment."3 6
In Maher, Zapata filed a motion to dismiss which the Texas fed-
eral district court denied in a decision similar to that in Maldonado L37
The federal district court in Maher held that the business judgment
rule did not grant a committee authority to compel dismissal of a
shareholder derivative suit in situations in which no demand is made on
the board of directors to initiate an action.3 8
Courts in various jurisdictions have distinguished those situations
where the shareholder is required to demand that the corporate board
file suit, from those situations when the shareholder is excused from
making such a demand prior to initiating a derivative suit. The distinc-
tions between "demand" and "no demand" conditions significantly im-
pact on the procedures and guidelines which are employed in a suit.39
In the Zapata trilogy none of the plaintiffs demanded the board of di-
rectors to file suit against any of the defendants, prior to initiating his
individual action. The board's own interest in the subject matter of the
litigation would have made demand futile.
The central issue interwoven among each of the three cases was
whether the independent committee had the power to compel dismissal
of the shareholder derivative actions, especially when many of the di-
rectors who appointed the committee were named defendants. Each
court had to deal with questions about the interpretation and applica-
tion of the business judgment rule; this led to divergent results in Mal-
donado I and II.
Because of these variations in interpretation and application of
Delaware corporate law, the proper framework (and no doubt, ur-
gency) for resolution of the issues existed. The Supreme Court of Dela-
ware acknowledged and resolved them in Zapata:40 it set new guide-
lines for Delaware courts to use in ruling on a corporation's motion to
36. 430 A.2d at 781.
37. 490 F. Supp. at 352-53.
38. Id. at 348.
39. The distinctions between demand and no demand are discussed in text at
198-200, infra.
40. 430 A.2d at 781.
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dismiss a derivative suit where demand has been excused. However,
because of the resulting impact the Zapata decision may have on appli-
cation of the business judgment rule in shareholder derivative suits, the
holding in Zapata most probably was not what some knowledgeable
commentators had anticipated."1
Shareholder Derivative Actions
A corporation is a unique entity providing investors an opportunity
to share in business ownership and profits, while minimizing an inves-
tor's financial exposure and involvement in the day to day management
of the firm.' 2 Management functions traditionally are delegated to the
directors of the corporation after their election to the board by the
stockholders. This separation between ownership and management is
not without pitfalls. The stockholder, "having surrendered individual
control over his investment for the opportunity of corporate profit,...
entrusts his fortunes to a board of directors who may well invest poorly,
or worse, engage in self dealing."' 3
The problems created by this separation between ownership and
management become more apparent when a minority stockholder has
serious and well-founded concerns with the quality and/or integrity of
the board's management decisions. A director or an officer of a corpo-
ration has a fiduciary duty to that business." A breach of that duty
gives rise to a cause of action by the corporation against that director
or officer.' 5 Similarly, the corporation may have claims against third
persons for wrongs unrelated to corporate management. 48 Whether in-
ternally or externally created, the result of the injury is damage to the
value of the corporation and, correspondingly, diminution in value'of
41. See discussion on commentators in text at 206, infra.
42. For a discussion of the attributes of the corporation entity as compared with
other business structures, see H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
ch. 2 (West 2d ed. 1970).
43. Stegemoeller, Derivative Actions and the Business Judgment Rule:
Directoral Power to Compel Dismissal, 69 ILL. B.J. 338 (1981).
44. Steinberg, The Use of Special Litigation Committees to Terminate Share-
holder Derivative Suits, 35 U. OF MIAMI L. REv. 1, 3 (1980); HENN, supra note 42, at
457-58.
45. HENN, supra note 42, at 95.
46. Id. at 740.
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shareholders' interests."' However, since it is the corporation that di-
rectly suffers from the loss, it is the corporation that has a direct cause
of action - not the individual stockholder.4 8 Generally, the individual
stockholder lacks sufficient voting strength to directly influence board
decisions to file suit or compel the ouster of an errant director. Lacking
the ability to force the corporation to sue in its own behalf, the stock-
holder may be doomed to watch his investment dwindle, or perhaps
gush, away.
When the corporation has a valid claim iwhich it refuses to litigate,
the individual stockholder theoretically has no legal remedy. 9 In the
past, the stockholder was considered to be without standing to initiate a
suit on behalf of the corporation. Seeing the minority shareholder in
this dilemma, equity courts developed the shareholder's derivative ac-
tion.51 They found this right to bring the suit derived from ownership of
an equitable or beneficial interest in the corporation and the corpora-
tion's failure to initiate a suit on its own behalf.5 2 "In legal effect a
stockholder's [derivative] suit is one by the corporation conducted by
the stockholder as its representative. The stockholder is only a nominal
plaintiff, the corporation being the real party in interest. '53 In essence,
the shareholder is a catalyst for the corporation to take action against
one of its own officers or a third party, if either is endangering the
corporation and its board of directors has not taken action.
The threshold question to be determined in most shareholder de-
rivative actions is whether the right to sue on behalf of the corporation
has vested in the shareholder. As a rule, state statutes regulate share-
holder derivative suits." Typically, these statutes require the stock-
holder, inter alia, to have "contemporaneous ownership of shares in or-
der to maintain the suit ... " and that the plaintiff "allege his efforts
47. 13 FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 5941.1 (Callaghan Rev. per. ed. 1980).
48. Id. § 5944.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. § 5940.
52. Id. § 5941.
53. Id. § 5939. The corporation "enters the litigation as a nominal party defen-
dant because of its failure to enforce the claim in its own rights." HENN, supra note 42,
at 777.
54. FLETCHER, supra note 47.
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to obtain relief within the corporation before bringing his suit."55
Delaware's Chancery Court Rules are in harmony with these re-
quirements. 56 The courts in Delaware have construed the chancery
court rules as creating two different types of shareholder derivative ac-
tions: those where a demand to initiate suit must be made on the corpo-
rate board, 57 and those where the demand requirement is excused.58
Generally a demand is considered to be a condition precedent to a
shareholder's right to initiate a derivative suit.59 The purpose of the
demand is to give "the management of the corporation an opportunity
to consider the merits of the dispute and to determine in the interests of
the corporation and the shareholders whether it might be disposed of
without the expense and delay of litigation." 60
There are a number of perfectly legitimate reasons why a board of
directors, or an independent investigaton committee acting in its stead,
may find it undesirable to litigate corporate claims. The probability of
success in trial, a cost-benefit analysis of the suit, and the effect on a
company's image and its employees' morale are factors bearing on a
decision to litigate.61
There may be instances when, after proper demand, the board
agrees to litigate.62 This decision would obviate the need for a share-
55. Id.
56. DEL. CODE ANN. Chancery Court Rules § 23.1 (1980). This rule provides:
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members to
enforce a right of a corporation or of an incorporated association, the cor-
poration or association having failed to enforce a right which may properly
be asserted by it, the complaint shall allege that the plaintiff was a share-
holder or member at the time of the transaction of which he complaing or
that his share or membership thereafter devolved on him by operation of
law. The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any,
made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the directors or
comparable authority and the reasons for his failure to obtain the action or
for not making the effort.
57. See generally 413 A.2d 1262.
58. See generally 430 A.2d 779.
59. FLETCHER, supra note 47, § 4961.
60. Id. § 4963.
61. Steinberg, supra note 44, at 2. See also Note, Corporations - The Share-
holder's Independent Right to Sue Derivatively - Maldonado v. Flynn and Its Progeny,
29 U. OF KAN. L. REV. 135 (1980).
62. See HENN supra note 42, § 361.
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holder's derivative suit because the corporation would be pursuing the
action under its own appellation."3 There are also situations in which a
demand has been made properly, and the board refuses to file suit;
however, rather than resisting the individual's efforts to initiate a deriv-
ative action, the board gives some type of assistance to the stock-
holder.64 In Sohland v. Baker,65 a Delaware case, a board refused to
file suit, but it financially assisted the stockholder in retaining counsel
in order that he could initiate a derivative suit.66 Assuming the board's
refusal to initiate suit rests on an "independen[t], good faith and rea-
sonable investigation"67 of the shareholder's allegations, the share-
holder's right to initiate the derivative action terminates. The share-
holder may still be able to initiate the suit if he meets the burden of
showing that these good faith elements are lacking.6 8 This is a difficult
burden to meet since the court will presume the existence of good faith
on the part of the board of directors.6 9 The board of director's decisions
in demand situations are protected under the business judgment rule. 0
Generally, a shareholder is excused from making a demand if it
would be futile;71 however, "the complainant normally must demon-
strate that the directors are either controlled by the alleged wrongdoer,
interested in the challenged transaction to a degree which impairs their
business judgment, or are participants in the alleged wrong."7 2 This
was the type of situation encountered in each of the Zapata cases: the
named defendants/directors constituted a majority of the corporate
board.
Recently, the common practice of corporate boards has been to
appoint an independent committee to investigate the need or desire for
initiating litigation after demand has been made.73 Similarly, in those
63. Id. at 750.
64. See id. § 361.
65. 141 A. 277 (Del. 1927).
66. See 430 A.2d at 783 discussing Sohland.
67. Id. at 787.
68. Id. at 784.
69. Id.
70. For discussion, see text at 200 infra.
71. See generally Steinberg, supra note 44.
72. Stegemoeller, supra note 43, at 342.
73. Steinberg, supra note 44.
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cases where demand is excused, and a derivative suit has been filed, the
board appoints a committee to determine whether the suit is in the best
interest of the corporation.74 Typically, the committee finds the suit is
not in the corporation's best interest, and, accordingly, seeks to have
the suit dismissed.75 This was the committee's recommendation in the
Zapata case.
Courts are faced with a dilemma in these no demand situations
when the corporation seeks to have the suit dismissed. If the board de-
termines that the suit is not in the best interest of the corporation,
should a minority shareholder override that determination and be able
to maintain the suit on the corporation's behalf?78 There is a presump-
tion that the board of directors and the independent committee have
acted in good faith on behalf of the corporation. Therefore, courts have
been reluctant to overrule decisions of the board of directors based on
their business judgment unless the board or the committee fails to meet
the good faith criteria." The courts in both Maldonado I and Maher
determined that the board did not have the authority to terminate de-
mand excused derivative suits under the business judgment rule. 8
It is appropriate, in this context, to examine the business judgment
rule.
The Business Judgment Rule79
"It is well settled that the management of a corporation is en-
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 430 A.2d at 785.
77. Id. at 784.
78. 413 A.2d at 1257. 490 F. Supp. at 348.
79. The "business judgment" rule has been restated by.one author as:
A corporation transaction that involves no self-dealings by, or other per-
sonal interest of, the directors who authorized the transaction will not be
enjoined or set aside for the directors' failure to satisfy the standards that
govern a director's performance of his or her duties, and directors who
authorized the transaction will not be held personally liable for resultant
damages, unless:
(1) the directors did not exercise due care to ascertain the relevant
and available facts before voting to authorize the transaction; or
(2) the directors voted to authorize the transaction even though they
Nova Law Journal
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trusted to its board of directors, and that business judgments made by
the board are not subject to review unless they are made in bad
faith."80 This concept has evolved into the business judgment rule
which has provided legal practitioners and scholars fertile ground for
debating whether the rule provides a corporation's board of directors
with only a shield or with a sword as well."' If the business judgment
rule is only protective, it merely shields the board from liability arising
out of inefficient, albeit, good faith decisions. However, if the board has
the authority to initiate legal actions based on its business judgment,
the rule becomes a sword as well.
The business judgment rule presumes that a board of directors, in
good faith, considers the best interests of the corporation when reach-
ing management decisions.8 2 As the court in Zapata noted, the business
judgment rule was a judicial creation in Delaware "to give recognition
and deference to directors' business expertise when exercising their
managerial power under § 141(a)" of the Delaware Code.83
did not reasonably believe or could not have reasonably believed the trans-
action to be for the best interest of the corporation; or
(3) in some other way the directors' authorization of the transaction
was not in good faith.
Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 111 (1979).
80. 490 F. Supp. at 351.
81. Arsht, supra note 79; Steinberg, supra note 44; Comment, Novel Application
of the Business Judgment Rule: Independent Directors Are Permitted to Terminate
Derivative Actions Against Fellow Interested Directors, 11 CuM. L. REV. 389 (1980);
Legal Times of Washington, Jan. 19, 1981, at 33 (Analysis & Perspective); Johnson &
Osborne, The Role of the Business Judgment Rule in a Litigious Society, 15 VAL. L.
REV. 49 (1980); Note, supra note 61. See also Abbey v. Control Corp., 603 F.2d 724
(8th Cir. 1979); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d 173, 237 N.E.2d 76 (1968);
Zapata v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
82. HENN, supra note 42, at 483.
83. 430 A.2d at 782. The court noted the applicable text of DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 141(a) (1980) to be:
The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this
chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors,
except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of
incorporation. If any such provision is made in the certificate of incorpora-
tion, the powers and duties conferred or imposed upon the board of direc-
tors by this chapter shall be exercised or performed to such extent and by
such person or persons as shall be provided in the certificate of
incorporation.
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It follows that if the board of directors has the power to manage
the corporation84 and the authority to appoint an independent commit-
tee to act in its behalf,85 then when the committee makes its good faith
business decision regarding suit on behalf of the corporation, its deci-
sion as a business judgment should be honored by the courts.8"
Thus, the shield versus sword debate becomes particularly signifi-
cant in the context of shareholder derivative actions. In those instances
where demand is required prior to commencing the derivative suit,
courts have been reluctant to challenge board refusal to sue on the cor-
poration's behalf.8 7 As noted earlier, the shareholder's right to sue de-
rivatively terminates once demand has been made and properly re-
fused. 8 Here the board's decision is conspicuously sheltered by the
business judgment rule."
However, in those situations where demand is excused, a question
arises as to whether the board can compel dismissal of the derivative
suit. Initially, the court in Maldonado II said yes, and held "that the
Committee had the authority under the 'business judgment' rule, to re-
quire the termination of the derivative action." 90
The court in Zapata however, rejecting the logic of Maldonado II,
held the rule should not impede derivative actions where demand on
the board was excused.91
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado: The Balance Tips for the
Shareholder
The court in Zapata addressed a novel issue: whether an indepen-
dent committee, appointed by the board of directors, had the power to
compel dismissal of a shareholder derivative suit when no demand had
been made on the board to initiate an action.92 To answer this question,
Id.
84. 430 A.2d 786.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 779.
87. Id. at 784.
88. See text at 199, supra.
89. The rule applies to directors and officers alike. Arsht, supra note 81, at 111.
90. 430 A.2d at 781.
91. See generally 430 A.2d 779 and discussion in 202-07 infra.
92. In the major case of Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979), the Supreme
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the court examined, separately, three inherent components:
The continuing right of a stockholder to maintain a derivative suit;
the corporate power under Delaware law of an authorized board
committee to cause dismissal of litigation instituted for the benefit
of the corporation; and the role of the Court of Chancery [of Dela-
ware] in resolving conflicts between the stockholder and the
committee. 3
Ultimately the court focused "on the power to speak for the corpora-
tion as to whether the lawsuit should be continued or terminated. '94
The court stated that "disputes pertaining to control of the suit
arise in two contexts."' 5 These contexts are: first, where a stockholder
properly demands the board to initiate suit, the board refuses, and the
stockholder claims the board's decision was wrongful; and second,
where the stockholder initiates a derivative suit without first making a
demand because such demand would be futile.98
In determining whether the individual stockholder had an individ-
ual right to maintain the suit, the court firmly distinguished the de-
mand required from the demand excused circumstance evidenced in
Zapata.97
"[W]here demand is properly excused, the stockholder does pos-
sess the ability to initiate the action on his corporation's behalf."98 But,
while acknowledging the shareholder's right to initiate, the court noted
that this right did not necessarily translate into shareholder power to
exclusively control the corporation's "right throughout the litigation. ' 9
Court, in developing a two prong test to be applied to similar questions arising in share-
holder derivative actions, held that state law was determinative as to whether a com-
mittee has the power to compel dismissal of an action. See also Zolezzi, Director Good
Faith Marches On: A California Analysis of Director Termination of Shareholder
Derivative Suits Under Burks v. Lasker, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 519 (1980).
93. 430 A.2d at 782.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 784.
96. Id.
97. The court's discussion regarding "demand required" situations was dicta,
however, it will be very persuasive in future decisions.
98. 430 A.2d at 784.
99. Id. at 785.
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The court reasoned "that such an inflexible rule would recognize the
interest of one person or group to the exclusion of all others within the
corporate entity." 00 The court recognized that "[e]ven when demand is
excusable, circumstances may arise when continuation of the litigation
would not be in the corporation's best interests."' 0'1 Therefore, the court
reasoned that if there was not "a permissible procedure under § 141(a)
by which a corporation [could] rid itself of detrimental litigation . . . a
single stockholder in an extreme case might control the destiny of the
entire corporation."' 2
After acknowledging the dangers of allowing a sole stockholder to
control derivative litigation, the court addressed the question of
whether the independent committee had the authority to seek termina-
tion of the suit. The court in Zapata held that the power of the board
to appoint an independent committee to act in its stead is found in the
Delaware statutes.'0 3 Therefore, since the committee received its au-
thority from the board, the committee "would have the power to move
for dismissal or summary judgment if the entire board did."'' 0 4 The
court further noted that although a majority of Zapata's board mem-
bers were tainted by self-interest, this was not "a legal bar to the dele-
gation of board power to an independent committee composed of disin-
terested board members."' 0 5
The court held that in both demand required and demand excused
circumstances, the board retained power "to make decisions regarding
corporate litigation."'0 8O Thus, the committee had the authority to seek
termination of the suit.
While reaffirming the committee's legal power, the Zapata court
nevertheless usurped board power to defeat the derivative suit and ex-
pressly changed the game plans for suits in demand excused situations.
By its promulgation of new guidelines the Delaware Supreme Court
appears to have given minority shareholders a distinct advantage in
such suits.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. See applicable text of statute at note 83, supra.
103. 430 A.2d at 785.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 786.
106. Id.
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As currently outlined by the Zapata court, the requirements for
the corporation's pretrial motion to dismiss include submitting "a thor-
ough written record of the investigation and its findings and recommen-
dations. . . .Under appropriate court supervision, akin to proceedings
on summary judgment, each side should have an opportunity to make a
record on the motion."'107 The moving party, i.e., the corporation, then
will have the burden of showing "that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to dismiss as a
matter of law."' 10 8
The more important advantage Zapata gives shareholders is a
two-step test which Delaware courts will be required to apply to that
motion. In the first step, "the court should inquire into the indepen-
dence and good faith of the committee and the bases supporting [the
committee's] conclusions."' 10 9 The independence and good faith ele-
ments are totally consistent with prior criteria established for reviewing
the propriety of a corporation's decisions. However, requiring the court
to review the bases of the committee's decision creates a new dimension
of inquiry into the committee's good faith." 0
Prior to Zapata, the decisions of a board of directors, under the
business judgment rule, were given a presumption of good faith, inde-
pendence and reasonableness."' The burden to prove otherwise was on
the shareholder who brought suit. The Zapata court now places on the
board the burden of proving the existence of those elements. As the
court stated, "[t]he corporation should have the burden of proving in-
dependence, good faith and reasonableness.""' 2 The court noted that
"[its] approach [was] consistent with the Delaware approach to 'inter-
ested director' transactions, where -the directors, once the transaction is
attacked, have the burden of establishing its 'intrinsic fairness' to a
court's careful scrutiny."" 3
107. 430 A.2d at 788.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. The court may now question the reasoning for the decision of the board of
directors or its independent committee, not just whether the decision was reached inde-
pendently and in good faith. See 430 A.2d at 789.
111. 430 at A.2d at 782.
112. Id. at 788.
113. Id. at 788-89.
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The second step mandates "[the] trial court [to] determine, apply-
ing its own independent business judgment, whether the motion should
be granted. This means, of course, that instances could arise where a
committee can establish its independence and sound bases for its good
faith decisions and still have the corporation's motion denied." ' 14
' Two commentators, Elmer W. Johnson and Robert S. Osborne,'1 5
felt the decision reached by the lower court in Maldonado I was too
harsh in terms of its impact on "second tier"16 business judgment dis-
missals in cases alleging breach of fiduciary duty."'' 17
Johnson and Osborne suggested a middle ground; once the defen-
dant corporation establishes the independence of its special committee,
"business judgment rule dismissal of derivative claims should be made
available regardless of the nature of the underlying contract.", 8 But
the middle ground they sought was a far distance from the landing
place of Delaware's Supreme Court. The coirt went much further, by
permitting the trial court to actually supplant the committee's business
judgment with its own.
The Johnson and Osborne suggestions seem to accord with the the-
ory that power to manage the corporation, and control its litigation, is
vested in the directors. If the independence and good faith of the com-
mittee's decisions remain in question after review by the trial court, the
court may, appropriately, deny dismissal of the derivative suit.
Allowing the court to delve so deeply into the committee's decision
making process invites judicial overreaching. The court in Zapata ac-
knowledged the danger of such overreaching" - but determined the
trial court's "fresh view" into the matter was desirable to properly bal-
ance the various interests involved.120 The court specifically envisioned
circumstances in which a dismissal, based solely on the corporation's
114. Id. at 789.
115. Johnson & Osborne, supra note 81.
116. The authors refer to the first tier as the original business decision made by
the board which creates the controversy, and the second tier as that decision made by
the committee as to whether or not to sue for injuries resulting from the first decision.
Id. at 64-68.
117. Id. at 68.
118. Id.
119. 430 A.2d at 788.
120. Id.
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ability to show good faith and independence, "would simply prema-
turely terminate a stockholder grievance deserving of further considera-
tion in the corporation's interest. '121
The court's decision in Zapata clearly- limits the use of the busi-
ness judgment rule: the rule is, thus, merely. a shield in demand ex-
cused derivative suits.1 22 The board of directors, or its committee, may,
by motion, seek termination of suit if this accords with its business
judgment. The motion will be honored or denied at the court's
discretion.
Conclusion
There are compelling policy arguments for protecting the minority
shareholder's right to control a derivative suit when controversies arise
regarding a board of director's independence or good faith. Similarly,
there are strong reasons for protecting the rights of the board to direct
corporate litigation. The shareholder, as an owner of the corporation,
seeks to maximize his returns and maintain the prestige, goodwill, and
value of the corporation. The board shares those concerns, but is also
mindful of the need to maintain autonomy as sole decision-maker of
the corporation. Because there are often factors considered in business
decisions which may not directly translate into dollars and cents, the
board of directors should have the flexibility to make those decisions in
good faith. Directors should not have the added pressure of finding the
court in its board room.
The Supreme Court of Delaware, in Zapata, was mindful of the
need to carefully balance the interests of the stockholder and the board
of directors. The "middle ground" the court struck may ultimately
prove to be a fair compromise. However, on its surface the decision in
Zapata creates cause for concern of possible judicial overreaching in
demand excused situations. It is conceivable that.the courts, in follow-
121. Id. at 789.
122. The procedures under "demand required" situations in essence remain un-
changed. The board still has the power to refuse to sue when demand is required. Id. at
785. In fact the court buttressed the sanctity of the board's "business judgment" in
those instances where: 1) demand is required, 2) demand is made, and 3) the board, in
good faith, reaches a decision not to sue. In those situations the court indicated share-
holders will not have standing to sue. Id. at 784.
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ing Zapata, will show little reluctance to carry their own business judg-
ment into demand required situations as well. By attempting to clarify
the various interpretations surrounding application of the business
judgment rule in derivative actions, the Zapata court may have pro-
vided Delaware courts with skeleton keys to all of Delaware's board
rooms.
Kenneth A. Rubin
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